UNIVERSITY  OF 
ILLINOIS  LIFRARY 
AT  URBANA-CMAMPA1GN 
OAK  STREET 

LIBRARY  FACILITY 


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4 


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This  Small  volume 

is 

Respectfully  Dedicated  to 
Those  Citizens  of  the  United  States 
Who  believe  in  the  doctrine 
of  THE 

Americas  for  the  Americans, 

BY  THE  AUTHOR. 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 
AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


CHAPTER  I. 

INTRODUCTORY. 

It  will  be  observed  that  throughout  this  entire  treatise 
the  author  has  endeavored  to  “brief5  the  financial  prob¬ 
lem  in  such  a  way  as  to  present,  with  all  the  clearness  and 
force  of  which  he  is  capable,  the  subject  in  consecutive 
sections  so  as  to  lead  to  a  clear  understanding  of  its 
merits  and  limitations,  without  attempting  to  enter  into 
a  discussion  of  its  details. 

The  author  has  persistently  sacrificed  grace  of  style  for 
lucidity  of  expression  in  order  to  instruct  rather  than  to 
entertain  the  student  of  the  monetary  problem ;  his  apol¬ 
ogy  for  giving  .this  small  volume  to  the  American  people 
is  his  conviction  that  they  deserved  to  have  the  question 
clearly  and  dispassionately  presented  to  them,  so  that 
they  may  the  more  wisely  pass  judgment  upon  it  at  the 
polls. 

The  chief  object  and  concern  and  purpose  of  the  au¬ 
thor  has  been  to  give  to  the  conservative  elements  of  both 
the  silver  and  the  so-called  “sound  money”  wings  of  the 
American  people  a  policy,  that  they  can  adopt  and  enforce, 
without  compromising  the  principles  of  either  faction, 
but  obtaining  in  a  different  form  than  what  they  demand 
the  substance  of  what  each  faction  requires. 

Before  mentioning  the  nature  of  this  policy,  it  is  per¬ 
haps  expedient  to  first  explain  the  attitudes  of  the  differ¬ 
ent  parties  and  factions  to  this  question. 

The  two  old  parties,  the  Republican  and  Democratic 
parties,  are  about  evenly  divided  into  silver  and  gold 
wings.  The  gold  wings  of  both  these  parties  are  in  reality 
for  the  single  gold  standard,  though  to  delude  the  people, 
they  claim  to  be  for  “sound  money,”  the  “honest  dollar” 
and  other  catch  expressions. 


6 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


The  gold  wing  of  the  Republican  party  wish  the  stand¬ 
ard  to  be  gold  alone,  and  all  paper  money  to  be  issued 
exclusively  by  the  National  banks,  thus  giving  into  the 
hands  of  Wall  Street  not  only  all  the  redemption  money, 
•  gold,  which  they  already  own  and  control,  but  also  all 
paper  money  redeemable  in  gold,  thus  enabling  consoli¬ 
dated  capital  to  so  manipulate  the  volume  of  money  that 
they  can  at  their  sovereign  pleasure  and  to  their  private 
profit  make  money  scarce  and  property  low,  money  plen¬ 
tiful  and  property  high.  The  monetary  system  they  pro¬ 
pose  is  one  based  upon  the  bonded  indebtedness  of  the 
National  Government,  increasing  the  burdens  of  the  peo¬ 
ple  while  commensurately  augmenting  the  profits  of  the 
few. 

The  gold  wing  of  the  Democratic  Party  propose  also 
to  establish  the  single  gold  standard,  but  instead  of  the 
National  Bank  System  insist  on  allowing  private  or  State 
banks  to  issue  money  on  any  kind  of  security,  to  swindle 
the  people  by  any  kind  of  method  imaginable. 

The  silver  wings  of  both  parties  demand  the  restora¬ 
tion  of  the  bimetallic  standard,  giving  the  people  the 
money  .the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  guarantees 
them  as  their  right,  and  of  which  they  can  not  be  Con¬ 
stitutionally  deprived  without  its  being  changed  as  pro¬ 
vided.  The  Constitution  declares  both  gold  and  silver 
to  be  money,  and  the  people  are  determined  to  have 
their  rights  restored. 

Another  faction  pretends  to  expect  that  an  international 
agreement  may  be  reached  that  will  remonetize  silver; 
they  expect  that  Great  Britain,  who  is  waxing  fat  at  the 
expense  of  other  nations  as  the  result  of  gold  monometal¬ 
lism,  will  voluntarily  surrender  that  advantage. 

It  runs  counter  to  the  convictions  and  sentiments  of 
the  American  people,  that  this,  the  greatest  and  most 
powerful  nation  on  earth,  must  ask  the  permission  of  its 
financial  and  commercial  enemy  to  be  allowed  to  resume 
its  Constitutional  monetary  system;  that  we  have  to  ask 
any  Nation’s  permission  and  consent  to  do  anything  we 
have  the  National  right  to  do;  that  we  must  beg  other 
countries  to  let  us  regulate  our  internal  affairs. 

The  charge  is  made  that  the  “silver  cranks  of  the  West” 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


7 


want  to  run  the  Government.  Who  are  they?  Ameri¬ 
can  citizens  as  staunch  and  true  to  our  interests  and  to 
the  flag  as  any  class  in  our  Republic.  The  financial  pol¬ 
icy  of  our  Government  has  been  against  the  rights,  in¬ 
terests,  and  desires  of  more  than  half  of  our  people  since 
1873.  In  accordance  withi  whose  financial  policy  have  our 
affairs  been  conducted  during  that  period?  Undeniably 
that  of  Great  Britain.  Why  should  Great  Britain  have 
more  voice  in  our  Government  than  our  own  citizens  are 
allowed  to  exercise? 

Something  must  be  done,  and  done  quickly;  but  the 
factions  now  control,  and  will  in  all  probability  long  con¬ 
trol  the  Government,  preventing  either  the  gold  or  silver 
wings  of  the  parties  from  getting  what  they  demand. 
They  must  apparently  agree  upon  some  compromise  if 
they  get  anything  at  all;  to  do  nothing  at  all,  resembles 
too  closely  the  policy  that  the  only  British  Administration 
we  ever  had  at  Washington  has  been  enforcing  for  the 
past  three  years,  to  be  popular.  The  people  demand  re¬ 
lief,  and  they  must  get  it. 

The  coinage  of  the  American  silver  product  will  not 
suffice;  the  difference  between  the  bullion  and  coin  value 
of  silver  in  other  lands  than  our  own  would  give  the  gold 
advocates  an  opportunity  to  claim  that  its  value  in  this 
country  is  artificial,  and  clamor  for  its  repeal.  The  coin¬ 
age  of  American  silver  would,  by  increasing  the  volume 
of  money  in  this  country,  increase  the  cost  and  price  of 
our  exports,  while  the  price  of  foreign  competing  articles 
would  not  be  raised,  increasing  the  present  difference, 
thus  boxing  our  fabrics  so  effectually  in  our  home  mar¬ 
ket  that  they  can  never  get  out.  That  is  a  compromise 
the  silver  men  should  never  consent  to. 

The  people  are  completely  at  sea  as  to  what  policy  to 
pursue  in  order  to  get  what  they  want,  to  get  their  Con¬ 
stitutional  rights,  and  the  leaders  are  incompetent  to  guide 
them.  Never  in  the  history  of  the  Republic  has  there  been 
so  much  cowardice  displayed  as  by  the  so-called  States¬ 
men  of  to-day,  men  who  are  absolutely  afraid  of  nothing, 
so  much  as  their  own  convictions,  if  they  possess  any. 
They  tell  us  they  want  “honest  money,”  so  do  the  people; 
they  tell  us  that  they  propose  to  remonetize  silver;  how? 


8 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


Nobody  knows,  and  least  of  all  they.  Jack  wanting  his 
supper  was  no  problem,  for  there  was  no  doubt  that  he 
wanted  it,  and  wanted  it  bad,  but  the  all  momentous  prob¬ 
lem  to  him  was  how  he  was  going  to  get  it.  The  people 
of  the  United  States  have  the  right  to  know  what  the' 
views  and  policies  of  aspirants  for  office,  and  especially 
the  Presidency,  are,  upon  the  issues  of  the  day.  Let  them 
boldly,  manfully  say  where  they  stand,  what  they  are 
for,  and  what  they  propose  to  do,  and  how  they  expect  to 
do  it.  Statesmen  who  have  no  opinion  and  no  policy 
are  unfit  to  lead;  those  who  are  too  cowardly  to  express 
the  convictions  they  do  possess  are  unworthy  of  sup¬ 
port. 

Such  politicians,  for  they  can  not  be  classed  as  States¬ 
men,  are  the  products  of  King  Caucus  and  Conventions, 
two  of  the  worst  enemies  the  people  have  to-day,  by 
which  a  few  “ringsters,”  a  few  “wire  pullers,”  a  few  polit¬ 
ical  manipulators  defeat  popular  demands,  dictate  plat¬ 
forms  and  nominate  candidates.  No  political  system 
was  ever  more  despotic,  more  monarchical  in  character 
and  effect  than  the  system  of  “boss  rule”  that  prevails  to¬ 
day  in  the  American  Republic.  Men  secure  office  not  by 
reason  of  their  merit  and  fitness  for  it,  but  as  the  result  of 
truckling  as  henchmen  to  the  “bosses.”  Congressmen  and 
Governors,  and  all  other  officeholders  are  no  sooner  elected 
than  they  at  once  start  to  do  one  or  two  things,  either  to 
keep  the  job  they  have  got,  or  get  another  and  better 
one;  they  do  everything,  but  do  their  duty  to  the  people. 

The  most  popular,  most  idolized  politician  and  States¬ 
man  of  the  future  will  be  the  man  who  not  only  has  opin¬ 
ions  on  public  issues,  but  has  got  the  courage  to  fear¬ 
lessly  express  them,  regardless  of  the  votes  it  may  make 
or  cost  him.  He  would  be  such  a  novelty,  such  a  con¬ 
trast  to  the  sea  of  pretense,  cowardice  and  hypocrisy,  that 
now  universally  prevails,  that  the  people  would  refresh¬ 
ingly  turn  to  'him  and  acclaim  him  their  chosen  leader. 

The  policy  proposed  by  the  Author  for  the  solution  of 
the  monetary  problem  gives  the  KEY  to  Independent 
American  Bimetallism.  This  policy  is  for  Congress  to 
enact  a  law  requiring  the  unlimited  free  coinage  of  silver 
as  soon  as  the  silver  in  a  dollar  is  worth  ioo  cents  in  the 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


9 


open  market.  This  policy  while  it  would  obtain  all  that 
the  silver  men  demand,  will  assure  to  the  ‘‘sound  money'’ 
men  an  “honest  dollar”  worth  its  face  value.  Nearly  all 
the  silver  in  the  world  is  produced  in  the  United  States, 
Mexico  and  Peru.  The  action  of  the  silver  miners  of 
these  countries  will  be  directed  to  withholding  their  silver 
from  the  market  in  order  to  force  its  value  up  to  ioo 
cents  on  the  dollar,  or  $1.29  an  ounce;  they  will  “bull” 
the  market  by  lessening  the  visible  supply,  that  is,  the 
purchasable  supply.  Another  powerful  factor,  here,  will 
assist  the  rise  in  the  value  of  'silver;  the  speculators,  seek¬ 
ing  to  gain  a  profit  on  -silver  before  it  reaches  $1.29  an 
ounce,  will  buy,  and  the  more  they  bid  for  it,  the  higher 
it  will  climb  until  it  reaches  that  figure.  The  action  of 
the  speculators  will  increase  the  demand  for  silver  at  the 
very  moment  that  the  miners  are  diminishing  the  pur¬ 
chasable  supply;  its  value  would  be  bound  to  go  up,  or 
violate  all  the  laws  of  economy.  There  would  be  all 
“bulls”  on  the  market  and  no  “bears.”  And  after  the 
silver  miners  obtain  a  permanent  market  for  their  bullion 
?t  the  value  of  $1.29  an  ounce;  after  they  get  free,  un¬ 
limited  coinage  they  will  keep  its  value  at  that  figure.  It 
requires  no  concerted  action  or  organization  to  induce 
men  to  avoid  danger  or  to  seek  a  profit.  If  the  silver 
miners  knew  that  they  could  get  their  silver  coined  free 
at  the  rate  of  $1.29  an  ounce,  the  moment  it  becomes 
worth  that  value,  they  will  “bull”  it  until  it  reaches  that 
figure,  and  when  it  gets  there,  they  will  keep  it  there. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  country  and  the  world  has  the 
fiat  of  law  that  no  silver  dollars  will  be  coined  until  worth 
100  cents,  until  they  become  “honest  money.”  The  result 
would  be  that  the  country  will  enjoy  a  much  needed  finan¬ 
cial  rest,  commerce  will  not  be  disturbed  by  any  possible 
change  in  the  purchasing  power  of  money,  below  100 
cents;  no  money  will  be  frightened  out  of  the  country, 
nor  will  any  remain  away  to  avoid  the  “contamination  of 
depreciated  money.”  The  consequence  will  be  that 
money  now  in  hiding  will  be  invested  in  productive  en¬ 
terprises.  This  policy  is  the  KEY,  not  only  of  the  mone¬ 
tary  problem,  but  also  of  the  political  situation;  it  is  the 
KEY  that  unlocks  legislative  complications. 


10 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


Politically  this  policy  affords  a  great  strategic  advan¬ 
tage  to  the  Republican  Party,  if  it  adopts  it  as  its  financial 
platform  at  St.  Louis,  and  nominates  a  Candidate  for  the 
Presidency  who  will  enforce  such  a  law.  The  Candidate 
and  the  Party  can  promise  the  South  and  West  that  sil¬ 
ver  will  be  admitted  to  unlimited  free  coinage  the  moment 
that  the  silver  in  a  dollar  becomes  worth  ioo  cents;  to 
the  North  and  the  East  can  be  given  the  assurance  that 
“honest  money”  will  be  guaranteed,  for  no  silver  will  be 
coined  until  it  is  worth  its  face  value  in  the  market.  This 
policy  is  no  straddle,  it  is  untainted  by  dishonor,  it  will 
be  a  pledge  that  can  and  will  be  redeemed,  it  is  a  policy 
that  will  give  all  parties,  all  sections,  all  States,  in  fact  the 
whole  Nation,  the  monetary  system  demanded 

It  is  a  policy  that  the  silver  Senate  and  a  “sound  money” 
House  can  and  will  enact  into  law;  it  is  a  policy  that  no 
President  be  he  for  silver  or  for  “sound  money”  would 
dare  to  veto.  It  is  a  policy  that  will  catch  silver  men  or 
gold  men  coming  and  will  catch  them  going;  if  they  are 
for  free  coinage,  they  get  it  when  the  dollar  is  worth  ioo 
cents;  if  they  are  for  “sound  money”  they  get  it,  for  no 
silver  will  be  coined  until  actually  worth  its  face  value. 
It  is  a  policy  that  cannot  be  beaten  at  the  polls,  or  in  the 
Halls  of  Congress. 

Does  not  this  policy  give  the  silver  men,  who  are  in  a 
minority  at  the  St.  Louis  Convention  on  the  independent 
16  to  i  proposition  which  the  party  cannot  be  persuaded 
or  coerced  into  adopting  as  its  financial  plank,  their  op¬ 
portunity  to  advocate  and  demand  so  equitable  and  rea¬ 
sonable  a  plank,  as  is  the  plank  to  coin  silver  free  in  un¬ 
limited  quantities  at  the  ratio  of-i6  to  i,  independent  of  the 
action  of  other  nations,  as  soon  as  the  silver  in  a  dollar 
is  worth  ioo  cents?  Should  any  combination  resist  and 
defeat  that  just  demand,  that  fair,  honorable,  safe  and 
certain  method  of  remonetizing  silver  and  restoring  bi¬ 
metallism  would  not  the  advocates  of  silver  construe  such 
action  as  an  indication  and  proof  that  the  dominant  fac¬ 
tion  in  the  party  Was  hostile  to  the  use  of  silver  on  any 
terms?  And  might  not  the  silver  men,  considering  that 
their  interests  have  been  ruthlessly  trampled  upon,  and 
their  equitable  demands  rejected,  have  recourse  to  the 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


11 


country;  might  not  they  form  another  party,  and  appeal 
to  the  people  to  thus  restore  our  Constitutional  Bimetallic 
System.  Should  not  this  danger  be  considered,  this  pos¬ 
sible  defection  be  reckoned  with? 

Republican  success,  next  November,  appears  certain; 
the  only  factor  that  can  probably  defeat  it  would  be  an  un¬ 
satisfactory  financial  plank  in  its  platform,  but  if  the 
Party  adopted  this  policy,  nothing  could  beat  it,  for,  since 
all  interests  would  be  benefited,  all  will  support  it.  The 
success  of  the  Republican  Party  being  thus  assured  if  it 
adopted  the  plank,  coin  silver  free  as  soon  as  the  silver 
in  a  dollar  is  worth  ioo  cents,  any  legislation  to  which  it 
committed  itself,  if  victorious,  would  have  at  once  the 
effect  of  law.  If  the  Party  committed  itself  to  that  finan¬ 
cial  legislation,  its  effect  on  the  value  of  silver  would  be 
apparent  at  once,  before  the  Party  actually  gains  power, 
before  the  next  Administration  goes  into  office  silver  would 
be  remonetized  and  bimetallism  restored  not  next  year 
or  the  year  after,  but  now,  this  year.  It  would  be  more 
beneficial  to  the  country  if  the  Republican  Party  adopted 
this  platform,  than  if  adopted  by  some  other  party  having 
less  certainty  of  success  Let  the  voters  remember  that 
if  the  Republican  Party  advocated  this  policy,  that  the 
financial  legislation  will  be  known  before  the  election  is 
held,  and  the  country  will  have  the  rest  that  certainty 
will  give.  Let  the  farmers  and  the  laborers  consider  the 
fact,  that  if  the  Republican  Party  adopts  that  platform, 
that  the  instant  rise  in  the  value  of  silver  from  about  60 
cents  to  $1.29  an  ounce,  will  be  accompanied,  as  it  always 
has  been  accompanied,  by  a  proportionate  rise  in  the  price 
of  wheat,  corn,  cotton,  all  products  of  the  farm  and  factory, 
and  that  wages  will  also  rise  correspondingly  to  the  in¬ 
creased  demand  for  labor  that  a  rise  in  the  value  of  prop¬ 
erty  will  create. 

The  Republican  Party  should  not  reject  this  policy, 
equitable  to  all  factions  and  States,  which  would  render 
certain  its  triumph  at  the  polls  in  November,  for  if  re¬ 
jected  might  not  its  opponents  find  therein  a  chance  to 
form  a  new  party,  adopt  this  policy  as  its  battle  cry, 
and  carry  the  day  by  that  appeal  to  justice  and  the  Con¬ 
stitution?  The  Republican  Party  should  not  deceive  itself, 


12 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


it  cannot  gain  power  on  ANY  KIND  of  a  platform,  or 
if  it  does  it  will  be  unable  to  retain  it,  for  when  confidence 
in  its  justice  and  wisdom  ceases,  its  power  is  shattered. 
This  question  must  be  settled  in  a  way  .satisfactory  to  all 
interests  and  to  all  parts  of  this,  our  common  country. 
The  tariff  is  no  longer  an  issue,  the  Nation  is  for  Protec¬ 
tion.  The  conservatism  of  the  McKinley  Tariff  has  been 
recognized,  but  even  its  distinguished  Author  will  not 
claim  that  it  will  settle  the  money  problem.  It  is  a  step 
in  the  right  direction,  but  no  measure  short  of  a  measure 
that  will  raise  the  value  of  silver  to  $1.29  an  ounce;  that 
will  resultantly  raise  the  price  of  Indian  wheat,  thereby 
lessening  its  drastic  competition  with  American  wheat; 
that  it  will  retard  the  development  of  these  silver  coun¬ 
tries,  whose  manufacturers,  even  now  in  their  infancy, 
threaten  our  Home  Market,  will  prove  a  satisfactory  so¬ 
lution  of  the  question.  This,  Protection  alone,  cannot  do. 

The  policy  this  Author  proposes  by  which  the  Constitu¬ 
tional  Bimetallic  System  can  be  restored  in  a  Constitutional 
manner,  is  the  Constitutional  Policy;  it  will  also  restore  to  the 
people  of  this  Nation  their  Constitutional  money  of  which 
they  have  been  Unconstitutionally  deprived.  This  Constitu¬ 
tional  Policy  will  restore  Bimetallism  peacefully,  surely, 
yet  swiftly ;  it  will  expand  the  volume  of  our  money  from  a 
scanty  to  an  adequate  volume;  it  will  raise  prices  and 
wages  from  a  lower  to  a  higher  level,  maintaining  at  the 
same  time  the  intended  purchasing  power  of  our  dollars. 
If  the  Republican  Party  expects  to  retain  the  confidence 
and  support  of  the  people,  it  must  if  installed  in  office 
again,  legislate  for  the  people;  it  must  awaken  their  en¬ 
thusiasm  by  appealing  to  their  patriotism;  it  must  fire  the 
National  heart  by  advocating  and  enforcing  a  Constitu¬ 
tional  Policy  that  will  maintain  the  dignity  and  the  free¬ 
dom  of  the  American  Republic;  it  must  restore  our  Bi¬ 
metallic  System  without  subjecting  our  people  to  the  hu¬ 
miliation  of  waiting  for  other  nations  to  help  us;  it  must 
demonstrate  our  independence  by  remonetizing  silver 
by  our  own  collossal  might,  and  force  the  Continent  of 
Europe  to  recognize  it  as  money.  The  Republican  Party 
must  oonvince  the  nations  of  the  earth  that  by  this  Con¬ 
stitutional  Policy  the  United  States  of  America  has  the 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


13 


KEY  to  Independent  American  Bimetallism;  that  our 
Nation  can  make  its  own  money,  do  its  own  work,  carry 
its  own  freight,  and  by  making  all  legislation,  Protec¬ 
tion,  Reciprocity,  the  creation  of  a  great  Merchant  Marine 
and  Navy,  the  construction  of  the  Nicaragua  Canal  and 
other  gigantic  Internal  Improvements  bend  to  the  up¬ 
building  of  the  Nation,  so  that  by  its  industrial,  commer¬ 
cial  and  financial  development  and  aggrandizement  the 
Olney  Doctrine  may  be  realized,  “THAT  THE  FIAT 
OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  ON  TPIE  WESTERN 
CONTINENT  IS  LAW/’ 

THE  ST.  LOUIS  CONVENTION  SHOULD 
ADOPT  THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  POLICY. 

March  13th,  1896,  .  JOHN  I.  JACOB. 

Suite  904  Atwood  Building,  Chicago. 


14 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


# 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE  LAW  OF  SUPPLY  AND  DEMAND. 

“The  supply  and  demand  of  money  determine  its  value, 
and  the  amount  of  money  in  circulation  determines  the  price 
of  commodities.  If  a  country  has  more  money  than  the  nor¬ 
mal  demand  for  it,  prices  will  rise,  or  in  otl^er  words,  the 
money  depreciates,  and  if  a  country  has  not  enough  money 
to  meet  the  demand,  prices  fall,  or  money  appreciates.  Thus 
we  have  the  means  of  determining  whether  a  country  has 
money  enough  or  not.”— Senator  Henry  M.  Teller  of  Colorado. 

The  supply  and  demand  for  money  should  always 
balance,  otherwise  its  value  will  inevitably  depreciate, 
or  appreciate  whenever  its  supply  exceeds,  or  is  less  than 
the  demand  for  it.  History  shows  that  the  supply  of 
metallic  money,  gold  and  silver,  is  limited;  that  its  over- 
supply  is  all  but  impossible,  and  that  instead  its  frequent, 
nearly  constant  scarcity,  is  the  chief  danger  to  be  seri¬ 
ously  apprehended.  A  surplus  production  of  products 
frequently  occurs,  for  the  reason  that  the  demand  for 
products  is  necessarily  limited,  but  an  overproduction 
of  money  is  practically  impossible,  because  the  demand 
for  it  is  unlimited;  the  more  money  a  man  gets,  the 
more  he  wants,  because  the  more  he  needs.  The  demand 
for  money  is  continually  increasing,  while  the  supply  of 
it  is  constantly  insufficient,  therefore  its  purchasing  power 
is  always  fluctuating. 

A  fall  in  the  value  of  money,  accompanied  by  a  corre¬ 
sponding  rise  in  the  price  of  commodities,  does  not 
demonstrate  that  the  money  is  unsound,  that  it  is  cheap, 
for  before  that  fact  can  be  established,  it  must  first  be 
proven  that  the  price  prior  to  its  rise  was  a  fair  price, 
that  labor  was  then  receiving  honest  wages,  and  that 
the  price  of  products  yielded  to  the  producer  a  reason¬ 
able  profit. 

If  the  wages  labor  got  and  the  price  producers  ob¬ 
tained  before  the  volume  of  money  was  enlarged  was 
too  low,  if  wages  and  prices  did  not  afford  the  laborer 
and  the  producer  a  decent,  satisfactory  livelihood,  then 
the  money  is  not  cheap,  nor  the  prices  inflated. 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


15 


When  money  falls  in  value  and  property  rises,  enter¬ 
prise  is  stimulated,  because  the  depreciating  form  of 
wealth,  money,  is  exchanged  for  the  appreciating  form 
of  wealth,  property,  which,  in  such  case  must  be  created 
by  labor.  When  property  falls  and  money  rises  in  value, 
hoarding  is  encouraged,  for  money  then  earns  a  profit 
by  idleness. 

If  the  purchasing  power  of  money  is  to  remain  sta¬ 
tionary,  as  it  should,  the  supply  of  it  must  correspond¬ 
ingly  increase  with  the  demand  for  it.  Let  ioo  represent 
the  demand  for  money,  and  ioo  also  represent  the  sup¬ 
ply,  then  the  purchasing  power  of  a  dollar  is  precisely 
ioo  cents,  or  normal.  Should  the  demand  for  money 
increase  from  ioo  to  200,  the  supply  remaining  100,  the 
purchasing  power  of  such  money  would  be  200,  or 
doubled,  a  dollar  would  purchase  200  cents  worth  of 
labor,  or  of  products.  If,  however,  the  supply  was  in¬ 
creased  from  100  to  200,  the  demand  remaining  the  same, 
or  100,  the  purchasing  power  would  be  diminished  by 
one-half;  one  dollar  would  buy  only  50  cents  worth  of 
labor,  or  of  products.  Any  increase  in  the  demand  for 
money  should  be  accompanied  by  a  corresponding  in¬ 
crease  in  the  supply,  else  the  purchasing  power  of  money 
will  fluctuate.  The  supply  and  demand  must  always 
balance.  Eventually,  primary  redemption,  or  real 
money  alone  fixes  values.  Credit  money  may  tempora¬ 
rily  enhance  prices,  but  when  such  promises  to  pay  are 
redeemed,  when  measured  in  real  money,  all  values  and 
prices  shrink. 

In  1873  the  total  supply  of  metallic  money,  gold  and 
silver,  was  8  billion  dollars.  Let  it  be  assumed  that 
the  purchasing  power  of  every  dollar  was  precisely  100 
cents  worth  of  produce.  As  8  billion  dollars  constituted 
the  entire  stock  of  money  by  which  all  values  were  meas- 
rude,  therefore  8  billion  dollars  would  buy  the  entire 
world.  The  demonetization  of  silver  destroyed  one-half 
of  the  supply  of  actual  money.  The  remaining  4  billions 
of  dollars  of  gold  then  and  now  values  the  product  and 
can  buy  the  whole  world.  A  dollar  now  buys  200  cents 
worth  of  produce,  or  twice  as  much  as  it  was  intended, 
by  the  Constitution,  to  buy.  Still  further  reduce  the 


16 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


supply  of  money  to  a  i,oooth  part  of  the  present  sup¬ 
ply,  or  to  4  million  dollars,  which  would  constitute  the 
entire  supply  of  money,  measuring  as  it  must  all  values, 
and  could  on  demand  buy  the  whole  world.  One  single 
dollar,  simply  because  of  its  scarcity,  would  purchase 
$2,000  worth  of  labor  or  of  labor’s  products,  and  those 
who  would  own  or  control  those  4  million  dollars  could 
own  and  control  the  world  and  the  human  race.  If  at 
that  stage,  it  was  proposed  to  increase  the  supply  of 
money  from  4  million  to  4  billion  dollars,  the  present 
supply,  some  Shylock  of  Greed  who  now  contends  that 
the  present  dollar  that  only  buys  200  cents  worth  of  prod¬ 
ucts  is  the  only  honest  dollar,  would  then  arise  and  de¬ 
nounce  the  proposed  dollars  as  dishonest;  he  would  con¬ 
tend  as  plausibly  as  he  does  now,  that  to  increase  the 
supply  of  money  would  cheapen  it;  that  it  would  debase 
it;  that  it  would  involve  repudiation;  that  it  would  inflate 
values;  he  would  contend  that  a  dollar  should  continue 
to  buy  $2,000  worth  of  products  instead  of  only  $2  worth 
as  it  now  does,  or  100  cents  worth,  as  it  did  prior  to 
the  demonetization  of  silver  in  1873.  This  “honest 
money”  man  would  argue  that  the  $2,000  dollar  was  the 
only  genuine  honest  dollar,  and  if  it  was  made  to  buy 
only  100  cents  worth,  as  intended  by  the  founders  of 
the  Republic,  that  it  would  produce  a  terrific  calamity 
Money  possesses  no  intrinsic  value  whatever;  that  is, 
a  value  that  never  changes,  no  matter  what  changes  have 
been  made  in  the  supply  and  the  demand  of  money.  Were 
diamonds' as  plentiful  as  pebbles,  aside  from  their  bril¬ 
liancy,  they  would  have  no  greater  value,  for  value 
is  not  a  fixity,  but  a  relation  between  the  supply  and 
the  demand.  It  is  not  the  cost  of  producing  money,  but 
the  ease  or  difficulty  of  obtaining  it  after  it  has  been 
produced,  that  determines  its  value.  Paper  money,  if 
made  legal  tender  for  all  debts  and  dues,  would  buy  as 
much  as  gold  if  it  were  as  scarce.  Scarce  money,  even 
though  made  of  paper,  bearing  the  stamp  of  the  govern¬ 
ment  and  received  by  it  for  all  dues,  would  buy  more 
than  plentiful  gold,  for  the  law  of  supply  and  demand 
govern  s0 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


17 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE  TRUE  CAUSE  OF  THE  PERIODICITY  OF  PANICS. 

It  is  popularly  believed  that  periods  of  depression, 
known  as  panics,  are  inherent  in  our  industrial  system. 
Many  seek  to  trace  the  cause  to  the  inequitable  distribu¬ 
tion  of  wealth;  others  appear  to  fancy  that  the  existing 
method  of  production,  the  wage  system  is  accountable. 
The  true  cause  must  be  found  in  a  fluctuating,  insufficient 
and  uncontrollable  volume  of  metallic  money,  which  is 
a  most  potent  factor  and  cause  of  the  inequitable  distri¬ 
bution  of  wealth.  The  demand  for  money  is  always  con¬ 
stant,  always  unlimited,  the  greater  the  supply  of  it,  the 
more  the  demand  for  it  expands. 

It  is  estimated  that  the  average  annual  increase  in  the 
demand  for  money  in  the  United  States  is  $70,000,000, 
and  if  the  purchasing  power  of  our  circulating  medium 
be  maintained  at  its  designed  power,  100  cents  worth  01 
products  for  a  dollar,  the  supply  must  be  increased  $70,- 
000,000  a  year. 

The  supply  of  money  of  the  metallic  character  is  pre¬ 
carious,  unreliable,  dependent  upon  accident,  upon  dis- 
coverv,  upon  what  can  neither  be  predicted  nor  con¬ 
trolled.  The  supply  of  metallic  money  is  utterly  insufficient 
to  meet  current  or  increasing  needs.  It  is  estimated 
that  about  one-half  of  the  silver  and  gold  mined  is 
used  in  the  arts,  leaving  the  remaining  50  per  cent,  to 
restore  the  loss  coins  have  sustained  in  weight  by  abra¬ 
sion,  and  to  increase  the  supply  of  money  to  meet  grow¬ 
ing  demands  for  its  use.  There  is  no  scientific  method 
of  increasing  and  controlling  the  supply  of  metallic 
money  to  meet  the  requirements  of  a  constantly  increas¬ 
ing  demand  for  it.  Just  so  long  as  the  metallic  money 
system  is  adhered  to,  just  so  long  will  we  have  an  un¬ 
stable,  unscientific  and  insufficient  supply  .of  money; 
just  so  long  will  the  prices  of  products  and  the  value 
of  property  dependent  upon  this  unsteady  medium  of 
exchange  be  subjected  to  fluctuation. 

Periods  of  depression,  panics,  are  born  naturally  and 
inevitably  of  periods  of  prosperity,  when  the  increased 
demand  for  products  advances  their  price.  Increased 


18 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


business  requires  an  increased  supply  of  money,  which, 
if  not  provided,  the  full  benefits  of  such  periods  of  pros¬ 
perity  are  not  enjoyed,  for  the  reason  that  if  the  pre¬ 
existing  supply  of  money  is  not  so  increased  its  purchas¬ 
ing  power  is  enhanced,  and  the  selling  price  of  com¬ 
modities  commensurately  reduced,  which  entails  a  loss 
on  the  producer,  who,  having  paid  wages  to  his  labor 
when  the  supply  of  money  compared  with  the  demand 
for  it  was  more  plentiful,  is  compelled  to  sell  his  prod¬ 
ucts  below  cost.  The  beneficial  results  of  such  periods 
of  prosperity,  which  would  be  fully  enjoyed  if  the  supply 
of  money  was  proportionately  augmented,  are  thus  neces¬ 
sarily  diminished  to  like  extent,  for  the  rising  price  of 
products  resulting  from  an  expanding  volume  of  money 
would  yield  a  profit  which  would  encourage  production 
and  advance  wages.  Thus  enlarged  prosperity  under 
the  metallic  monetary  system  inevitably  generates  suc¬ 
ceeding  periods  of  depression. 

In  periods  of  depressed  trade,  the  diminished  demand 
for  commodities  reduces  their  prices.  This  tendency  of 
the  value  of  property  to  fall  in  value  during  such  periods 
is  partially  resisted  and  counteracted  by  the  influence  of 
money  thrown  out  of  employment  by  the  lessened  de¬ 
mand  for  its  use  in  trade,  to  effectively  increase  the  sup¬ 
ply  of  money,  thereby  enhancing  prices  and  steadying 
values.  It  is  therefore  self-evident  that  periods  of  pros¬ 
perity  and  depression  alternate,  the  latter  being  caused 
by  the  former,  and  the  latter  preparing  the  way  by 
slightly  rising  prices  produced  by  the  volume  of  idle 
capital  to  encourage  industry,  for  the  succeeding  period 
of  prosperity. 

The  remedy  for  the  periodical  panics  is  equally  mani¬ 
fest;  the  demand  and  supply  of  money  must  always  bal¬ 
ance,  in  order  to  secure  a  medium  of  exchange,  whose 
purchasing  power  will  remain  unfluctuating.  As  this 
evil  is  inherent  in  and  inseparable  from  a  metallic  mone¬ 
tary  system,  it  must  be  supplanted  entirely,  or  supple¬ 
mented  by  a  legal  tender  paper  system  whose  volume 
can  at  all  times  l3e  easily  and  scientifically  regulated,  so 
as  to  exactly  meet  the  increased  demand  for  its  use, 
whether  caused  by  developing  industry,  or  the  exigen- 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


19 


cies  of  war,  keeping  the  purchasing  power  of  a  dollar 
always  precisely  at  ioo  cents.  As  the  average  annual 
increased  demand  for  money  in  this  country  is  about 
$70,000,000,  should  the  amount  of  gold  and  silver  unre¬ 
quired  in  the  arts,  or  needed  to  restore  the  loss  of  weight 
that  circulating  coin  has  sustained,  be  valued  at  only 
$50,000,000,  the  government  must,  if  the  purchasing 
power  of  the  dollar  is  to  remain  steady,  yearly  emit,  issue 
$20,000,000  of  legal  tender  paper,  greenback  receivable 
for  all  debts  or  dues  to  supplement  the  increase  in  the 
metallic  money  so  as  to  make  the  supply  and  demand 
balance.  This  scientific  regulation  of  the  supply  of 
money  would  assist  instead  of  checking,  as  the  metallic 
system  does,  the  rise  in  the  price  of  products  and  the  value 
of  property  that  an  increased  demand  for  labor  and  prod¬ 
ucts  creates.  This  continuously  expanding  volume  of 
money  would  not  only  prevent  the  fall  in  value  of  prop¬ 
erty  now  occasioned  by  a  shrinkage  in  the  circulating 
medium,  not  only  assist  a  rise  in  the  value  of  labor  and 
products,  but  still  further  advance  prices,  and  impart  to 
industry  a  stimulus  it  would  not  otherwise  obtain.  Ris¬ 
ing  prices  increase  production,  and  in  order  to  meet  the 
increased  need  for  money  require  a  greater ,  volume  of 
money,  and  the  supply  should  be  thus  increased.  The 
depression  of  trade  due  primarily  to  a  scanty  and  inade¬ 
quate  volume  of  money  would  thus  be  prevented. 

Appreciation  of  money  encourages  idleness,  for  the 
possessor  of  it  can  merely  by  hoarding  it  further  en¬ 
hance  its  purchasing  power,  and  by  its  very  withdrawal 
from  use  in  industry  still  further  add  to  his  “unearned 
increment”  of  value.  This  additional  profit  that  its  pos¬ 
sessor  obtains,  is  at  the  expense  of  labor,  which  loses 
employment,  or  is  forced  by  depressed  industry  to  take 
reduced  wages.  Would  such  money  be  honest?  This 
leads  us  to  consider  what  is  honest  money. 

CHAPTER  IV. 

WHAT  IS  AN  HONEST  DOLLAR? 

An  honest  dollar,  is  such  a  dollar  that  always  buys  100 
cents  worth  of  produce  or  of  labor  at  all  times  and  under 
all  circumstances,  a  dollar  whose  purchasing  power  never 


20 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


rises  or  falls.  A  dollar  that  buys  more  or  less  than  ioo 
cents  worth  is  dishonest.  The  relation  between  the  sup¬ 
ply  and  the  demand  of  money,  and  between  money  and 
the  supply  of  property  fixes  the  prices  of  property. 
Money  really  never  depreciates  for  the  reason  that  the 
demand  for  money  is  always  equal  to  the  supply  of  it. 
Money  apparently  depreciates  when  its  supply  is  in¬ 
creased,  the  fact  is,  however,  the  prices  of  commodities 
rise  from  an  unjustly  low  to  a  fairer  and  a  j uster  price. 
Stability  of  value  is  the  most  important  and  essential  at¬ 
tribute  that  money  can  possess.  Stability  of  prices 
depends  chiefly  upon  the  stability  of  money.  Falling 
prices  can  be  prevented  by  increasing  the  supply  of 
money,  which  would  engender  greater  industrial  activity, 
thus  stimulating  values.  If  by  doubling  the  supply  of 
money,  a  dollar  no  longer  buys  200  cents  worth  of  prod¬ 
ucts,  but  can  procure,  only  106  cents  worth,  then  it  is  the 
first  dollar  that  is  the  dishonest  one,  and  the  latter  the 
honest  dollar.  In  such  a  case,  the  value  of  the  money 
would  not  depreciate,  for  the  dollar  possessed  an  extra 
value  that  was  not  intended,  it  has  been  at  a  premium  and 
that  premium  has  been  destroyed. 

A  creditor  who  lends  $100  at  the  legal  rate  of  interest, 
and  demands  its  repayment  in  money  whose  purchasing 
power  is  greater  than  that  of  the  money  he 
loaned,  is  a  robber.  If  a  debtor  who  borrows 
$100,  can  return  it  in  money  which  buys  less  than  what 
the  face  value  would  indicate  was  its  purchasing 
power,  then  he  is  a  swindler.  But  we  have  shown  already 
that  while  money  can  be  scarce  and  can  buy  too  much,  it 
can  never  be  too  plentiful  and  buy  less  than  its  face  value, 
for  the  demand  is  always  equal  to  it.  Appreciated  money 
can  benefit  only  the  creditor  class  at  the  expense  of  all 
’  other  classes,  principally  labor.  The  people  are  benefited 
only  by  a  dollar  which  buys  100  cents  worth,  no  more, 
no  less,  they  require  a  standard  in  which  obligations  ex¬ 
tending  over  long  periods  of  time  will  not  vary,  but  pre¬ 
serve  an  accurate  measure.  The  farmer’s  prosperity  is 
not  augmented  by  selling  twice  as  much  wheat  as  he 
should,  in  order  to  obtain  a  200-cent  dollar;  neither  are 
the  interests  of  the  laboring  classes  promoted  by  working 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


21 


twice  as  long  in  order  to  secure  a  200-cent  dollar.  The 
people  do  not  want  scarce  money ;  they  want  money  which 
is  sufficiently  plentiful  to  do  business  with.  The  interest 
of  the  creditor  class  is  directly  opposed  to  that  of  the 
producing  class,  if  the  field  for  the  investment  of  surplus 
capital  is  closed  in  the  purchase  of  bonds,  it  must  find 
use  in  industry,  employing  labor,  making  good  times  and 
rendering  all  classes  prosperous;  but  if  these  millions  are 
to  be  locked  up  in  the  Government  vaults  in  exchange  for 
bonds,  it  is  withdrawn  from  use,  from  circulation  in  trade 
and  from  distribution  among  the  people. 

So-called  statesmen  are  now  telling  the  people  that  they 
are  opposed  to  “dishonest  money/’  that  they  are  for  “hon¬ 
est  money,”  so  are  the  people.  Why  this  necessity  to 
declare  that  they  favor  “honest  money?”  What  do  they 
pretend  to  say  is  “dishonest”  they  do  not  aver,  though 
they  allude  to  silver.  The  Constitution  says  that  both 
gold  and  silver  shall  be  money;  that  both  shall  be  coined 
as  directed  by  Congress  and  that  both  shall  be  legal  ten¬ 
der  for  all  debts.  Are  not  these  silver  dollars  which  pay 
labor  for  toil,  that  pay  rent,  that  pay  our  grocery  bills  and 
our  tailor  bills,  that  pay  all  the  obligations  of  the  people, 
that  pay  our  sailors  and  soldiers  their  pensions  for  having 
received  wounds  and  disabilities  in  defense  of  the  Nation’s 
life,  but  which  is  not  good  enough  to  redeem  Govern¬ 
ment  bonds  and  certificates  to  repay  Wall  Street  for  its 
heroic  sacrifices,  are  not  such  dollars  “honest?”  If  they 
are  “dishonest”  it  is  because  the  creditor  class  which  boy¬ 
cotts  silver  has  made  them  “dishonest.”  We  are  told  that 
gold  is  our  standard  of  value,  and  that  the  demonetization 
of  silver  in  1873  merely  recognized  gold  as  a  standard 
which  had  existed  since  1834. 

CHAPTER  V. 

THE  AMERICAN  STANDARD  OF  VALUE  IS  IOO  CENTS. 

The  unit,  or  standard  of  value  in  the  United  States  is  100 
cents  in  the  decimal  scale;  it  always  has  been  100  cents;  it 
has  never  been  anything  else,  no  matter  whether  it  is 
represented  in  gold  or  silver.  This  unit  the  First  Con¬ 
gress  called  a  dollar,  whose  value  was  fixed  by  law.  A 
double  standard  is  an  absurdity,  an  utter  impossibility 


22 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


that  can  no  more  exist  than  two  yardsticks  of  different 
length. 

It  is  equally  as  absurd  to  contend  that  we  have  or  ever 
had  a  “gold  standard”  or  a  “silver  standard.”  ioo  cents 
is  the  American  unit  of  value,  just  as  much  as  the  foot 
is  our  unit  of  measure,  or  the  pound  is  our  unit  of  weight. 
A  unit  is  a  unit/regardless  of  the  fact  that  it  is  expressed 
in  gold,  or  in  silver.  A  pound  is  a  pound  whether  it  is 
lead  or  feathers.  No  one  speaks  of  “lead”  pounds,  or 
“feather  pounds,”  but  of  a  pound  of  so  much  of  this  or  that 
commodity,  therefore  it  is  supremely  idiotic  to  speak  of  sil¬ 
ver  or  gold  units  or  standards  of  values.  Our  unit  or 
standard  of  value  is  purely  arbitrary;  it  has  no  relation  to 
anything  whatever,  except  the  monetary  standards  of 
other  nations.  A  bimetallic  standard  is  simply  the  unit  or 
standard  of  value  expresed  in  two  metals,  gold  and  silver. 
A  “gold  standard”  or  a  silver  standard  means  ioo  cents 
worth  of  gold  or  silver. 

The  First  Congress  decreed  by  the  law  of  1792  that  a 
dollar’s  worth  of  silver  should  consist  of  37  ij  grains, 
pure,  and  that  a  dollar’s  worth  of  gold  should  consist 
of  1-15  part  of  silver,  or  24.7  grains  pure.  By  that  law  of 
1792  Congress  authorized,  as  required  by  the  Constitu¬ 
tion,  the  free  unlimited  coinage  of  both  gold  and  silver, 
and  fixed  their  ratio  at  15  to  1,  making  both  gold  and 
silver  money  legal  tender  for  all  debts  and  dues.  The 
unit  of  value  by  that  law  was  expressed  in  a  silver  dollar 
of  37 1 1  grains,  but  the  unit  did  not  rest  upon  silver  ex¬ 
clusively,  for  it  rested  upon  both  metals.  The  gold  dol¬ 
lar,  by  that  law  of  1792,  was  a  pure  fiction,  which,  while 
it  did  not  actually  exist,  nevertheless,  the  gold  dollar 
effectively  competed  with  the  silver  dollar.  If  the  pos¬ 
sessor  of  10  silver  dollars  or  units  sought  to  exact  more 
than  $10  worth  of  products,  or  labor  in  exchange  for 
them,  or  that  they  should  pay  more  than  $10  worth  of 
bonds,  the  owner  of  the  produce  could  exchange  it  for 
a  gold  eagle,  or  the  owner  of  the  bond  could  redeem  it 
in  the  same  gold  eagle  equal  in  value  to  ten  silver  dollars 
or  units.  This  competition  between  gold  and  silver  pre¬ 
vented  either  from  going  to  a  premium,  and  consequently 
undervaluing  property.  Thus  this  law  of  1792  was  bi- 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


23 


metallic,  it  rested  on  both  metals,  otherwise  it  would 
have  been  monometallic. 

Double  gold  eagles  were  coined  equal  in  value  to  io 
silver  dollars,  or  units;  they  were  not  declared  to  be  $20, 
but  equal  in  value  to  $20;  gold  eagles  were  coined  of 
the  value  of  10  silver  units  or  dollars,  they  were  not 
declared  to  be  $10;  half  eagles  of  gold  were  coined  which 
were  of  the  value  of  5  silver  dollars,  or  units,  they  were 
not  declared  to  be  $5;  2J  gold  coins  were  coined  which 
were  of  the  value  of  2\  silver  dollars,  or  units,  they  were 
not  declared  to  be  $2.50.  Why  this  distinction?  For 
this  reason:  it  was  decided  to  express  the  unit  or  dollar 
in  silver,  “to  be  of  the  value  of  the  Spanish  milled  dollar, 
the  same  as  is  now  current,”  simply  for  convenience  in 
calculation;  the  people  had  for  years  been  doing  business 
with  that  dollar,  hence  their  transactions  had  been  com¬ 
puted  in  them  and  they  were  familiar  with  its  value. 

Then  again,  if  the  unit  of  value  should  be  changed 
in  weight  and  fineness  it  would  be  more  expensive  to 
recoin  them  than  to  recoin  the  gold  coins,  which  were 
few  in  number  and  of  larger  denomination,  and  when 
tfiis  change  was  being  made  the  people  would  be  at  sea 
in  their  calculations.  Consequently,  whenever  any  change 
was  made  in  the  ratio  between  gold  and  silver,  as  was 
made  in  1834  from  15  to  1  to  16  to  1,  it  was  effected 
by  reducing  the  weight  of  the  gold  coins,  the  gold  dollar 
from  24.7  to  23.2  grains  pure,  and  business  was  not  dis¬ 
turbed.  From  the  foundation  of  the  Federal  Govern¬ 
ment  to  the  present  day  the  weight  of  pure  silver  in  the 
silver  unit  or  dollar  has  never  been  changed,  but  has 
always  been  as  provided  by  that  law  of  1792  of  the  weight 
of  37 1 J  grains,  which  was  the  weight  of  the  silver  in 
the  Spanish  milled  dollar. 

The  ratio  fixed  by  Congress  was  arbitrary,  though 
made  to  conform  to  the  European  ratio;  Congress  could 
have  declared  a  ratio  of  10  to  1,  or  of  30  to  1,  as  readily 
as  the  one  it  did  declare  of  15  to  1,  though  the  concur¬ 
rent  circulation  of  both  metals  would  not  have  prevailed. 
Even  the  slight  variance  that  existed  after  1803,  between 
the  American  and  French  ratios  of  15  to  1,  and  that  of 
15^  to  1,  prevented  their  concurrent  circulation.  The 


24 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


fact  that  we  first  from  1803  to  1834  had  only  silver  money, 
and  from  1834  to  1873  had  only  gold  in  our  circulation 
by  no  means  changed  the  unit  or  standard  of  value,  which 
was  throughout  that  entire  period  100  cents,  the  “Dollar 
of  the  Daddies.”  The  ratio  adopted  was  not  controlled 
or  fixed  by  the  ratio  of  the  production  of  gold  and  silver, 
for  it  was  entirely  independent  of  it;  it  was  arbitrary. 
The  truth  of  this  statement  is  proven  by  the  facts. 

CHAPTER  VI. 

THE  LEGAL  RATIO  IS  NOT  FIXED  BY  THE  RATIO  OF  PRODUCTION. 


Years.  Ratio  of  Production.  Legal  Ratio. 

1811-1820 . 47.4  to  1.  15.5  to  1. 

1821-1830 . 32.4  to  1.  15.8  to  1. 

1831-1840 . 29.3  to  1.  15.7  to  1. 

1841-1850 . 14.2  to  1.  15.8  to  1. 

1851-1855 .  4.5  to  1.  15.4  to  1. 

1856-1800 .  4.4  to  1.  15.3  to  1. 

1861-1865 .  5.9  to  1.  15.4  to  1. 

1866-1870 .  6.9  to  1.  15.6  to  1. 

1871  . 10.9  to  1.  15.6  to  1. 

1872  . 12.7  to  1.  15.6  to  1. 


These  facts  show  that  during  this  entire  period,  while 
the  ratio  of  the  production  of  gold  and  silver  fluctuated 
violently  from  47.4  to  1  down  to  only  4.4  to  1,  the  con¬ 
trolling  legal  ratio,  the  French,  remained  almost  steady 
at  15.5  to  1. 

The  value  of  the  gold  and  silver  mined  during  this 
period  changed  in  the  ratio  of  the  value  from  4  to  1  of 
silver  to  gold  to  3  of  gold  to  1  of  silver.  Had  the  legal 
ratio  been  based  upon  the  ratio  of  the  production  of 
gold  and  silver,  or  upon  the  ratio  of  the  value,  it  would 
have  been  absolutely  indispensable  to  change  it  at  least 
once  a  year. 

The  legal  ratio  fixes  the  commercial  ratio  of  gold  and 
silver. 

The  value  of  a  coin  is  not  regulated  by  the  market 
price  of  gold  or  silver  it  contains,  but  by  law.  Instead 
of  the  market  price  or  value  of  coins  being  governed  by 
the  commercial  price  of  the  metal  they  contain,  the  mar¬ 
ket  price  is  fixed  by  the  legal  value,  which,  under  the  un¬ 
limited  coinage  of  both  gold  and  silver  free,  at  all  times 
controls. 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


25 


Strictly  speaking,  under  the  unlimited  free  coinage  of 
both  metals,  the  metals  possess  no  market  price,  for  the 
market  price  must  J^e  adjusted  by  the  supply  of  the  prod¬ 
uct  and  the  demand  for  its  use  in  the  arts  of  commerce, 
but  when  the  price  of  a  metal  for  use  in  the  arts  and  not 
as  money  is  absolutely  fixed  by  the  legal  value  of  it  as 
money  an  outside  factor,  it  can  have  no  market  price. 
Rothschild  cannot  buy  silver  for  60  cents  an  ounce  for  use 
in  arts,  or  for  money  at  its  gold  valuation,  if  the  United 
States  Government  will  coin  it  at  $1.29  an  ounce,  for  the 
owner  of  silver  ore  will  not  exchange  it  for  gold  or  com¬ 
modities  at  the  price  of  60  cents  an  ounce  when  he  is  per¬ 
mitted  to  coin  it  free  and  exchange  it  for  gold  or  products 
at  the  value  of  $1.29  an  ounce. 

From  1792  to  1803  the  American  and  French  ratios 
were  precisely  the  same,  15  to  1.  During  all  that  period 
gold  and  silver  concurrently  circulated  in  the  United 
States  and  France.  The  market  ratio  of  gold  and  silver 
during  that  period  was  exactly  the  legal  ratio,  15  to  1, 
showing  that  the  commercial  price  was  fixed  by  the  legal 
value  of  the  two  metals.  And  in  1803  the  very  instant 
that  Napoleon  changed  the  French  ratio  to  15.5  to  1,  the 
market  ratio  accordingly  changed  to  15.5  to  1.  The 
ratio  of  France  and  the  Latin  Union  changed  the  com¬ 
mercial  ratio  of  gold  and  silver,  although  the  American 
ratio  until  1834  remained  15  to  1,  simply  because  of  the 
fact  that  at  that  stage  of  our  national  development,  those 
nations  composing  the  Latin  Union  were  commercially 
and  industrially  more  powerful  than  the  United  States, 
and  consequently  could  use  a  greater  amount  of  money 
in  trade  and  the  needs  of  their  Governments  were  vastly 
larger. 

From  1803  to  1873  the  French  ratio  absolutely  con¬ 
trolled  the  commercial  ratio  the  wide  world  over,  regard¬ 
less  of  the  sudden  and  radical  changes  in  the  ratio  of  the 
production  of  gold  and  silver,  regardless  of  Great  Britain’s 
attitude  upon  the  question. 

Although  Great  Britain  adopted  the  single  gold  standard 
in  1816,  the  London  market  ratio  of  gold  and  silver  re¬ 
mained  fixed  at  the  French  ratio,  15^  to  1,  minus  the 
cost  of  transportation,  commission  and  the  cost  of  coin- 


26 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


age  at  the  French  mints;  and  when  silver  was  required 
in  London  for  shipment  to  India,  the  price  rose  to  pre¬ 
cisely  its  French  coinage  value,  plus  the  cost  of  acquisi¬ 
tion  which  included  transportation,  commission,  etc.,  ex¬ 
penses  demonstrating  beyond  the  shadow  of  a  doubt  that 
the  French  legal  ratio  governed  the  market  value  of  the 
two  metals. 

Under  the  free,  unlimited  coinage  of  both  gold  and  sil¬ 
ver,  the  legal  ratio  inevitably  and  invariably  fixes  the 
commercial  ratio,  for  the  reason  that  when  the  Govern¬ 
ment  of  the  Nation  that  can  use  all  the  surplus  gold  and 
silver,  coins  the  two  metals  free  in  unlimited  quantities  at 
a  certain  ratio  an  unlimited  monetary  demand  is  thereby 
created,  which  controls  the  price  fixed  by  the  limited 
demand  for  their  use  in  the  arts  which  is  insufficient  to 
absorb  and  employ  their  total  supply  for  mercantile  pur¬ 
poses.  How  this  operates  is  very  clear;  if  the  legal  ratio 
is  15  to  i,  no  bullion  owner  of  silver  could  be  found  who 
would  give  more  than  15  ounces  of  silver  for  an  ounce  of 
gold,  so  long  as  he  has  the  right  to  coin  15  ounces  of  it 
free  which,  by  law,  after  its  coinage,  he  can  exchange  for 
an  ounce  of  gold.  Therefore,  when  silver  is  needed  in 
the  arts,  the  purchaser  must  give  one  ounce  of  gold  to 
get  15  ounces  of  silver. 

Nor  is  it  possible  for  the  silver  bullion  owner  to  exact 
a  higher  price  for  his  ore  by  insisting  upon  exchanging  it 
for  less  than  the  legal  ratio,  because  the  purchaser  who 
so  long  as  he  can  get  15  ounces  of  silver  for  one  of  gold 
by  melting  the  silver  coins,  will  not  give  an  ounce  of  gold 
for  less  than  15  ounces  of  silver. 

Thus  the  market  ratio  of  gold  and  silver  can  never,  un¬ 
der  their  free  coinage,  be  either  more  or  less  than  the  legal 
ratio.  The  silver  bullion  owners  cannot  for  another  rea¬ 
son  extort  a  greater  than  the  legal  value  of  silver,  because 
the  mercantile  demand  for  silver  is  insufficient  to  con¬ 
sume  the  entire  product,  so  that  could  they  force  it  to  a 
temporarily  higher  price,  it  must  eventually  fall  to  the  level 
of  the  legal  value. 

From  1834  to  1873  the  legal  value  of  silver  was  higher 
in  Europe  than  in  the  United  States,  therefore  our  silver 
left  us  to  go  to  Europe,  not  because  there  was  a  greater 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


27 


need  for  it  in  the  arts  than  existed  in  this  country,  but 
because  the  legal  value  of  it  was  higher  there  than  here, 
where  it  was  wanted  for  coinage  into  money.  And  as 
the  legal  value  fixed  the  market  price  of  silver  it  com- 
m?nded  a  higher  market  price  in  Europe  than  it  could 
in  the  United  States  for  its  use  in  the  arts,  or  higher  than 
its  legal  value  here. 

When  the  free  coinage  of  gold  and  silver  are  both  lim¬ 
ited,  or  when  one  metal  is  coined  free  in  unlimited  quan¬ 
tities,  and  the  coinage  of  the  other  metal  is  prohibited, 
then  the  market  and  legal  values  of  the  two  metals  diverge 
and  vary.  When  the  coinage  of  both  metals  are  limited, 
or  prohibited,  a  surplus  remains  for  which  there  is  no 
mercantile  demand,  which  depresses  the  market  price, 
thus  wedging  apart  the  legal  and  market  values. 

When,  however,  gold  is  not  only  coined  free,  but  in 
unlimited  quantities,  while  the  coinage  of  silver  is  abso¬ 
lutely  prohibited,  the  legal  and  market  demand  for  gold 
is  sufficient  to  use  its  entire  output,  while  one-half  the  de¬ 
mand  for  silver  is  destroyed,  leaving  a  fifty  per  cent,  mar¬ 
ket  demand  to  consume  a  ioo  per  cent,  production  of  sil¬ 
ver,  thereby  cutting  its  market  price  half  in  two. 

This  discrimination  against  silver  in  favor  of  gold  by 
denving  the  former  coinage  while  admitting  the  latter  to 
coinage,  of  disusing  one  as  money,  and  overusing  the 
other  as  redemption  money  has  forced  apart  their  legal 
and  commercial  ratios.  Prior  to  1873  fully  50  per  cent, 
of  the  gold  and  silver  mined  were  absorbed  in  the  arts, 
the  remaining  one-half  was  used  as  money. 

CHAPTER  VII. 

AMERICAN  FINANCIAL  HISTORY  FROM  1 792  TO  1 873. 

The  First  Congress  of  the  United  States  by  the  law  of 
1792  fixed  the  market  value  of  gold  and  silver  in  this 
country,  by  decreeing  that  37 ij  of  pure  silver  and  24.7 
grains  of  pure  gold  should  be  100  cents  worth,  or  one  dol¬ 
lar.  Both  gold  and  silver  were  admitted  to  unlimited 
free  coinage,  and  both  were  declared  to  be,  and  treated 
as  redemption  money.  Until  1873  both  metals  were 
treated  equally.  Dollars  that  are  equal  to  the  same 


28 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


thing  are  equal  to  each  other.  In  this  country  under  the 
unlimited  free  coinage  of  both  metals  a  dollar  whether 
of  gold  or  silver  could  be  worth  neither  more  nor  less  than 
itself,  for  the  reasons  given  in  the  preceding  chapter. 

Whenever  the  metal  in  our  coins  was  worth  more 
in  another  country  than  its  coin  value  in  this,  they  leit 
us  and  went  to  such  country,  but  whenever  the  metal  in 
our  coins  was  worth  less  in  another  country  than  its  coin 
value  in  this,  it  left  such  country  and  came  to  our  coun¬ 
try.  When  our  silver  dollar  was  overvalued  in  Europe 
and  undervalued  in  the  United  States,  it  was  worth  103 
cents  in  gold  in  Europe  but  not  in  this  country,  here  it 
could  pass  for  only  100  cents. 

However,  even  though  the  market  and  legal  values  be 
precisely  the  same,  the  purchasing  power  of  a  dollar  may, 
simply  because  of  the  scarcity  of  the  number  of  dollars, 
be  greater  than  100  cents,  whether  the  scarcity  is  due  to  a 
lack  of  all  kinds  of  money,  gold  and  silver,  or  is  due  to 
the  fact  that  one  of  the  metals  have  been  demonetized 
and  its  competition  destroyed,  allowing  the  remaining 
metal  a  chance  to  command  a  premium. 

All  values  are  measured  by  the  amount  of  money  in 
circulation,  which  if  it  be  scarce,  prices  are  low,  but  if  it 
be  plentiful,  prices  are  high.  This  change  in  the  values 
of  property,  and  the  purchasing  power  of  money  can  be 
effected  without  any  change  in  the  weight  or  purity  of 
the  dollars,  and  without  any  change  or  variance  between 
the  market  and  legal  values  of  the  metal  undemonetized. 

Silver  and  gold  circulated  concurrently  in  this  country, 
and  Europe,  from  1782  to  1803,  during  which  time  Ameri¬ 
can  and  French  ratios  were  the  same,  neither  being  under 
or  overvalued.  In  order  to  get  more  gold,  Napoleon  in 
1803  changed  the  French  ratio  to  15!  to  1,  thus  undervalu- 
ing  gold  and-overvaluing  silver  in  the  United  States,  caus¬ 
ing  gold  to  leave  us,  and  silver  to  come  to  us.  In  the 
United  States,  one  ounce  of  gold  could  exchange  for  only 
15  ounces  of  silver,  while  in  France  and  on  the  Continent, 
it  could'  get  1 5-!  ounces,  gaining  half  an  ounce,  therefore 
gold  left  us  and  went  to  France.  Silver,  on  the  contrary, 
refusing  to  exchange  15J  ounces  of  itself  to  get  an  ounce 
of  gold,  when  by  crossing  the  ocean  to  America  it  could 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


29 


get  the  same  ounce  of  gold  with  only  15  ounces  of  itself, 
therefore  to  avoid  the  loss  of  half  an  ounce,  silver  left 
France  and  came  to  our  country.  Whenever  we  bought 
goods  or  paid  debts  abroad  we  sent  gold  because  being 
worth  3  per  cent,  more  than  silver,  it  bought  or  paid  3  per 
cent.  more. 

During  this  period,  1803  to  1834,  the  gold  in  our  gold 
dollar  was  worth  about  three  cents  more  than  its  face 
value  or  103  cents.  Our  monetary  system  still  rested, 
however,  upon  both  metals,  for  silver  could  not  command 
a  premium  of  a  cent,  for  the  moment  it  rose  to  100  cents 
it  would  become  equal  in  value  to  gold,  it  could  not  rise 
higher  than  gold  or  even  equal  in  value  to  it  before  it 
would  bring  gold  back  again  into  concurrent  circulation 
with  (Silver. 

In  1834  we  endeavored  to  secure  their  concurrent  cir¬ 
culation  by  diminishing  the  weight  of  the  gold  dollar  and 
increasing  the  ratio  so  that  they  would  again  become  equal 
in  value.  The  ratio  was  accordingly  changed  to  15.98  to 
1,  the  ratio  popularly  known  as  16  to  1,  but  this  ratio 
made  gold  too  dear  and  silver  too  cheap  in  the  United 
States,  so  that  while  we  did,  as  we  desired,  get  more  gold, 
we  lost  our  silver.  Sixteen  ounces  of  silver  refused  to  ex¬ 
change  for  one  ounce  of  gold  in  our  country,  because  in 
France  15 \  ounces  of  silver  could  get  the  same  ounce  of 
gold,  thus  saving  half  an  ounce  by  leaving  us  and  going 
to  France,  which  it  did  Under  this  ratio,  gold,  by  gain¬ 
ing  half  an  ounce  in  the  United  States,  left  Europe  and 
came  to  us.  Our  motive  in  paying  our  foreign  debts  or 
bills  in  silver  became  the  same  as  it  had  formerly  been  to 
pay  in  gold,  viz. :  it  paid  or  bought  3  per  cent.  more.  The 
silver  dollar  was  worth  103  cents  in  France  therefore  it 
refused  to  circulate  in  this  country  with  a  97-cent  gold 
dollar. 

In  1853  we  attempted  to  retain  our  silver  money  by  the 
Gresham  Law  which  authorized  the  slight  debasement 
of  our  silver  coin/s  8^  per  cent.  The  assertion  that  the 
Gresham  Law  of  1853  practically  demonetized  silver  is 
false,  for  it  merely  discontinued  the  coinage  of  subsidiary 
silver  on  private  account,  limiting  the  legal  tender  quali¬ 
ties  of  such  coins  to  $5,  but  the  coinage  of  the  silver  dollar 


30 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


remained  free  and  unlimited  and  its  legal  tender  qualities 
unrestricted.  Silver  still  continued  to  compete  with  gold 
under  the  operation  of  that  law.  This  attempt  proved  a 
failure,  for  even  though  we  coined  8  million  silver  dol¬ 
lars  between  1792  and  1873,  although  we  had  also  coined 
during  that  period  $140,000,000  subsidiary  silver  coins 
and  made  Spanish  and  Mexican  silver  legal  tender,  which 
brought  many  millions  of  such  money  into  the  country,  this 
money  all  left  us.  So  that  in  1873  we  had  little  if  any  silver 
money  in  this  country,  and  in  fact  since  i860  we  had  no 
gold,  as  we  were  doing  business  on  a  greenback  basis  in 

1873- 

During  the  period  1792  to  1803,  gold  and  silver  con¬ 
currently  circulated  in  the  United  States;  but  during  the 
periods  1803  to  1834,  and  1834  to  1873,  we  had  the  alter¬ 
nate  circulation  in  this  country,  first  of  silver  and  last  of 
gold  During  the  entire  period  1792  to  1873,  however,  we 
enjoyed  the  benefits  of  the  bimetallic  system.  At  no 
times  prior  to  1873  did  we  suffer  the  evils  of  monometal¬ 
lism  which  has  resulted  from  the  demonetization  of  silver  in 
that  year. 

(In  1873)  “We  had  no  silver  (since  1834),  and  it  had 
no  influence  whatever  on  our  prices,  or  on  our  ability 
to  pay  debts.” — Carlisle  at  Covington,  Ky.,  1895.  Is  it 
true  that  the  absence  of  silver  from  our  circulation  had  no 
influence  whatever  on  prices  of  commodities  in  this  coun¬ 
try  and  our  ability  to  pay  our  debts?  For  40  years  prior 
to  1873  our  silver  dollars  because  they  were  worth  103 
cents  in  France,  left  us;  the  cheap  gold  drove  out  the 
dear  silver.  Suppose  in  1873,  Mr.  Carlisle,  3  cents* 
worth  of  silver  had  been  clipped  from  the  silver  dollar 
would  it  not  have  been  worth  precisely  100  cents?  or 
suppose  3  cents’  worth  of  gold  had  been  added  to  the  gold 
dollar,  would  it  not  then  have  been  worth  100  cents? 
as  the  result  of  either  change  in  the  weight  of  our  silver 
or  gold  coins  would  not  our  gold  and  silver  dollars  have 
each  become  worth  100  cents,  equal  to  each  other  in 
value,  which  was  essential  to  their  concurrent  circulation 
in  the  United  States?  The  moment  the  dollars  became 
equal  in  value,  Mr.  Carlisle,  would  not  silver  have  re¬ 
turned  to  this  country,  and  we  would  then  have  had  both 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


31 


gold  and  silver?  This,  instead  of  proving  the  failure  of 
bimetallism,  demonstrates  that  had  the  United  States 
and  France  adopted  the  same  ratio,  the  two  metals  would 
have  concurrently  circulated; 

Now  what  effect  had  silver  when  absent  upon  values 
in  this  country?  So  long  as  the  mints  were  open  to  the 
free,  unlimited  coinage  of  both  gold  and  silver,  and  both 
were  treated  as  redemption  money,  gold  could  not  have 
risen  3  per  cent,  before  it  would  have  become  equal 
to  or  exceeded  the  value  of  the  silver  dollar,  which  would 
have  brought  silver  back  into  circulation.  Gold  could 
command  no  premium  so  long  as  it  met  the  competition 
of  silver.  It  was  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  the  competi¬ 
tion  of  silver  that  it  was  demonetized,  which  forbade  the 
coinage  of  silver  coins,  and  treated  the  silver  money  al¬ 
ready  coined  as  unfit  for  redemption  purposes.  De¬ 
monetization  therefore  prevented  any  further  increase 
in  the  supply  of  money  by  the  coinage  of  silver  money, 
and  the  destruction  of  one-half  the  volume  of  metallic 
money  of  redemption,  increased  the  demand  and  use  of 
the  remaining  one-half,  gold,  thus  sending  gold  to  a 
premium. 

If  the  value  of  money  rises,  the  price  of  products  falls, 
therefore  the  competition  of  silver,  by  preventing  any 
rise  in  the  value  of  money,  any  rise  in  the  purchasing 
power  of  gold  beyond  3  per  cent.,  did  influence  prices 
by  rendering  it  absolutely  impossible  for  prices  to  fall 
as  the  result  of  a  rise  in  the  value  of  money. 

Not  only  was  Carlisle  in  error  when  he  declared  that 
the  absence  of  silver  from  circulation  had  no  influence 
upon  our  prices,  but  he  was  equally  wrong  when  he  as¬ 
serted  that  silver  had  in  its  absence  no  effect  on  our 
ability  to  pay  our  debts.  For,  since  we  pay  our  debts 
with  products,  with  labor,  with  the  proceeds  of  what  we 
sell,  that  same  cause  which  prevented  the  rise  in  the 
value  of  gold,  viz.,  the  competition  of  silver,  and  which 
prevented  the  corresponding  fall  in  the  prices  of  com¬ 
modities  and  of  labor,  maintained  our  ability  to  pay  our 
debts.  We  were  not  obliged  then  as  now  to  give  200 
cents’  worth  of  commodities  to  get  a  dollar,  as  we  are 
now.  The  competition  of  silver  under  the  bimetallic 


32 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


system  guaranteed  good  honest  prices,  and  even  when 
absent  did  influence  our  debt-paying  ability.  Under  that 
beneficent  bimetallic  system  the  debtor  possessed  the  con¬ 
stitutional  right  to  pay  his  debts  and  obligations  in  either 
gold  or  silver,  and  he  always  paid  in  what  at  the  time 
happened  to  be  the  cheapest  money.  This  option  resid¬ 
ing  in  the  debtor  as  which  money  he  shall  choose  to 
pay,  produced  an  increased  demand  for  the  cheaper  and 
a  diminished  demand  for  the  dearer  money,  which,  caus¬ 
ing  a  rise  in  the  value  of  the  cheaper,  and  a  fall  in  the 
value  of  the  dearer  money,  until  their  values  equalized. 
Under  this  system  neither  gold  nor  silver  were  able  to 
go  to  a  permanent  premium,  thereby  insuring  a  greater 
stability  of  value  than  was  possible  if  either  gold  or  silver 
monometallism  prevailed.  Values  were  more  stable 
when  based  on  a  bimetallic  standard  which  for  80  years 
maintained  a  legal  value  at  the  ratio  of  15J  to  1  between 
gold  and  silver,  than  had  values  been  based  entirely  upon 
either  gold  or  silver  whose  ratio  of  production  during 
that  period  fluctuated  from  47.4  to  1  to  only  4.4  to  1. 

Why  was  this  monetary  system  which  imparted  such 
stability  to  values  abandoned?  and  who  secured  its  aban¬ 
donment?  The  power  that  displaced  a  bimetallic  stand¬ 
ard  as  required  by  the  Constitution,  based  on  both  gold 
and  silver,  by  one  based  exclusively  upon  gold,  must 
not  only  have  possessed  the  requisite  ability,  but  must 
also  have  some  special  and  peculiar  interest  in  effect¬ 
ing  such  a  tremendous  revolution  in  the  monetary  stand¬ 
ard  upon  which  the  value  of  all  property,  the  stability 
of  all  business,  upon  which  the  liberties  of  men  and  the 
prosperity  of  the  great  American  Republic  rested. 

When  money  is  scarce  its  purchasing  power  is  in¬ 
creased,  while  the  selling  price  of  all  property  is  corre¬ 
spondingly  reduced.  When  money  is  plentiful,  however, 
its  purchasing  power  is  diminished,  while  the  selling  price 
of  all  property  is  correspondingly  enhanced.  Certain  it 
is  that  the  class  possessing  property  is  not  benefited  by 
scarce  money,  which  obliges  him  to  give  more  of  his 
property  in  exchange  for  it  than  he  should  do  under 
bimetallism;  certainly  the  laborer  is  not  enriched  by 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


33 


scarce  money,  which  forces  him  to  work  twice  as  long 
as  formerly  to  get  a  dollar. 

It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  the  creditor  class,  which 
lends  $100,  which  because  of  its  scarcity  buys  $200 
worth  of  property,  is  the  class  which  would  most  natu¬ 
rally  seek  to  overthrow  the  bimetallic  system,  which  would 
prevent  his  getting  his  $100  back  in  money  which  will 
buy  more  than  $100.  The  system  that  made  money 
scarce  would  help  the  creditor  class  as  much  as  the  'sys¬ 
tem  which  made  money  plentiful  would  hurt  it.  Provid¬ 
ing  against  the  “undeserved  decrement”  of  plentiful 
money  the  creditor  class  sought  to  obtain  the  “unearned 
increment”  of  scarce  money. 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

THE  ROTHSCHILD  GOLD  CONSPIRACY. 

Though  the  springs  are  not  the  whole  watch,  they  con¬ 
stitute  its  motive  power;  though  the  Rothschilds  do  not 
possess  all  the  capital  in  the  world,  they  represent  the 
most  effective  and  colossal  combination  of  it  that  exists, 
or  has  ever  existed,  for  they  own  or  control  at  least  $2,- 
000,000,000,  which  is  fully  one-half  of  the  world’s  supply 
of  gold  or  redemption  money.  Was  it  possible  that  such 
a  conspiracy  could  be  conceived,  and  be  put  into  suc¬ 
cessful  operation  without  the  connivance,  consent,  and 
support  of  the  Rothschilds  who  owned  and  controlled  at 
least  one-half  of  all  the  gold  which  was  to  be  made  ex¬ 
clusively  the  money  of  ultimate  redemption,  and  who 
more  than  all  others  would  be  most  benefited  by  such 
a  change?  Without  their  assistance  nothing  could  have 
been  done. 

To>  correctly  appreciate  the  power  the  Rothschilds 
possessed  and  understand  the  conspiracy  which  demone¬ 
tized  silver  in  1873  it  will  be  necessary  to  review  its  his¬ 
tory  for  a  century  past. 

The  British  Government  during  the  wars  of  the  French 
Revolution  was  forced  to  borrow  money  to  meet  expenses. 
The  larger  amount  of  this  loan  it  negotiated  from  the 
Rothschilds  in  silver  and  gold,  as  this  family  had  several 
hundred  millions  which  it  had  secured  as  the  rich  profits 


34 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


of  National  brokerage  in  which  for  a  number  of  years  it 
had  been  engaged.  These  loans  were  made  payable  in 
specie,  and  under  the  stress  of  circumstances  that  specie 
was  gold. 

Both  gold  and  silver  left  circulation  and  hid  so  that  in 
1795  the  British  Government  was  forced,  under  the  leader¬ 
ship  of  Pitt,  to  issue  paper  money  at  a  time  when  the  very 
existence  of  the  Government  was  at  stake,  being  menaced 
by  the  British  fleet  in  mutiny  under  the  flag  of  the  “Float¬ 
ing  Republic,”  which  threatened  the  city  of  London  with 
destruction. 

In  order  to  crush  Napoleon  the  British  Government 
was  compelled  not  only  to  issue  for  its  own  needs  several 
hundred  millions  of  pounds  sterling  in  paper  money,  but 
also  forced  to  issue  a  vast  amount  of  such  paper  legal  ten¬ 
der  money  for  other  Nations  on  the  Continent  and  guar¬ 
antee  their  payment.  This  money  the  British  Govern¬ 
ment  maintained  at  par,  never  a  cent  of  it  was  ever  at  a 
discount. 

Great  Britain  fought  with  paper  money,  which  always 
stands  up  and  fights;  Napoleon  fought  with  metallic 
money,  gold  and  silver,  which,  in  times  of  danger  and 
disaster,  invariably  sneaks  out  of  sight.  It  was  paper 
money  which  really  conquered  Napoleon,  for  he  could 
eventually  procure  no  money  to  equip  and  pay  his  armies, 
so  thev  disbanded. 

The  condition  of  trade  under  this  paper  money  period 
Alison,  in  his  History  of  Europe,  has  described  as  follows: 
“Prosperity  unheard  of  and  unparalleled  prevailed  in  every 
department  of  the  Empire  (British),  the  landed  proprie¬ 
tors  were  in  affluence ;  wealth  to  an  unheard  of  extent  had 
been  created  among  the  farmers;  our  revenues  were  quad¬ 
rupled,  our  colonial  possessions  encircled  the  earth;  this 
period  terminated  in  a  flood  of  glory  and  a  blaze  of  pros¬ 
perity  such  as  had  never  been  surpassed  by  any  nation.” 

At  the  termination  of  the  Napoleonic  wars  these  Roths¬ 
child  loans  fell  due,  payable  in  gold,  which  the  British 
Government  could  not  readily  procure.  These  loans  were 
renewed  on  long-time  payments  payable  in  gold,  and  the 
British  Government  in  1816  demonetized  silver  and 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


35 


adopted  the  single  gold  standard,  resuming  specie  pay¬ 
ments  on  that  basis  in  1821. 

This  step  she  took  at  the  dictation  of  the  Rothschilds, 
though  at  the  time  she  was  entirely  upon  a  paper  basis 
and  enjoying  unexampled  prosperity,  there  being  scarcely 
.  a  dollar  of  gold  or  silver  in  circulation.  One  of  the  results 
of  the  adoption  of  the  single  gold  standard  was  that  the 
number  of  English  landowners  was  reduced  from  160,000, 
in  1820,  to  only  30,000,  in  1840. 

The  Rothschilds,  however,  had  scarce  money,  which 
they  and  the  creditor  class  so  fondly  describe  as  “honest 
money.7’  And  when  money  becomes  more  plentiful  and 
dollars  buy  only  100  cents  worth  of  property  as  honest 
dollars  should,  they  tell  us  that  the  country  is  flooded  with 
“cheap  money.” 

The  British  gold  standard,  before  its  adoption  by  the 
United  States  and  France,  did  not  affect  prices  and  values 
outside  of  England,  and  only  in  England  to  the  extent 
that  silver  was  no  longer  treated  as  redemption  money, 
gold  being  used  exclusively  for  that  purpose. 

Scarce  money,  however,  prevailed  in  England  and  the 
British  branch  of  the  Rothschild  family  was  secure,  but 
their  interests  were  imperiled  by  the  immense  gold  dis¬ 
coveries  of  California  and  Australia  in  1849  and  for  a 
decade  following,  but  it  dared  venture  no  change  in  the 
monetary  system,  for  its  fortunes  were  based  upon  the 
single  gold  standard.  The  purchasing  power  of  gold  fell 
and  the  creditors  got  back  money  which,  because  it  had 
suddenly  become  very  plentiful,  bought  less  than  the 
money  they  had  loaned.  What  effect  did  this  “flood  of 
cheap  money”  produce?  Prosperity  instead  of  adversity 
and  disaster  followed  this  so-called  depreciation  of  the 
currency.  At  no  period  of  our  history  has  our  Nation 
been  more  prosperous  than  just  after  those  great  gold  dis¬ 
coveries  in  California.  Gold  was  the  plentiful  and  silver 
the  scarce  money,  gold  the  “cheap”  and  silver  the  “honest 
money.”  The  Rothschilds  of  England  had  chosen  the 
wrong  metal,  apparently,  but  they  dared  not  change. 

At  this  Critical  moment  for  the  family  fortunes,  the 
German  branch  of  the  Rothschilds  came  to  the  rescue  by 
demonetizing  gold  in  Germany  and  establishing  the  sin- 


36 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


gle  silver  standard.  Holland  also  demonetized  gold  and 
adopted  the  silver  standard.  So  far  as  the  French  Govern¬ 
ment  was  influenced  by  the  French  branch  of  the  Roths¬ 
child  family,  if  it  was  influenced  at  all,  it  was  in  the  direc¬ 
tion  of  bimetallism,  that  branch  of  the  Rothschild  family 
preferred  to  straddle,  so  that  no  matter  which  metal,  gold 
or  silver,  rose  in  value,  it  would  be  safe;  at  least  France 
refused  to  abandon  bimetallism. 

The  output  of  gold  began  about  that  time  to  lessen,  and 
the  Nevada  silver  discoveries  of  1859  threatened  to  make 
silver,  as  usual,  the  more  plentiful  metal,  and  gold  the 
scarce  metal.  Germany  thereupon  hastily  abandoned  the 
silver  standard  and  endeavored  to  induce  France  to  adopt 
with  her  the  single  gold  standard;  France  again  refused. 

By  the  war  of  “71”  Germany  forced  France  to  pay  her 
an  indemnity  of  $1,000,000,000  in  gold,  and  immediately 
adopted  the  single  gold  standard,  by  demonetizing  silver, 
and  threw  her  melted  'silver  on  the  market  to  the  extent  of 
$300,000,000  which  exceeded  the  capacity  of  the  mints 
and  left  a  surplus.  Partly  for  political  reasons,  and  partly 
for  financial,  France  to  prevent  Germany  from  exchang¬ 
ing  her  silver  for  French  gold,  suspended  the  free  coinage 
of  silver  in  1876. 

All  the  European  monetary  systems  are  founded  upon 
a  perpetual  debt  that  has  never  been  paid,  and  is  never 
expected  to  be  paid,  but  prior  to  our  War  of  Rebellion 
there  was  no  great  debt  in  this  country  upon  which  to 
^  base  such  a  monetary  system. 

At  the  beginning  of  that  War  our  Government  was  un¬ 
able  to  borrow  money  from  Europe  which  desired  the  de¬ 
struction  of  our  Union,  or  from  Wall  Street  which  lacked 
the  patriotism  to  make  any  sacrifice  for  its  preservation, 
except  at  the  cost  of  a  heavy  discount  and  an  exorbitant 
rate  of  interest,  and  even  the  money  it  loaned  upon  such 
terms  was  in  small  sums. 

To  meet  the  extraordinary  needs  of  the  most  gigantic 
war  of  all  history,  the  United  States  Government  was 
obliged  to  issue  paper  money  based  upon  its  honor  and 
its  existence  which  was  then  being  weighed  in  the  balance, 
which  was  made  legal  tender  for  all  dues  except  custom 
duties  and  the  interest  upon  the  public  debt. 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


37 


This  paper,  known  as  the  Greenback  system,  originated 
in  a  Bill  in  the  House  of  Representatives  early  in  1862 
which  provided  for  the  issue  of  full  legal  tender  paper 
money,  receivable  for  all  debts  and  dues.  That  Bill  was 
amended  by  the  Senate,  so  as  to  require  that  all  custom 
duties  and  the  interest  on  the  National  debt  be  paid  in 
coin,  gold  or  silver. 

That  pernicious  and  infamous  amendment,  Thaddeus 
Stevens  declared  in  the  House,  Feb.  20th,  1862,  “Made 
two  kinds  of  money,  one  for  the  banks  and  brokers,  and 
one  for  the  people.”  The  Bill  became  a  law  as  amended, 
and  created  a  fictitious  demand  for  coin  to  pay  our  custom 
duties  and  the  interest  on  the  public  debt,  which  was 
scarce  and  in  fact  but  very  little  specie,  gold  or  silver,  was 
then  in  the  country. 

The  result  of  this  discrimination  against  the  greenback 
in  favor  of  coin  was  that  gold  and  silver  at  once  went  to 
a  premium,  and  the  larger  the  importations,  and  the 
greater  the  bonded  indebtedness  became,  increasing  the 
amount  of  interest  paid,  the  higher  went  the  premium  on 
metallic  money,  until  the  greenback  dollar  as  measured 
in  gold  or  silver  was  worth  only  about  40  cents.  In  order 
to  pay  their  custom  duties  the  people  were  forced  to  give 
$1  of  the  greenback  currency,  or  a  dollar’s  worth  of  com¬ 
modities  to  get  40  cents  in  gold  or  silver.  This  system 
could  inure  only  to  the  advantage  of  the  class  which  pos¬ 
sessed  the  coin  money,  the  creditor  class,  and  gave  the 
creditor  class  the  opportunity  to  exchange  their  gold 
and  silver  for  greenbacks  at  that  heavy  discount  and  with 
those  cheap  greenbacks  to  purchase  at  their  face  value 
the  bonds  of  the  United  States  Government. 

Wall  Street  thus  secured  almost  the  entire  issue  of  our 
Government  bonds. 

These  bonds  were  made  payable  in  the  lawful  money 
of  the  country,  which  at  that  time  was  greenbacks,  as 
there  was  no  other  kind  of  money  in  circulation.  The 
clause  in  that  law  of  1862  providing  that  custom  duties 
and  the  interest  on  the  National  debt  be  paid  in  coin, 
gold  and  silver,  demonstrated  that  the  bond  itself  was 
payable  in  other  money  than  coin,  paper  money. 

Wall  Street  bought  the  bonds  in  greenbacks  which  were 


38 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


made  payable  in  that  kind  of  money,  at  a  time  when  the 
greenbacks  were  at  a  discount  of  60  per  cent.,  thereby 
clearing  a  profit  of  that  extent  from  that  source  alone. 
What  right  or  claim  had  Wall  Street  to  be  repaid  in  other 
money  than  the  kind  it  loaned,  which  was  paper? 

But  Wall  Street  was  not  content  to  receive  the  same 
kind  of  money  it  exchanged  for  the  bonds;  it  was  not  satis¬ 
fied  with  the  kind  of  money  that  had  saved  the  Republic; 
the  money  paid  the  heroes  of  the  War,  their  widows  and 
orphans  was  not  good  enough,  not  sacred  enough, 
because  not  scarce  enough  to  satisfy  the  bondholders. 

But  Wall  Street  was  not  content  with  the  purchasing 
power  of  the  outstanding  greenbacks,  which  according 
to  John  J.  Knox,  at  that  time  Comptroller  of  the  Treas¬ 
ury,  states  that  on  July  the  ist,  1866,  when  the  green¬ 
backs  reached  their  greatest  volume,  amounted  to  $1,261,- 
415,475  in  Government  greenbacks,  and'  $281,479,908  in 
National  Bank  notes,  making  a  total  of  $1,542,895,383. 
Between  that  date  and  July  ist,  1870,  yielding  to  the  dic¬ 
tation  of  the  Money  Power,  for  no  other  class  would  be 
benefited  by  it,  the  Government  reduced  the  volume  of 
greenbacks  to  $396,894212',  (which  with1  the  National 
Bank  notes  which  had  increased  to  $299,766,984,  made  a 
total  of  $696,661,196,  thus  contracting  the  entire  currency 
of  the  country  for  practically  there  was  no  metallic  money 
in  our  circulation,  in  four  brief  years,  at  a  time  when  we 
most  sorely  needed  every  dollar  we  had,  to  the  enormous 
extent  of  $846,234,177.  The  result  of  this  infamous  and 
uncalled  for  contraction  was  the  panic  of  ‘‘73/’  which 
though  it  set  in  earlier  than  that  year,  did  not  become  so 
pronounced  until  additional  legislation  in  the  direction 
still  further  of  contraction  made  its  avoidance  impossible. 

Not  content  with  the  tremendous  advantage  secured  by 
that  Law  of  1862,  and  the  contraction  of  our  currency 
since  the  war,  the  Creditor  Class  influenced  Congress  to 
pass  the  Law  of  March  18th,  1869,  making  the  bonds 
themselves  payable  in  coin,  gold  and  silver.  This  was  one 
of  the  steps  in  the  most  infamous,  damnable  conspiracy 
against  the  rights  of  the  people  ever  conceived  and  exe¬ 
cuted,  for  it  forced  a  great  Nation  to1  pay  its  gigantic  debt 
in  another  kind  of  money  than  the  money  it  borrowed, 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


39 


in  money  which  was  dearer,  possessing  greater  purchas¬ 
ing  power  than  the  greenback  because  less  plentiful,  in 
money  which  forced  the  people  to  give  more  of  their 
property  in  order  to  get  it,  to  work  longer  for  a  dollar 
than  there  was  reason  to  do.  This  Act  vastly  increased 
the  already  stupendous  debt  of  the  United  States  which 
the  common  people  had  to  pay,  and  gave  the  bondholders 
a  greater  amount  of  money  than  the  Nation  had  con¬ 
tracted  to  pay.  That  Act  was  an  act  of  confiscation,  be¬ 
cause  it  required  the  farmer  to  sell  more  wheat,  corn,  cot¬ 
ton,  beef,  etc.,  than  justice  exacted. 

This  act  of  extortion  and  robbery  did  not  glut  the 
greed  of  the  capitalists,  for  by  the  Law  of  July  14th,  1870, 
entitled,  “An  Act  to  Authorize  the  Refunding  of  the 
National  Debt,”  Congress  directed  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  that  when  the  5-20  bonds  fell  due  and  the  Gov¬ 
ernment  had  the  option  to  pay  them  at  the  expiration  of 

5  years  from  date  of  issue,  else  they  ran  20  years,  to  re¬ 
fund  the  debt  by  issuing  in  exchange  for  the  old  bonds, 
new  ones  bearing  a  lower  rate  of  interest  than  the  old  ones, 
but  running  for  a  longer  period  of  time. 

To  illustrate  the  advantage  of  this  policy  to  the  Credi¬ 
tor  Class  by  making  our  National  Debt  perpetual  almost, 
the  Government,  we  will  suppose,  owed  $100,000,000  in 
bonds,  which  fell  due  soon,  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Treas¬ 
ury  is  persuaded  by  the  lender  that  the  debtor  is  not  in  a 
position  to  pay.  Wall  Street  said  to  Uncle  Sam,  “you  are 
not  in  a  position  to  pay  this  debt  of  $100,000,000,  bearing 

6  per  cent,  interest;  now  we  do  not  desire  to  be  exacting, 
instead  of  paying  us  $106,000,000  due  a  year  from  date, 
give  us  new  bonds  payable  in  30  years  from  this  date  for 
$100,000,000  and  we  will  knock  off  2  per  cent,  on  the 
interest,  so  that  when  due  you  will  pay  us  at  4  per  cent., 
$220,000,000,  a  clear  gain  to  us  of  only  $114,000,000.” 
This  is  the  great  science  of  Refunding,  which  is  heralded 
as  an  act  of  exceptional  brilliancy  and  ability  on  the  part 
of  our  Secretaries  of  the  Treasury.  It  is  the  science  of 
Robbery. 

But  even  this  third  step  did  not  satiate  the  rapacity  of 
these  Vampires;  not  satisfied  with  securing  the  interest 
on  the  bonds  in  coin,  gold  and  silver,  nearly  all  of  which 


40 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


they  held;  not  satisfied  with  making  the  bonds  payable  in 
the  lawful  money  of  the  country,  greenbacks  at  the  time 
of  their  issue,  also  payable  in  gold  and  silver  after  having 
obtained  them  in  exchange  for  paper  money ;  not  satisfied 
with  extending  needlessly  the  bonded  indebtedness  of  the 
Nation,  which  Vastly  augmented  their  wealth  and  power 
in  return  for  no  consideration  whatever,  this  Creditor 
Class,  by  the  Demonetization  Act,  passed  by  Congress 
February  18th,  1873,  bv  prohibiting  the  coinage  of  silver, 
or  its  use  as  money  of  redemption,  doubled  the  value  of 
the  gold  unit  or  dollar,  making  it  worth  at  least  200 
cents. 

The  Act  of  1862  needlessly  increased  the  burdens  of 
the  people;  the  Act  of  1869  made  the  National  debt  pay¬ 
able  in  a  different  kind  of  money  than  what  the  people 
had  promised  to  pay;  the  Act  of  1870,  requiring  the  re¬ 
funding  of  the  bonded  debt,  was  as  useless  as  it  was  un¬ 
just,  postponing  the  date  of  payment,  increasing  the  debt 
of  the  people  for  the  benefit  of  the  few;  the  Act  of  1873 
tampered  with  the  unit  of  value  itself  and  made  it  worth 
two  to  one,  so  that  for  every  dollar  that  Wall  Street  loaned, 
it  got  back  the  same  number  of  dollars,  but  dollars  that 
buy  twice  as  much  as  the  dollars  were  worth  in  1873. 
After  Demonetizing  silver  and  restricting  the  pjpyment  of 
our  bonds  to  gold  alone,  when  they  were  really  payable  in 
coin,  gold  or  silver,  Congress,  on  January  14th,  1875, 
fixed  the  Resumption  of  specie  payments  to  begin  January 
1st,  1879. 

The  people  of  the  United  States  are  honest,  they  desire 
to  pay  their  National  debt,  and  have  been  fondly  and 
proudly  imagining  that  the  National  debt  was  fast  ap¬ 
proaching  extinction.  In  1866,  when  the  National  debt 
reached  its  high  water  mark,  our  Government  owed,  in 
round  numbers,  $2,828,000,000;  on  January  1st,  1896,  our 
National  debt  was  $1,235,000,000.  During  that  period 
of  thirty  years  the  people  of  this  country  have  paid  in 
interest  alone  on  their  National  debt,  the  stupendous  sum 
of  $2,635,000,000.  Apparently  we  have  greatly,  by  $1,- 
700,000,000,  reduced  the  debt  and  its  extinction  at  an  early 
day  is  certain.  Principal  and  interest  the  American  peo¬ 
ple  have  paid  $4,335,000,000.  The  number  of  dollars  we 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


41 


owe  has  been  reduced,  but  when  the  people  of  the  United 
States  reflect  that  the  remaining  $1,235,000,000  that  they 
owe  in  this  year,  1896,  will  buy  as  much  wheat,  corn,  cot¬ 
ton,  farm  and  factory  products  as  the  entire  $2,828,000,000 
could  buy  in  1866,  they  will  perceive  that  practically  they 
have  not  reduced  their  National  debt  one  single  cent,  that 
they  have  after  all  their  heroic  sacrifices  to  extinguish  the 
National  debt,  paid  nothing,  but  have  in  addition  paid  to 
the  bondholders,  or  Wall  Street,  which  holds  most  of  our 
bonds,  the  tremendous  sum  of  $2,635,000,000  as  a  present; 
they  will  perceive  that  it  is  as  difficult  now  to  pay  what  is 
left  of  our  debt  as  it  was  in  1866  to  pay  the  whole  debt, 
because  they  have  to  give  twice  as  much  of  their  products 
to  get  the  gold  to  pay  the  bonds. 

After  paying  $1,700,000,000,  or  more  than  three-fifths  of 
the  entire  debt,  the  American  people  are  compelled  to 
give  at  the  beginning  of  1896  646,000,000  more  bushels 
of  wheat,  or  90,780,000  more  barrels  of  flour,  or  8,673,- 
400,000  more  pounds  of  cotton,  or  50,000,000  more  bar¬ 
rels  of  pork,  or  425,000,000  more  pounds  of  wool  to  pay 
the  remaining  $1,237,500,000  than  they  were  obliged  to 
give  in  1866  to  pay  the  whole  debt  of  $2,827,668,960. 

At  the  very  moment  in  our  history  when  our  Nation 
needed  the  greatest  volume  of  money,  at  the  very  moment 
when  its  expenses  and  obligations  were  greatest,  at  the 
very  moment  when  Congress,  the  chosen  representatives 
of  the  people,  should  have  increased  the  volume  of  metal¬ 
lic,  and  paper  money,  when  it  should  have  protected  the 
people  against  schemes  to  rob  them,  by  paying  the  debt 
in  the  kind  of  money  in  which  they  were  contracted,  Con¬ 
gress,  secretly  or  openly,  passed  laws  increasing  the  pub¬ 
lic  burdens,  increasing  the  debt  itself  by  making  it  payable 
in  metallic  money,  and  destroying  one-half  the  volume  of 
money.  The  result  of  this  legislation  is  that  the  Ameri¬ 
can  people  are  paying  Wall  Street  their  National  debt  at 
the  rate  of  $4  to  the  $1  promised.  At  the  very  moment 
when  Congress  should  have  been  true  to  the  people,  it 
betrayed  them. 

On  the  very  afternoon  preceding  his  assassination,  the 
immortal  Lincoln  gave  to  Schuyler  Colfax,  afterward 
vice-president  of  the  United  States  under  Grant,  who 


42 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


was  just  departing  for  the  far  West,  this  message  to  con¬ 
vey  to  the  miners:  “Mr.  Colfax,  I  want  you  to  take  a 
message  from  me  to  the  miners  whom  you  visit.  I  have 
very  large  ideas  of  the  mineral  wealth  of  our  Nation. 
Now  that  the  Rebellion  is  overthrown,  and  we  know 
pretty  nearly  the  amount  of  our  national  debt,  the  more 
gold  and  silver  we  mine  makes  the  payment  of  that  debt 
so  much  the  easier.  Now,  I  am  going  to  encourage 
that  in  every  possible  way.  We  shall  have  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  disbanded  soldiers,  and  many  have  feared 
that  their  return  home  in  such  great  numbers  might 
paralyze  industry  by  furnishing  suddenly  a  greater  sup¬ 
ply  of  labor  than  there  is  a  demand  for.  I  am  going  to 
try  and  attract  them  to  the  hidden  wealth  of  our  moun¬ 
tain  ranges,  where  there  is  room  enough  for  all.  Immi¬ 
gration,  which  even  the  war  has  not  stopped,  will  land 
upon  our  shores  hundreds  of  thousands  more  per  year 
from  overcrowded  Europe.  I  intend  to  point  them  to 
the  GOLD  AND  SILVER  that  waits  for  them  in  the 
West.  Tell  the  miners  from  me  that  I  shall  promote  their 
interests  to  the  utmost  of  my  ability,  BECAUSE  THEIR 
PROSPERITY  IS  THE  PRpSPERITY  OF  THE 
NATION;  and  we  shall  prove  in  a  very  few  years  that 
WE  ARE  THE  TREASURY  OF  THE  WORLD/ 
Such  was  Lincoln’s  last  thoughts;  increase  the  amount 
of  money  so  that  we  could  pay  our  debts  easier,  get 
better  prices  for  our  property,  diminish  the  burdens  of 
the  people,  and  increase  the  prosperity  and  power  of  the 
Nation.  But  the  great  patriot  fell  by  the  hand  of  an 
assassin,  and  the  people  lost  their  best  friend  and  great¬ 
est  protector,  and  the  very  danger  that  Lincoln  feared, 
the  Conspiracy  of  Capital,  was  fully  realized. 

There  was  absolutely  no  excuse  or  necessity  whatever 
for  the  resumption  of  specie  basis,  for  there  was  very 
little  gold  or  silver  then  in  the  country;  we  were  on  a 
paper,  greenback  basis,  our  National  debt  was  incurred 
on  that  basis,  our  contracts  drawn  on  that  basis,  our 
property  sold  on  that  basis,  so  that  to  suddenly  contract 
the  volume  of  money  by  making  these  greenbacks,  them¬ 
selves  money,  mere  promises  to  pay,  redeemable  in  gold 
and  silver,  which  were  scarce,  the  value  of  money  would 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


48 


be  doubled,  and  tlie  value  of  property  reduced  one-half. 
It  was  rank  confiscation  of  the  property  of  the  people, 
and  those  who  were  and  are  to-day  the  beneficiaries  of 
that  atrocious  piece  of  robbery  are  in  no  position  to 
claim  that  a  restitution  to  the  people  of  their  constitu¬ 
tional  rights  is  repudiation  of  debts  due  them,  which  by 
their  chicanery,  duplicity,  and  act,  was  more  than  doubled. 

The  condition  of  the  country  during  this  greenback 
period  was  highly  prosperous,  and  if  the  greenbacks  were 
at  a  discount,  and  gold  and  silver  at  a  premium,  it  was 
in  exact  proportion  to  the  extent  that  the  greenback  was 
discriminated  against  and  coin  money  favored. 

Certain  it  is,  that  when  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
for  a  brief  period  just  after  the  war  made  them  receiv¬ 
able  for  custom  duties,  the  greenbacks  immediately  went 
to  par. 

A  Government  that  refuses  to  accept  the  same  money 
it  pays  its  citizens  and  soldiers  to  discharge  its  obliga¬ 
tions  and  defray  its  expenditures  is  dishonest.  If  the 
greenbacks  were  good  enough  to  pay  the  soldiers  and  sail¬ 
ors,  and  their  widows  and  orphans,  to  save  this  Repub¬ 
lic,  they  were  and  are  good  enough  for  all  purposes. 

Instead  of  rearranging  the  ratio  to  conform  to  the 
French  ratio,  so  as  to  secure  the  return  of  silver,  and  the 
concurrent  circulation  of  both  metals,  Congress  prohib¬ 
ited  the  coinage  of  silver  when  it  was  worth  3  cents  more 
than  the  gold  dollar,  and  made  gold  the  sole  money  of 
redemption. 

CHAPTER  IX. 

THE  DEMONETIZATION  OF  SILVER  IN  1873. 

The  demonetization  of  silver  consists  of  two  elements, 
without  possessing  both  of  which  it  can  never  be  fully 
demonetized;  first,  prohibiting  or  restricting  it  free,  un¬ 
limited  coinage;  second,  the  disuse  of  all  silver  money 
already  coined,  or  to  be  afterward  coined  as  money  of 
absolute  and  ultimate  redemption.  The  demonetization 
act  of  1873,  which  omitted  the  coinage  of  the  silver  dol¬ 
lar,  and  destroyed  its  legal  tender  qualities,  provided 
“that  the  gold  coins  of  the  United  States  shall  be  a  dollar 
piece,  which,  at  the  standard  weight  of  25.8  grains,  shall 


44 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


be  the  unit  of  value;”  then  follows  directions  as  to  the 
weight  and  fineness  of  the  other  gold  coins. 

The  distinction  between  the  bimetallic  law  of  1792 
and  the  gold  monometallic  law  of  1873  consists  in  this, 
that  by  the  bimetallic  law  of  1792  the  mints  were  open 
to  the  free,  unlimited  coinage  of  both  gold  and  silver 
at  a  fixed  ratio,  and  that  both  metals  were  used  as 
money  of  ultimate  redemption;  while  by  the  gold  mono¬ 
metallic  law  of  1873,  though  the  mints  remained  open 
to  the  free,  unlimited  coinage  of  gold,  they  were  closed 
to  silver,  its  coinage  being  prohibited,  and  gold  alone 
being  used  as  redemption  money,  thus  destroying  the 
competition  of  silver  and  permitting  gold  to  go  to  any 
premium  that  greed  could  exact. 

By  the  bimetallic  law  of  1792  the  unit  of  value,  100 
cents,  was  expressed  in  the  silver  dollar  of  371J  grains 
pure,  and  also  by  the  fictitious  gold  dollar  of  24.7  grains, 
pure.  Both  dollars  were  legal  tender  for  anything  and 
any  amount;  they  competed;  if  one  got  too  dear,  the 
other  was  used,  until  their  values  equalized;  that  was 
our  bimetallic  system.  Restore  that  system,  even  though 
the  unit  or  dollar  be  expressed  in  gold  and  the  silver 
dollar’s  weight  be  regulated  by  ratio  in  proportion  to 
the  gold  dollar  and  bimetallism  would  be  re-established. 
The  silver  men  are  not  advocates  of  silver  monometal¬ 
lism,  because  they  do  not  seek  to  secure  the  free,  un¬ 
limited  coinage  of  silver  and  prohibit  the  coinage  of  gold, 
neither  do  they  attempt  to  make  silver  the  sole  money 
of  redemption.  That  would  be  silver  monometallism. 
The  silver  advocates  on  the  contrary  demand  the  restora¬ 
tion  of  the  bimetallic  system  which  existed  until  its  re¬ 
peal  in  1873,  and  which  even  the  opponents  of  its  restora¬ 
tion  concede  was  bimetallic. 

Silver  cannot  be  remonetized  by  coining  it  free  in 
unlimited  quantities,  if  it  be  not  treated  and  actually  used 
as  redemption  money,  nor  can  it  be  remonetized  by  using 
it  as  redemption  money  and  prohibiting  its  coinage.  To 
be  remonetized  silver  must  both  be  admitted  to  free, 
unlimited  coinage  and  treated  as  money  of  redemption 
equally  with  gold. 

There  has  been  about  $500,000,000  in  silver  dollars 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


45 


coined  since  1878,  more  than  in  the  80  preceding  years 
of  the  Republic,  but  that  did  not  restore  bimetallism  for 
those  dollars,  though  declared  by  law  to  be  legal  tender 
for  anything  and  everything,  were  not  treated  so  by  the 
.Treasury  Department,  which  has  persistently,  since  1878, 
redeemed  all  government  bonds  and  certificates,  by  their 
terms  redeemable  in  coin,  either  gold  or  silver,  in  gold 
alone.  The  act  of  February,  1873,  partly  demonetized 
silver  by  omitting  the  coinage  of  the  silver  dollar,  and 
limiting  the  legal  tender  qualities  of  other  silver  coins, 
that  is,  subsidiary  coins,  to  $10.  Another  act  passed 
in  December,  1873,  restricted  the  legal  tender  qualities 
of  ALL  silver  coins  to  $10,  thereby  completing  its  de¬ 
monetization.  The  Bland-Allison  Law  of  1878  partly 
remonetized  silver  by  restoring  to  the  silver  dollar  its 
complete  legal  tender  qualities,  but  it  limited  its  coinage 
to  not  more  than  $4,000,000  a  month,  nor  less  than 
$2,000,000  a  month.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 
Sherman,  refused  to  coin  more  than  the  minimum 
amount  required  by  the  law,  disseminating  the  pernicious, 
infamous  and  unconstitutional  heresy  that  silver  was  a 
cheap  money,  not'  to  be  trusted,  and  unfit  to  pay  the 
national  coin  obligations  and  bonds  which  he  and  all  of 
his  successors  in  office  have  persistently  redeemed  ex¬ 
clusively  in  gold,  in  palpable  violation  of  the  law.  If 
silver  was  “cheap”  money  in  1878  it  was  because  he  was 
the  cause  of  it  in  large  measure,  for  when  its  demonetiza¬ 
tion  was  secured  in  1873,  it  was  accomplished  for  the 
reason  that  silver  was  worth  TOO  MUCH,  being  worth 
103  cents,  the  reason  which  he  has  given  as  the  ground 
for  its  disuse  as  money,  thus  committing  himself  to  the 
use  of  cheap  money,  gold,  in  1873.  The  gold  standard 
advocates  claim  that  silver  is  <not  an  “honest  dollar”  be¬ 
cause  only  worth  50  cents.  If  it  is  worth  only  50  cents 
who  made  it  so?  If  it  is  dishonest  who  is  responsible 
for  it?  If  the  legislation  of  1873  could  make  a  103-cent 
silver  dollar  worth  only  50  cents,  the  repeal  of  that  legis¬ 
lation  should  raise  it  back  to  103  cents. 

The  “hammer  test”  is  a  popular  fallacy.  It  is  con¬ 
tended  that  only  that  money  which  is  worth  as  much 
in  the  bullion  as  it  purports  to  be  worth  in  the  coin, 


46 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


is  honest  money.  Under  equal  conditions  this  is  true, 
but  when  gold  is  allowed  and  silver  denied  free  coinage 
it  is  as  absurd  as  it  is  unjust. 

After  the  demonetization  of  silver,  a  gold  and  a  silver 
dollar,  one  is  worth  ioo,  the  other  only  50  cents.  Why? 
Let  the  owner  take  the  gold  dollar  when  melted  to  the 
goldsmith  for  sale,  and  demand  100  cents  for  its  23.2 
pure  grains;  he  gets  it  because  otherwise  he  can  take  it 
to  the  mints  and  have  it  coined  free,  stamped  100  cents, 
which  will  pass  current  everywhere  for  that  amount. 

Then  let  him  take  the  silver  dollar  after  it  is  melted 
to  the  silversmith  and  demand  100  cents  for  its  371^ 
grains;  he  doesn’t  get  it  because  he  must  take  what 
the  purchaser  chooses  to  give,  else  get  nothing,  for  he 
cannot  get  it  coined,  the  Government  refuses  to  stamp 
100  cents  on  it.  But  give  the  silver  owner  the  right  to 
have  it  coined  free,  in  unlimited  quantities,  on  equal 
terms  with  gold,  then  would  he  take  less  for  it?  Try  him. 

The  demonetization  of  silver  doubled  the  demand  for 
gold,  and  divided  the  demand  for  silver;  the  consequence 
was  that  the  value  of  gold  was  doubled,  while  the  value 
of  silver  was  reduced  one-half.  The  demand  for  gold 
was  equal  to  the  supply,  while  silver  was  thrown  on  the 
market  and  compelled  to  take  what  it  could  get.  This 
forced  their  legal  and  commercial  ratios  apart.  Had  the 
tables  been  reversed,  would  gold  have  fared  any  better? 
From  1687  to  1873  the  commercial  ratio  was  the  same 
as  the  legal,  because  fixed  by  it,  which  was  never  in 
those  two  centuries  lower  than  14.14  to  1,  and  never 
higher  than  16.25  to  1,  a  variation  of  two  per  cent.  Ob¬ 
serve  the  instant  and  tremendous  change  between  the 
market  and  the  legal  ratios  of  gold  and  silver  since 
1873,  down  to  1894. 


THE  GREAT  CHANGE  IN  THE  MARKET  RATIO  OF  GOLD  AND 


SILVER. 


Years.  Market  Ratio. 

1874  . 16.17  to  1. 

1875  . 16.59  to  1. 

1876  . 17.88  to  1. 

1877  . 17.22  to  1. 

1878  . 17.94  to  1. 


Years.  Market  Ratio. 

1879  . 18.40  to  1. 

1880  . 18.05  to  1. 

1881  . 18.18  to  1. 

1882  . 18.19  to  1. 

1883  . 18.64  to  1. 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


47 


Years. 

Market  Ratio. 

Years. 

Market  Ratio. 

1884. .. . 

.  .18.57  to  1. 

1890. .. 

. .  .19.75  to  1. 

1885. .. . 

.  .19.41  to  1. 

1891. . 

. .  .20.92  to  1. 

1886. . . . 

.  .20.78  to  1. 

1892. . 

. .  .23.73  to  1. 

1887. .. . 

.  .21.13  to  1. 

1893. .. 

.  .  .29.78  to  1. 

1888. .. . 
1889. .. . 

.  .21.99  to  1. 

.  .22.09  to  1. 

1894. . 

..  .32.00  to  1. 

Thus  we  see  that  a  change  has  occurred  of  ioo  per  cent, 
in  twenty  years  under  gold  monometallism,  while  there 
was  a  change  of  only  two  per  cent,  in  two  centuries  under 
bimetallism.  Which  system  imparts  greater  stability  to 
values? 

CHAPTER  X. 

THE  UNCONSTITUTIONALITY  OF  DEMONETIZATION. 

The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  of  America  pro¬ 
vides,  Article  i,  Section  8,  “That  Congress  shall  have 
power,  To  coin  money,  regulate  the  value  thereof,  and  of 
foreign  coin,  and  fix  the  standard  of  weights  and  meas¬ 
ures;”  in  Article  i,  Section  io,  it  provides  that  “No  State 
shall  enter  into  any  treaty,  alliance  or  confederation ;  grant 
letters  of  marque  and  reprisal;  coin  money;  emit  bills  of 
credit;  make  anything  but  gold  AND  silver  coin  a  tender 
in  payment  of  debts;  pass  any  bill  of  attainder,  ex  post 
facto  law,  or  law  impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts,  or 
grant  any  title  of  nobility.” 

In  the  first  section  cited,  Congress  is  authorized  and 
empowered  to  coin  money  and  regulate  the  value  thereof; 
in  the  second  section  cited  the  States  are  expressly  for¬ 
bidden  “to  make  anything  but  gold  and  silver  a  tender 
for  the  payment  of  debts.”  It  should  be  carefully  noted 
that  the  expression  gold  AND  silver,  not  gold  OR  silver 
is  used.  The  ioth  section  expresses  the  kind  of  coin  that 
Congress  shall  make  into  money,  that  it  shall  be  not  gold 
OR  silver,  either  or  both,  but  that  it  shall  be  both  gold 
AND  silver;  on  this  point  the  Constitution  is  not  directory 
but  mandatory;  Congress  is  given  no  option  as  to  the 
kind  of  coin  to  be  selected,  it  must  be  gold  AND  silver; 
to  its  wisdom,  however,  is  left  the  task  of  determining 
the  standard  to  be  established,  the  fixing  of  the  ratio  be¬ 
tween  gold  AND  silver,  and  the  regulation  of  THEIR 
values,  and  of  foreign  coin,  for  the  reason  that  ratios, 


48 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


standards  and  conditions  may  change,  as  they  have 
changed.  Rather  than  construe  the  Constitution  as  to 
the  power  of  Congress  to  demonetize  either  gold  or  silver, 
or  both,  the  author  prefers  to  quote  the  great  Webster,  and 
the  lamented  Blaine  and  Garfield  on  this  question,  so  that 
their  reputation  may  give  added  weight  to  the  opinion.. 

Our  Government  is,  as  Lincoln  declared,  “A  Government 
of  the  people,  for  the  people,  and  by  the  people.”  The 
only  method  to  change  or  amend  the  Constitution,  is  by 
an  Act  of  Congress,  passed  by  a  two-thirds  majority,  and 
adopted  by  three-fourths  of  the  States  of  the  Union. 

That  is  the  Government  that  the  Revolutionary  Fath¬ 
ers  established;  that  is  the  Government  that  we  had  for 
80  years;  that  is  the  Government  which  unknown  to  the 
people,  unknowni  to  the  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Repre¬ 
sentatives,  James  G.  Blaine,  which  passed  the  Act  of  1873, 
unknown  to  the  President,  Ulysses  S.  Grant,  who  ap¬ 
proved  it,  whose  Constitution  was  unconstitutionally 
changed. 

The  Constitution  provided  that  both  gold  and  silver 
should  be  money,  that  both  should  be  coined  at  the  ratio 
and  value  fixed  by  Congress  and  that  both  shall  be  legal 
tender  for  all  debts.  That  question  was  never  submitted 
to  the  people,  to  determine  whether  they  desired  and 
willed  that  the  Bimetallic  System  should  be  discarded, 
that  question  was  never  submitted,  because  the  assassins 
of  the  people’s  rights  dared  not  submit  it;  they  could  not 
have  carried  a  single  State  on  that  issue. 

The  Constitution  provides  that  Congress  shall  pass  no 
laws  impairing  the  obligations  of  contracts,  yet  Congress 
could  not  have  passed  any  law  which  more  flagrantly  im¬ 
paired  the  obligations  of  contracts  than  the  Demonetiza¬ 
tion  Act  of  1873,  which  revolutionized  the  measure  of 
values  itself  by  which  everything  is  adjusted  and  in  which 
all  contracts  are  expressed. 

Suppose  Congress  had  enacted  that  every  year  one  inch 
should  be  added  to  a  yard  measure,  would  not  that  have 
impaired  the  obligations  of  a  contract  that  required  a  mer¬ 
chant  or  manufacturer  to  furnish  1,000  yards  of  cloth  in 
a  yard  that  had  when  the  contract  fell  due  increased  to  say 
56  inches  in  twenty  years,  when  he  had  agreed  to  furnish 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


49 


1,000  yards  of  cloth  in  yards  36  indies  long';  the  injustice 
would  be  as  manifest  as  it  would  be  atrocious.  So  sup¬ 
pose  Congress  had  also  provided  that  the  bushel  meas¬ 
ure  should  increase  in'  size  from  32  quarts  to  52  quarts,  a 
quart  a  year  added,  would  not  it  have  impaired  the  obli¬ 
gation  of  the  contract  that  compelled  the  farmer  to  give 
more  of  his  produce  than  he  had  contracted  to  do,  simply 
because  the  bushel  had  grown  in  size,  have  imposed  bur¬ 
dens  upon  him  that  would  have  been  unjust  because  he 
received  no  additional  compensation  for  it?  If  Congress 
had  by  legislation  tampered  with  weight  and  made  the 
pound  increase  so  that  in  a  few  years  it  should  contain 
36  ounces  instead  of  16  when  the  contract  was  made,  an 
ounce  a  year  added,  everyone  could  see  the  infringement 
of  human  rights. 

Congress  did  not  do  those  things,  in  that  man¬ 
ner,  but  it  has  by  its  discriminative  legislations  against  sil¬ 
ver  made  the  103-cent  silver  dollar  of  1873  worth  only  50 
cents  in  1893,  and  the  97-cent  gold  dollar  of  1873  worth 
fully  200  cents  in  1893,  requiring  the  farmer  to  sell  his 
wheat  for  60  cents  in  1893  instead  of  $1.47  in  1873;  forcing 
the  producer  to  give  twice  as  much  of  his  products  as 
in  1873;  forcing  the  debtor  to  give  the  same  number  of 
dollars  as  he  had  contracted  to  give,  but  dollars  that 
had  become  twice  as  hard  to  get  and  which  will  buy 
twice  as  much  as  the  dollars  he  had  agreed  to  pay. 

Such  Constitutional  authorities  as  Daniel  Webster  be¬ 
lieved  that  neither  gold  nor  silver  could  be  demonetized; 
said  Webster: 

“I  am  clearly  of  the  opinion  that  neither  Congress  nor  any 
other  authority  can  legally  demonetize  either  gold  or  silver. 
The  command  to  Congress  is  to  coin  money,  not  to  destroy 
it;  to  create  legal  tender  money  for  the  use  of  the  people,  and 
the  grant  of  authority  to  create  money  cannot  be  construed 
to  mean  authority  to  destroy  money.” 

James  G.  Blaine  declared  in  the  Senate  Chamber,  Feb¬ 
ruary  7th,  1878,  during  the  Bland-Allison  Debate,  on  that 
subject,  in  part  as  follows: 

“I  believe  gold  and  silver  coin  to  be  the  money  of  the  Con¬ 
stitution;  indeed,  the  money  of  the  American  people  anterior 
to  the  Constitution,  which  that  great  organic  law  recognized 
as  quite  independent  of  its  own  existence.  No  power  was 


50  THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 

conferred  on  Congress  to  declare  that  either  metal  should  not 
be  money.  Congress  has  therefore  in  miy  judgment  no  power 
to  demonetize  silver,  any  more  than  to  demonetize  gold;  no 
power  to  demonetize  either,  than  to  demonetize  both.  If, 
therefore,  silver  has  been  demonetized,  I  am  in  favor  of  re¬ 
monetizing  it.  If  its  coinage  has  been  prohibited,  I  am  in 
favor  of  ordering  it  to  be  resumed.  If  it  has  been  restricted, 
I  am  in  favor  of  having  it  enlarged.  Few  persons  can  be 
found,  I  apprehend,  who  will  maintain  that  Congress  pos¬ 
sesses  the  power  to  demonetize  both  gold  and  silver,  or  that 
Congress  should  be  justified  in  prohibiting  the  coinage  of 
both;  and  yet  in  logic  and  legal  construction  it  would  be  diffi¬ 
cult  to  show  where  and  why  the.  power  of  Congress  over  silver 
is  greater  than  over  gold,  greater  over  either  than  over  the 
two.” 

James  A.  Garfield,  during  this  same  Bland-Allison  De¬ 
bate  stated  his  position  upon  the  question  as  follows: 

“Every  man  who  is  opposed  to  the  use  of  silver  coin  as 
part  of  the  legal  currency  of  the  country,  I  disagree  with. 
Every  man  who  is  opposed  to  the  actual  legal  use  of  both 
metals,  I  disagree  with.  I  would  endow  the  two  dollars  with 
equality  and  make  the  coinage  free.” 

Webster  and  Blaine  regarded  the  demonetization  of 
silver  unconstitutional,  though  Webster  died  years  before 
it  was  demonetized  . 

It  is  refreshing  to  find  men  who  are  really  statesmen; 
who  possess  the  courage  of  their  convictions  and  have  the 
manhood  to  declare  them  whether  it  costs  them  votes  or 
not;  who  believe  that  the  people  whose  suffrages  they 
seek  are  entitled  to  be  acquainted  with  their  position  upon 
the  great  issues  of  the  day,  instead  of  declaring  for  “honest 
money,  maintained  at  a  parity”  and  yet  be  too  cowardly 
to  say  HOW  it  is  to  be  maintained  at  a  parity  or  explain 
what  is  “honest  money”  or  what  is  “dishonest  money.” 

The  defeat  of  Blaine  for  the  Presidency  was  a  great 
National  calamity,  due  to  the  machinations  of  Wall  Street. 
In  1876  the  efforts  of  the  Eastern  Capitalists  defeated 
Blaine  for  the  nomination,  and  again  in  1880  because  he 
was  a  champion  of  silver  and  an  advocate  of  bimetallism. 
Unable  to  secure  his  own  nomination  in  1880,  he  defeated 
the  candidates  of  Wall  Street  by  throwing  the  nomination 
to  Garfield,  an  advocate  of  bimetallism.  In  1884  Wall 
Street  defeated  the  election  of  Blaine  at  the  polls,  and  gave 
the  Presidency  to  Cleveland,  than  whom  subsequent 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


51 


events  have  amply  proven  it  could  not  have  secured  a 
more  subservient  tool,  and  a  worse  enemy  of  the  rights  of 
the  people. 

CHAPTER  XI. 

HAS  SILVER  FALLEN  OR  GOLD  RISEN  IN  VALUE  SINCE  1 873. 

The  value  of  money,  like  the  price  of  commodities,  is 
regulated  by  the  law  of  supply  and  demand.  A  fall  in  the 
value  of  money  can  be  effected  either  by  an  increase  in  the 
supply,  or  by  a  decrease  in  the  demand.  In  1873  the  sil¬ 
ver  in  our  silver  dollar  was  worth  103  cents  in  France, 
where  it  was  coined  at  a  lesser  ratio  than  in  the  United 
States;  to-day  it  is  worth,  as  measured  in  gold,  only  50 
cents.  What  has  caused  the  fall  in  its  value?  Was  the 
supply  too  great  or  was  the  demand  too  small?  The  ratio 
of  the  production  of  gold  and  silver,  prior  to  1873,  was  for 
awhile  as  high  as  47  to  1,  indicating  a  legal  and  commer¬ 
cial  ratio  of  47  to  1,  yet  under  its  free  coinage,  its  legal 
ratio  fixed  the  market  ratio  at  15  J  to  1.  Since  1873  their 
ratio  of  production  has  averaged  18  to  1,  indicating  a  com¬ 
mercial  and  legal  ratio  of  18  to  1,  yet  the  commercial 
ratio  was,  in  1894,  32  to  1. 

During  the  period  1801  to  1851  the  world’s  output 
of  gold  was  $768,000,000;  of  silver  $1,400,000,000;  an  ex¬ 
cess  of  silver  amounting  to  $614,000,000.  But  the  value 
of  silver,  instead  of  falling,  was  maintained  on  a  parity 
with  gold,  simply  because  of  the  fact  that  they  were  given 
equal  rights  and  were  equally  used,  silver  was  maintained 
on  a  parity  with  gold  and  that,  too,  without  redeeming  it 
in  gold,  as  the  new  fangled  school  of  financiers  imagine 
to  be  essential.  During  the  period  1851  to  1892  the 
world’s  output  of  silver  was  $3,704,000,000;  of  gold  $4,- 
847,000,000;  an  excess  of  gold  amounting  to  $1,143,- 
000,000.  During  this  entire  period  of  92  years  the  pro¬ 
duction  of  gold  has  exceeded  that  of  silver  by  $530,000,- 
000,  so  that  if  either  metal  should  have  been  cheapened 
by  its  alleged  overproduction,  it  manifestly  should  have 
been  gold  instead  of  silver. 

But  the  values  of  gold  and  silver  are  not,  as  has  been 
proven,  regulated  by  their  production,  but  by  the  demand 
for  their  use  as  money,  and  their  supply.  Certainly  the 

5  \  t  j  ^ 


52 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


demand  for  money  is  not  less  than  it  was  in  1873,  but  the 
demand  for  silver  is  less  now  than  then,  while  the  demand 
for  gold,  due  to  the  boycott  of  silver,  is  greater  now  than 
it  was  then,  or  greater  than  it  should  have  become. 

The  production  of  gold  in  1873  was  $96,000,000;  in  1895 
it  was  $192,000,000;  the  production  of  silver  in  1873  was 
$82,000,000;  in  1895  it  was  $196,000,000.  The  produc¬ 
tion  of  both  gold  and  silver  have  about  doubled  since  1873. 
If  this  overproduction  theory  is  correct,  why  has  silver 
fallen  50  per  cent,  in  value,  because  its  supply  has  doubled 
during  the  same  period  of  time  that  the  supply  of  gold  has 
also  doubled.  Why  has  silver  gone  down  and  gold  gone 
up?  We  are  told  that  its  reduced  value  is  due  to  im¬ 
proved  machinery  and  a  diminished  cost  of  production  of 
silver.  The  same  would  be  equally  true  of  the  improved 
machinery  to  obtain  gold,  yet  the  value  of  gold  has  risen 
instead  of  falling  as  silver  has  done.  Why?  Improved 
methods  of  production  to  reduce  the  cost  of  mining  gold 
and  silver  were  devised  prior  to  1873,  yet  the  value  of 
silver  did  not  fall  nor  the  value  of  gold  rise  until  after  the 
demonetization  of  silver. 

The  cost  of  production  does  not  control  the  value 
of  money  metals,  for  sometimes  $100,000  is  expended 
to  obtain  one  ounce  of  silver,  yet  that  ounce,  instead 
of  selling  for  $100,000,  as  it  should,  got  in  1873  only 
$1.29  and  in  1893  only  60  cents;  the  average  cost  of  pro¬ 
ducing  an  ounce  of  silver  is  estimated  at  about  $2  an 
ounce.  A  miner  may  estimate  his  labor  worth  $5  a 
day,  and  yet  accidentally  he  might  pick  up  a  nugget 
of  pure  gold,  weighing  50  ounces,  making  the  cost  of  its 
production  only  10  cents  an  ounce,  yet  it  commands 
at  the  mint  and  in  the  market,  a  value  of  $20.68  an  ounce, 
for  the  average  cost  of  its  production  exceeds  as  a  rule 
that  figure. 

As  the  overproduction  of  the  metal  that  is  alleged  to 
have  caused  the  fall  in  the  value  of  silver  should  have 
also  caused  the  fall  of  gold,  instead  of  which  gold 
doubled  in  value,  while  the  value  of  silver  was  diminished 
by  one-half,  it  is  evident  that  overproduction  did  not 
operate  to  produce  this  impossible  variance.  Why  then 
has  it  fallen?  The  true  test  of  this  overproduction  theory 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


53 


is  this:  If  both  gold  and  silver  money  have  been  used 
without  discrimination,  given  equal  rights  and  uses  since 
1873,  any  overproduction  of  either  gold  or  silver,  or  of 
both,  would  have  increased  the  total  supply  of  money 
which  would  be  followed  by  a  fall  in  the  value  of  all 
money,  of  both  gold  and  silver,  not  of  either  gold  or 
silver,  alone.  The  fact  is  that,  after  its  coinage,  the  silver 
dollar  buys  as  much  produce  as  gold  does,  but  does  not 
pay  as  much  debt  as  gold  does,  simply  because  the  cred¬ 
itor  will  not  accept  it.  It  is  contended  that  if  coined 
free,  the  value  of  silver  money  would  fall,  while  that 
of  gold  would  remain  stationary,  if  it  did  not  actually 
rise  as  much  as  silver  fell.  If  this  be  true,  it  would  only 
demonstrate  that  the  demand  is  manipulated;  that  there 
is  a  discrimination  in  the  use  of  money,  a  disuse  of  silver 
and  an  overuse  of  gold,  causing  silver  to  fall  and  gold 
to  rise. 

Destroy  the  unconstitutional  privilege  of  creditors  to 
choose  what  kind  of  money  the  debtor  shall  pay  him, 
and  give  that  choice  to  the  debtor,  as  the  Constitution 
gave  him,  and  a  large  part  of  the  premium  on  gold  would 
be  destroyed.  By  no  other  theory  than  a  discrimination 
in  the  demand  for,  that  is,  the  use  of  money,  can  the 
rise  in  the  value  of  gold  and  the  fall  in  the  value  of  silver 
be  satisfactorily  explained.  The  Rothschilds  have  boy¬ 
cotted  silver,  thereby  doubling  the  demand  for  gold,  and 
destroying  half  of  the  demand  for  silver,  causing  the 
value  of  gold  to  go  up,  and  the  value  of  silver  to  go 
down. 

The  British  Delegate  from  India,  Sir  Guilford  Moles- 
wortli,  to  the  Brussels  Monetary  Conference,  said: 

“Since  1873  the  population  demanding  gold  lias  quadrupled, 
and  the  foreign  trade  demanding  gold  has  trebled.  The  de¬ 
monetization  of  silver  for  international  monetary  purposes 
in  Europe  has  caused  gold  to  perform,  single  handed,  the 
work  previously  done  by  gold  and  silver  combined.  The  an¬ 
nual  supply  of  gold  scarcely  exceeds  the  amount  required  for 
industrial  purposes.  It  follows  as  a  necessary  sequence  of 
the  facts,  that  with  the  increased  demand  for  gold,  its  value 
must  rise,  or  in  other  words,  gold  prices  must  fall.” 


54 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


CHAPTER  XII. 

FOREIGN  TESTIMONY  TO  THE  RISE  IN  THE  VALUE  OF  GOLD. 

In  October,  1892,  the  distinguished  British  statesman, 
Mr.  Balfour,  declared: 

“But  there  is  another  point,  namely,  the  utility  of  our  mon¬ 
etary  standard  as  a  permanent  record  of  debts  and  obliga¬ 
tions,  lasting  through  long  periods  of  time.  Can  we  claim 
that  great  quality  for  a  standard  which  monometallists  admit 
has  appreciated  30  to  35  per  cent,  in  fifteen  years,  and  of 
whose  appreciation  no  man  living  can  prophesy  the  limits. 
A  monetary  standard  of  which  this  can  be  said  does  not  ful¬ 
fill  the  very  elementary  qualities  which  we  require  in  a  mon¬ 
etary  standard.  I  have  no  desire  for  inflation.  Give  me  a 
standard  which  will  remain  constant  and  I  ask  no  more, 
but  do  not  put  me  off  with  a  standard  which  rises  35  per 
cent,  in  fifteen  years.  If  I  have  to  choose,  if  I  am  given  the 
unwelcome  choice  between  a  standard  which  appreciates  and 
a  standard  which  depreciates;  between  a  system  under  which 
prices  are  lowered  and  a  system  under  which  prices  are  raised, 
then  in  the  interest  of  every  class  in  the  community,  not 
excluding  the  owners  of  fixed  debt,  give  me  a  standard  which 
depreciates,  and  give  me  prices  which  rise.” 

The  British  Royal  Commission  on  the  Depression  of 
Trade  in  1885,  reported  in  part  as  follows: 

“That  the  depression  dated  from  the  year  1873  or  there¬ 
abouts;  that  it  extended  to  every  branch  of  industry,  includ¬ 
ing  agriculture,  manufacture  and  mining,  and  that  it  was 
not  confined  to  England,  but  had  been  experienced  to  a  greater 
or  less  degree  in  all  the  industrial  countries  of  the  world; 
that  it  appeared  to  be  closely  connected  with  the  serious  fall 
in  the  general  prices  which  even  then  was  most  observable, 
though  it  has  since  been  more  strongly  marked,  resulting  in 
the  diminution,  in  some  cases  in  even  the  total  loss  of  profit, 
and  consequent  irregularity  of  employment  to  the  wage- 
earners;  that  the  duration  of  the  depression  has  been  most 
unusual  and  abnormal;  that  no  adequate  cause  for  this  state 
of  things  was  discoverable,  unless  it  be  found  in  some  gen¬ 
eral  dislocation  of  values  caused  by  currency  changes  and 
which  only  would  be  capable  of  affecting  an  area  equal  to 
that  which  the  depression. of  trade  covered.” 

Sir  William  Houldsworth,  British  Delegate  to  the  Brus¬ 
sels  Conference,  said: 

“Is  it  not  apparent  on  my  friend’s  own  showing  THAT  A 
NEW  FACTOR  has  appeared  in  the  field  of  industry.  Things 
arp  not  as  they  wTere.  The  reason  is  plain;  the  foundations 
have  given  away  upon  which  trade  rests.  The  standard  of 
value  has  been  ALTERED.” 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


55 


Mr.  Giffen,  one  of  the  ablest  and  staunchest  advocates 
of  the  single  gold  standard  in  Great  Britain,  says: 

“The  fall  of  prices  in  such  a  general  way  as  to  amount  to 
what  is  generally  known  as  a  rise  in  the  purchasing  power 
of  gold,  is  generally,  I  might  almost  say  universally,  admitted. 
Measured  by  any  commodity  or  group  of  commodities  usually 
taken  as  a  measure  for  such  purpose,  gold  is  undoubtedly 
possessed  of  more  'purchasing  power  than  was  the  case  fifteen 
or  twenty  years  ago,  and  thisi  high  purchasing  power  has  been 
continued  over  a  long  enough  period  to  allow  for  all  minor 
oscillations.  We  have  a  clear  and  definite  idea  that  silver 
has  not  depreciated  at  all;  it  is  simply  gold  that  has  risen. 
It  is  quite  a  fact  that  a  large  proportion  of  the  national  debt 
of  this  country  (England)  was  accumulated  at  a  period  when 
15  quarters  of  wheat  would  buy  a  consol;  to-day  it  takes  75 
quarters  to  pay  it  off.” 

The  people  of  the  United  States  have  an  equally  clear 
and  definite  idea  that  it  takes  more  of  labor,  more  of 
labor’s  products,  to  pay  off  the  debt  contracted  some 
years  past,  than  it  did  then,  and  that  it  the  evil  which 
it  is  proposed  to  remedy. 

•In  1883  Mr.  Goschen,  a  great  British  statesman,  thus 
felicitously  expressed  himself: 

“The  fall  of  prices  comes  from  the  rise  of  gold.  Fortunate 
are  those  who  own  sovereigns,  and  unfortunate  are  those  who 
own  commodities.  Take  care;  gold  is  increasing  in  value, 
prices  are  falling,  and  a  crisis  menaces  us.” 

A  little  later,  on  another  occasion,  he  declared: 

“We  have  escaped  by  the  skin  of  our  teeth.” 

“We  can  say  positively  that  the  recent  change  from  a  high 
to  a  low  level  of  prices  is  due  to  a  change  in  the  money  in  the 
direction,  and  of  the  nature  of  absolute  contraction.”— Giffen. 

Alphonse  Allard,  Delegate  to  the  Brussels  Monetary 
Conference,  from  Belgium,  said: 

“The  crisis  which  was  foretold  in  1870  is  now  at  hand,  and 
in  action.  The  disturbances  which  it  produces  are  the  more 
unjust  and  profound,  since  the  fall  in  prices  is  not  produced 
by  the  development  of  labor,  or  by  the  abundance  of  wealth, 
but  by  an  artificial  cause,  which  is  none  other  than  the  law 
proscribing  silver,  and  thereby  producing  the  appreciation  of 
gold.  No  variation  in  the  level  of  prices  can  be  observed 
in  silver  countries.  It  follows,  therefore,  that  the  depreciation 
of  silver  in  Europe  is  only  produced  by  the  appreciation  of 
gold.  It  seems,  therefore,  to  me  obvious,  that  it  is  the  opera¬ 
tion  of  the  appreciation  of  gold  which  makes  us  believe  in 
the  depreciation  of  silver.  As  to  the  fall  of  silver,  there  is 


56 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


none,  except  that  which  we  have  created  for  ourselves  in 
Europe,  where  silver  is  valued  in  gold.  We  have  seen  that 
there  is  no  fall  of  silver,  besides  that  which  we  ourselves 
bring  about  by  measuring  it  in  gold,  which  is  scarce.  I  have 
shown  you  that  the  real  evil  followed  not  from  the  fall  of 
silver,  but  from  the  appreciation  of  gold.  Have  you  not 
heard  from  the  delegates  from  Mexico,  that  in  theirs,  a  silver 
producing  country,  where  the  circulation  consists  solely  of 
silver,  and  where,  if  that  metal  had  been  depreciated,  it  would 
have  been  felt  soonest  of  all,  that  the  imaginary  depreciation 
has  never  existed.  Silver,  they  tell  us,  still  buys  in  Mexico 
the  same  quantities  of  commodities  as  before.” 

Equally  emphatic  in  denial  of  the  depreciation  of  silver, 
is  the  utterance  of  the  London  Statist,  a  gold  standard 
paper,  which  says: 

“We  presume  that  the  plan  is  based  upon  the  mistaken 
notion  that  the  value  of  gold  is  more  stable  than  that  of  silver. 
We  have  seen  between  1873  and  1880  all  gold  prices  fall  ruin¬ 
ously.  We  have  also  seen  that  during  the  same  period  silver 
prices  did  not  fall;  in  other  words,  while  the  smaller  quantity 
of  gold,  year  after  year,  exchanged  for  a  larger  quantity  of 
commodities,  silver  included;  the  same  quantity,  or  nearly  the 
same,  exchanged  for  the  same  quantity  of  all  other  commodi¬ 
ties,  gold  excluded.  Does  it  not  necessarily  follow  that  the 
value  of  silver  during  the  past  twenty  years  has  been  far 
more  stable  than  the  value  of  gold?” 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

THE  FALL  IN  THE  PRICE  OF  COMMODITIES  SINCE  1873. 

The  fall  in  the  value  of  silver  after  its  demonetization 
has  been  accompanied  by  a  corresponding  fall  in  the  price 
of  commodities  in  gold  countries,  whether  free  trade  or 
protective.  Silver  has  fallen  in  value  from  $1.29  an  ounce 
to  only  60  cents  since  -1873,  during  which  time  the  price 
of  wheat  has  fallen  from  $1.47  a  bushel.  This  fall  we 
are  told  is  due  to  overproduction.  In  answer  to  this  fa¬ 
vorite  theory  of  the  gold  standard  advocates,  we  quote 
M.  Allard,  at  the  Brussels  Monetary  Conference,  who 
declared: 

'  “But  we  are  told  that  if  prices  have  fallen,  it  is  due  to 
overproduction.  M.  Cramer  Frey  has  told  us  that  prices  have 
fallen.  If  I  should  join  him  in  gravely  telling  you  that  for 
twenty  years  all  nations,  all  mankind,  has  been  so  obstinate 
as  to  produce  more  than  it  could  consume;  that  for  twenty 
years,  like  Danaides,  the  universe  has  produced  things  for 
which  it  had  no  use,  it  would  not  seem  serious  to  you,  and 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


57 


you  would  be  right.  That  is,  however,  the  paradoxical  char¬ 
acter  of  the  singular  theory  of  overproduction  by  wThich 
our  opponents  would  prove  that  our  privations  result 
from  an  excess  of  production,  and  that  labor  engenders 
poverty.  -  From  1850  to  1873  the  total  production  of  the  world 
increased  per  year  2.8  per  cent.  That  was  the  age  of  California 
and  bimetallism.  Prices  increased  40  per  cent.  From  1873 
to  1885  the  production  of  the  world  increased  only  1.6  per 
cent.,  a  decrease  of  nearly  one-half.  Prices  should  have  in¬ 
creased,  but  on  the  contrary  they  fell  32  per  cent.” 

The  price  of  the  staple  articles  of  agriculture,  which  are 
the  least  affected  by  improved  machinery,  has  also  fallen 
heavily.  Improvements  in  machinery  reducing  the  cost 
of  production  were  devised  prior  to  1873,  yet  up  to  that 
year  when  all  prices  culminated  in  the  highest,  prices  had 
risen  largely,  but  for  some  mysterious  reasons  after  the 
demonetization  of  silver  they  began  to  fall;  yet  we  are 
told  it  is  not  the  result  of  cause  and  effect.  The  price  of 
cotton  fell  from  19.3  cents  in  1872  under  bimetallism,  to 
only  7.2  cents  in  1893  under  gold  monometallism;  wheat 
has  fallen  from  $1.47  a  bushel  to  only  60  cents;  silver  has 
fallen  from  $1.32  an  ounce  to  only  about  60  cents.  Had 
this  fall  in  values  and  prices  been  the  result  of  a  diminished 
cost  of  production,  as  is  claimed,  it  would  have  developed 
gradually  from  the  beginning  of  improvements  in  pro¬ 
ductive  processes,  and  reduced  the  price  of  products  sim¬ 
ultaneously,  instead  of  these  improved  processes  advanc¬ 
ing  prices  steadily  up  to  1873,  then  suddenly  and  abruptly 
reducing  prices  from  year  on  to  the  present  day.  To  say 
the  least,  it  is  decidedly  queer,  but  it  proves  that  prices 
have  been  influenced  by  some  factor  outside  and  uncon¬ 
nected  with  improved  machinery  and  reduced  processes 
of  production. 

Again,  is  it  not  equally  queer,  that  while  improved  pro¬ 
cesses  of  production  have  reduced  the  prices  of  products 
in  all  gold  standard  countries,  those  same  improvements 
have  in  all  silver  standard  at  least  maintained,  if  not  ad¬ 
vanced  prices.  Said  Sir  Guilford  Molesworth,  at  the 
Brussels  Monetary  Conference: 

“It  is  absurd  to  suppose  that  a  revolution  of  this  character 
could  have  affected  gold  prices  so  seriously  and  yet  should 
have  left  silver  prices  unaffected.  Silver  is  the  standard  of 
value  of  more  than  half  the  world,  yet  silver  prices  have  re- 


58 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


mained  stable,  whilst  gold  prices  have  fallen  from  40  to  50 
per  cent.” 

Let  us  apply  the  overproduction  theory  to  the  fall  in 
the  price  of  wheat.  In  1887  the  world  raised  its  largest 
wheat  crop,  which  was  2,266,331,368  bushels.  The  av¬ 
erage  price  of  our  export  wheat  in  that  year  was  89  cents 
a  bushel.  In  1888  the  world’s  crop  was  45,000,000 
bushels  less  than  the  crop  of  1887,  yet  the  price  was  4  cents 
a  bushel  less  than  it  was  the  preceding  year.  In  1889  it 
was  191,000,000  bushels  less  than  the  crop  of  1887,  while 
the  price  was  only  1  cent  per  bushel  higher.  In  1890, 
the  crop  was  94,000,000  bushels  less  than  that  of  1887, 
yet  the  price  was  83  cents,  or  6  cents  less  than  the  price  in 
1887.  In  1891,  the  wheat  crop  was  61,000,000  bushels 
less  than  it  was  in  1887,  and  the  price  was  4  cents  per 
bushel  lower.  In  1892,  the  crop  was  49,000,000  bushels 
less  than  that  of  1887,  and  the  price  9  cents  lower.  In 
1893,  the  crop  was  166,000,000  bushels  less  than  that  of 
1887,  yet  the  price  instead  of  being  higher  as  it  should 
have  been,  was  only  65  cents  a  bushel,  which  was  24 
cents  a  bushel  lower  than  it  was  in  1887.  During  the 
decade  1882-1892,  it  is  estimated  that  the  world’s  popu¬ 
lation  increased  100,000,000.  Here  we  have  an  instance 
of  where  the  demand  enormously  increased;  the  supply 
largely  decreased,  yet  theprice,in  defianceof  the  established 
principles  of  economy,  fell.  In  1882  the  per  capita  pro¬ 
duction  of  wheat  was  1.52  bushels,  and  the  price  $1.19  a 
bushel;  in  1892  the  per  capita  production  was  1.36  bush¬ 
els,  yet  the  price  was  only  65  cents  a  bushel.  The  supply 
was  reduced  .16  bushel  per  capita,  but  the  price  fell  54 
cents  per  bushel,  and  that  too  in  the  face  of  a  vastly  in¬ 
creased  demand. 

Upon  whose  shoulders  have  rested  the  greater  losses 
entailed  by  the  demonetization  of  silver?  The  silver  pro¬ 
ducers  have  been  persistently  misrepresented  to  be  the 
only  class  that  has  suffered  by  its  demonetization,  and 
the  only  class  that  would  be  benefited  by  its  remonetiza¬ 
tion;  they  are  described  as  a  class  that  wants  to  get  a  dol¬ 
lar  for  50  cents’  worth  of  silver.  If  they  are  permitted  to 
coin  their  silver  free  at  the  rate  of  100  cents  for  371 J,  then 
the  market  price  would  be  the  same,  100  cents,  for  they 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


59 


would  not  take  50  cents  for  what  they  could  get  twice  as 
much  for.  The  loss  to  the  silver  producers,  through 
demonetization  of  silver,  has  never  in  any  year  since  then 
exceeded  $32,000,000,  while  the  loss,  due  to  the  same 
cause,  to  the  farmer  on  the  reduced  price  of  wheat,  was, 
in  1892,  over  $250,000,000. 

The  cotton  planter  has  also  suffered  a  heavy  loss;  the 
cotton  crop  for  1894  was  6,600,000  bales,  averaging  470 
pounds  each.  In  1873  it  was  16  cents  a  pound,  while  in 
1894,  though  the  demand  for  cotton  fabrics  was  immeas¬ 
urably  greater  in  the  latter  year  than  in  the  former,  was 
less  than  6  cents  a  pound  in  the  latter,  entailing  a  net  loss, 
due  to  demonetization  of  silver,  on  the  planter,  of  10  cents 
a  pound,  or  over  $310,000,000. 

The  acreage  loss  to  the  planter  by  the  fall  in  the  price  of 
cotton  in  the  20  years,  1873  to  1893,  has  been  from 
$28.01  to  only  $10.60  per  acre,  being  a  loss  of  62  per  cent. 
The  farmer  has  suffered  a  loss  on  the  fall  in  the  price  of 
wheat,  which  has  been  $13.16  to  $6.00  per  acre,  over  54 
per  cent.;  or,  if  the  acreage  of  the  five  great  staples  be 
taken  as  an  average,  we  find  that  the  agricultural  classes 
of  this  country  have  suffered  a  loss  on  the  acreage  of  wheat, 
corn,  oats,  hay  and  cotton  from  $15.65,  in  1873,  to  $8.15, 
showing  a  loss  of  48  per  cent. 

The  cotton  crop  of  our  country  in  1891  was  9,000,000; 
in  1892  it  was  6,717,000,  and  only  6,600,000,  in  1894,  re¬ 
vealing  a  heavy  reduction,  at  the  same  time,  however,  the 
price,  instead  of  rising  as  it  should  have  done,  fell  several 
cents  a  pound. 

The  aggregate  loss  that  the  agricultural  classes  have 
suffered  by  the  demonetization  of  silver,  and  the  conse¬ 
quent  appreciation  of  gold,  and  its  attendant  evil,  the  fall 
in  the  value  of  property,  on  the  reduced  price  of  their 
products  in  the  single  year  1893,  if  they  could  have  ob¬ 
tained  the  bimetallic  price  for  the  same  products  in  1873 
was  nearly  or  quite  $1,500,000,000.  In  other  words,  had 
bimetallism  been  retained  and  the  farmers  got  the  same 
price  for  their  products  in  1893  as  they  did  in  1873  they 
would  have  had  the  enormous  sum  of  $1,500,000,000  in 
their  pockets,  which  would  have  more  than  paid  the 
National  debt.  In  the  20  years,  1873  to  1893,  taking  the 


60 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


year  1893  as  an  average  of  the  loss  the  farmers  have  en¬ 
dured,  they  have  in  those  20  years  lost  the  stupendous  sum 
of  $30,000,000,000,  nearly  one-half  of  the  total  wealth  of 
the  United  States  in  1890,  during  which  time  the  silver 
producers  have  lost  the  paltry  sum  of  only  $640,000,000,  • 
though  itself  a  large  sum. 

The  owners  of  all  property,  whatsoever,  agricultural, 
manufacturing  or  real  estate,  have  suffered  the  same 
gigantic  losses,  due  to  the  fall  of  prices,  and  gold  men, 
those  who  seek  to  perpetuate  the  gold  standard  upon  us, 
tell  us  that  under  that  standard  there  is  no  hope  for  the 
producer,  that  throughout  all  the  years  to  come,  he  must, 
if  it  be  retained,  be  content  with  less  and  less  remuneration 
for  his  toil,  that  prices  will  continue  to  fall. 

M.  Leroy,  Beaulieu,  a  French  economist  and  an  advo¬ 
cate  of  the  single  gold  standard,  in  a  recent  article,  says: 

“For  my  part  I  do  not  look  for  a  very  decided  advance  in 
prices,  because  all  agricultural,  industrial  and  scientific  prog¬ 
ress  tends  to  render  products  generally  more  abundant,  less 
costly,  and  more  freely  offered,  and  because,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  rate  of  increase  of  population  tends  to  fall 
away  in  most  countries.” 

Certainly  this  is  not  a  very  rosy  prospect,  to  present  to 
men  and  ask  their  suffrages  to  endorse;  no  wonder  the 
population  tends  to  fall  away,  wages  growing  steadily  less 
and  less,  and  to  grow  still  smaller  there  is  not  much  in¬ 
ducement  to  live.  Again  says  Beaulieu: 

“Compared  with  other  industries,  the  silver  mining  industry 
of  the  United  States,  according  to  official  figures,  is  but  a 
trifling  affair— $37,500,000,  market  value,  and  double  that  at 
coinage  value.  What  are  these  sums  compared  to  the  immense 
products  of  every  sort  of  the  United  States?  Less  that  one- 
half  per  cent,  of  the  total  product,  if  we  take  the  market 
value;  less  than  one  per  cent.,  even,  if  we  take  the  coinage 
value.  And  to  give  an  artificial  value  to  such  an  insignifi¬ 
cant  portion  of  its  product  the  United  States  would  compro¬ 
mise  all  the  rest.  That  appears  manifestly  unreasonable.” 

In  the  respect  of  the  value  of  its  product  the  silver 
mines  are,  as  we  have  just  demonstrated,  very  insignifi¬ 
cant  compared  with  the  agricultural  industry;  it  has  not 
been  as  large,  as  flourishing,  nor  as  profitable  as  the  gold 
brokerage  business  has  proven  to  have  been  since  1873. 
But  as  a  measure  of  value,  the  effect  its  coinage  would 


61 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 

have  upon  the  prices  of  commodities  the  remonetization  of 
silver  is  of  paramount  importance  and  advantage  to  every 
industry  in  our  country.  It  is  difficult  to  conceive  how 
the  rest  of  the  industries  of  the  United  States  could  be 
more  seriously  compromised  by  the  remonetization  of  sil¬ 
ver,  than  they  have  all  been  compromised  by  the  gold 
standard  since  1873;  the  farmers  alone  have  lost,  since 
then,  $30,000,000,000,  while  the  silver  producers  have  lost 
the  comparatively  insignificant  sum  of  only  $640,000,000. 
Says  Beaulieu  again: 

“The  interest  of  the  United  States  as  a  producer  of  silver 
is  wholly  secondary  in  comparison  with  the  IMMENSE 
ADVANTAGE  the  country  would  have  in  the  possession  of 
A  SOLID  METALLIC  CURRENCY  resting  on  the  metal 
adopted  by  the  chief  civilized  countries,  and  which,  by  its 
great  value  and  small  volume,  is  alone  suited  to  the  uses  of  a 
rich  people.” 

Truly,  as  we  have  just  seen,  this  is  an  “immense  advan¬ 
tage”  well  worth  dying  for.  The  bimetallists  freely  ad¬ 
mit  “the  great  value  and  small  volume  of  gold;”  that  is 
what  they  complain  of,  and  seek  to  remedy;  they  also 
gladly  concede  that  that  kind  of  money  is  “alone  suited 
to  the  uses  of  a  rich  people;”  that  is  the  very  reason  why 
it  is  unjust,  the  very  reason,  if  suited  for  the  rich  alone,  as 
he  says,  that  is  unsuited  for  the  producers,  the  laborers, 
the  great  masses  of  the  people  themselves. 

“Contention  is  made  by  some  of  the  advocates  of  the  single 
gold  standard  that  the  value  of  gold  is  a  permanent  quality, 
and  that  the  quality  that  peculiarly  commends  the  measure 
as  a  measure  of  value  is,  that  it  is  stable,  it  stands;  in  short, 
that  it  is  unchangeable.  We  venture  the  assertion  that  there 
are  few  men  of  reputation  in  financial  science  in  this  or  any 
other  country  Who  would  express  such  an  opinion. 

“An  examination  of  the  subject  will  prove  that  the  theory 
of  the  stability  of  gold  is  completely  untenable.  If  there  were 
but  two  kinds  of  flesh  food,  beef  and  mutton,  and  a  law 
should  be  passed  forbidding  mutton  to  be  used  as  food,  what 
would  be  the  effect  upon  beef?  The  price  would  at  once  rise. 
If  there  are  but  two  kinds  of  money  metals  in  the  world, 
silver  and  gold,  and  the  law  should  deprive  silver  of  its 
money  function,  its  debt  paying  power,  is  it  not  equally  cer¬ 
tain,  the  demand  being  concentrated  upon  gold,  that  gold 
would  rise  in  value?  In  that  event  what  phenomenon  with 
respect  to  the  price  of  commodities  would  be  observed?  Must 
they  not  decline,  and  for  the  reason  that  the  volume  of  money 


62 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


having  been  reduced  by  one-half,  more  commodities  would  be 
required  to  obtain  possession  ©f  gold.  And  as  the  volume  of 
business  expanded  in  a  period  of  profound  peace,  creating  a 
continuously  increasing  demand  for  gold,  would  not  prices 
persist  in  falling  all  along  the  line?  These  results  could  have 
been  clearly  foreseen  in  1873  by  any  thoughtful  man.  They 
are  the  results  that  may  be  observed  now  by  any  man  who 
will  merely  open  his  eyes.  Prices  of  all  staple  commodities 
have  been  steadily  falling  for  twenty  years.  The  decline  be¬ 
gan  in  the  year  1873,  when  silver  was  demonetized  here  and 
in  Europe,  and  it  is  attributable  chiefly  to  the  fact  that  the 
material  in  which  all  other  values  have  been  measured  has 
itself  advanced  in  value.  If  further  proof  was  required,  it 
miay  be  found  in  the  fact  that  prices  in  silver  using  countries 
have  not  declined,  but  silver  to-day  buys  as  much  of  any 
other  commodity  as  it  bought  two  decades  ago.  It  is  asserted 
that  this  theory  is  not  sound,  because  the  price  of  labor  has 
not  fallen;  but  labor  is  not  a  mere  inanimate  commodity.  It 
has  a  resisting  force,  and  that  force  has  been  made  effective 
by  organization  against  the  influence  that  would  thrust  wages 
down.  It  is  urged  that  mechanical  improvements  and  inven¬ 
tions  in  processes  have  put  prices  down.  But  there  has  been 
no  great  labor  saving  invention  of  a  revolutionary  character 
since  1873.  The  cost  of  producing  wheat  in  some  regions  has 
been  reduced,  but  in  no  such  degree  as  to  account  for  a  60 
per  cent,  fall  in  the  value  of  the  cereal.  Cotton  has  declined 
nearly  50  per  cent.;  but  in  what  respect  are  wheat  growing 
and  cotton  picking  any  less  costly  than  they  were  twenty 
years  ago?” — The  New  York  Press,  1893. 

The  price  of  some  few  articles  may  possibly  have  risen, 
but  such  a  rise  can  readily  be  explained  by  the  fact  of 
there  being  a  short  crop,  a  reduced  supply,  or  a  suddenly 
increased  demand ;  for  instance  the  price  of  hogs  has  ad¬ 
vanced  because  the  increase  of  hogs  has  not  kept  pace 
with  the  rate  of  the  increase  of  population.  Wages  have 
risen  since  1873,  but  wages  have  risen,  because  the  de¬ 
mand  has  increased  more  rapidly  than  the  supply  and  also 
because  of  the  efforts  of  labor  unions;  labor’s  wages  have 
risen,  because  in  the  struggle  between  Protection  and  the 
Gold  Standard,  the  demand  for  labor  created  by  the  Pro¬ 
tected  development  of  our  matchless  resources,  has  more 
than  equalled  the  shrinkage  of  values  and  of  wages  caused 
by  the  destruction  of  one-half  the  redemption  money  in 
adopting  the  single  gold  standard.  In  Free  Trade  Eng¬ 
land,  however,  under  her  gold  standard,  the  wages  of  her 
labor  are  lower  than  they  were  in  1873. 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


63 


Said  Carlisle,  at  Memphis,  Tenn.,  1895,  speaking  of 
the  Senate  Report  of  1892  on  the  wages  of  labor  and  the 
price  of  products: 

“Wages  were  found  to  be  nearly  61  per  cent,  higher  than 
in  1860,  which  was  thirteen  years  before  the  silver  legislation 
(1873),  was  more  than  8  per  cent,  higher  than  in  1873,  when 
that  legislation  was  adopted.” 

Had  Carlisle  been  discreet,  he  would  have  kept  his 
mouth  shut  on  this  point,  for  his  statement  demonstrates 
which  is  the  better  monetary  system  for  the  producer  and 
the  laborer;  by  his  own  figures,  it  appears  that  wages 
have  risen  53  per  cent,  in  only  13  years  under  bimetallism, 
while  they  only  rose  8  per  cent,  under  20  years  of  the 
single  gold  standard,  and  that  too,  despite  the  fact  that 
the  rise  was  assisted  by  the  enormous  demand  for  labor 
created  by  the  protected  development  of  our  resources 
which  began  about  that  time,  which  advanced  us  from  a 
third-class  manufacturing  country,  to  a  greater  manufac¬ 
turing  nation  than  Great  Britain,  France  and  Germany 
combined  in  1892;  despite  the  fact  that  during  that  period 
great  labor  unions  were  formed  which  have  materially 
contributed  to  advance  wages,  or  at  least  to  successfully 
resist  a  reduction  prior  to  1893;  despite  the  fact  that 
against  all  the  efforts  of  the  class  which  he  represents,  more 
than  $500,000,000  of  silver  have  been  coined  since  1878 
and  put  into  circulation  where  they  have  been  used  in 
trade,  but  not  for  Governmental  redemption  purposes, 
which  by  to  that  extent  augmenting  the  volume  of  money, 
has  resisted  the  shrinkage  in  wages  and  values  that  the 
single  gold  standard  has  caused.  By  Carlisle’s  own  fig¬ 
ures  which  appears  to  be  the  best  monetary  system  for 
the  property  owner,  the  producer,  and  the  laborer?  Had 
bimetallism  been  retained  is  it  not  reasonable  to  assume 
that  the  system,  which  by  his  confession  advanced  wages 
53  per  cent  in  only  13  years,  would  in  the  20  years  that 
have  followed  under  the  favorable  conditions  that  have 
existed  and  had  the  tendency  to  assist  the  rise  in  wages, 
to  have  still  further  advanced  them,  and  if  again  adopted 
would  again  cause  wages  to  rise  far  higher  than  they 
have  risen? 


64 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

INCREASED  INDEBTEDNESS  UNDER  THE  GOLD  STANDARD. 

James  G.  Blaine  declared  in  the  United  States  Senate 
in  1878: 

“I  believe  the  struggle  now  going  on  in  this  country  and  in 
other  countries  for  a  single  gold  standard,  would,  if  success¬ 
ful,  produce  widespread  disaster  in  the  end  throughout  the 
world.  The  destruction  of  silver  as  money  and  establishing 
gold  as  the  sole  unit  of  value  would  have  a  ruinous  effect  on 
all  forms  of  property  except  those  investments  which  yield 
a  fixed  return  in  money.  These  would  be  enormously  en¬ 
hanced  in  value,  and  would  gain  a  disproportionate  and  unfair 
advantage  over  every  other  species  of  property.” 

In  1880  the  total  private  indebtedness  of  the  American 
people  was  $6,700,000,000;  in  1890  it  was  $19,700,000,- 
000,  an  increase  of  $13,000,000,000.  The  funded  debt 
of  our  railroads,  which  in  1880  was  $2,392,000,000,  had 
increased  to  $5,463,000,000  in  1890,  an  increase  of  129  per 
cent.  Their  current  debt  doubled  in  7  years,  and  it  is 
estimated  that  the  liabilities  of  our  railroads  exceed  their 
assets  by  $5,000,000,000.  The  debts  of  telegraph,  tele¬ 
phone,  street  railways,  water,  gas,  electric  plants  and 
other  kindred  industries  are  beyond  computation.  In 
the  decade  1880  to  1890,  the  loans  and  overdrafts  of  our 
national  banks  increased  from  $994,000,000  to  $2,171,- 
000,000;  that  of  other  banks,  except  private  ones,  in¬ 
creased  from  $378,000,000  to  $1,189,000,000.  The  ag¬ 
gregate  debt  of  our  states  and  cities  in  1890  was  $1,135,- 
210,000,  or  was  $18.13  per  capita.  Our  national  bonded 
debt  in  1892  was  $585,000,000. 

It  would  require  all  of  our  currency,  gold,  silver  and 
paper,  more  than  ten  times  over  to  pay  our  private  debts ; 
it  would  require  all  our  gold  more  than  three  times  over 
to  pay  the  interest  on  it  at  the  rate  of  6  per  cent.  Our 
private  debts  in  1890  amounted  to  more  than  all  the 
gold  and  silver  produced  in  the  whole  world  since  the 
discovery  of  America,  and  two-thirds  of  that  colossal 
sum  we  incurred  in  ten  years;  and  yet  we  are  gravely 
told  that  if  we  coin  silver  we  will  have  too  much  money, 
that  it  will  flood  the  country  with  cheap  money.  We 
have  not  got  enough  money  to  do  business  with,  and 
there  is  no  probability  that  we  shall  ever  have  sufficient 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


65 


metallic  money,  both  gold  and  silver,  for  our  gigantic 
purposes. 

The  prevailing  low  rate  of  interest  is  frequently  men¬ 
tioned  as  an  indication  that  money  is  abundant,  but  this 
fact,  instead  of  proving  its  truth,  demonstrates  its  falsity. 
We  quote  a  gold  man  in  support  of  this  statement,  Giffen 
of  England: 

“Land  and  capital  are  despoiled  and  enterprise  decaying 
that  a  nation’s  creditors  may  grow  fat  in  idleness  upon  the 
‘unearned  increment’  of  gold.  As  gold  gets  scarce  it  seems 
to  get  cheaper;  that  is,  the  bank  rate  falls,  but  this  is  not  the 
mark  of  the  real  cheapness  of  abundance;  it  is  only  a  symptom 
that  because  trade  and  enterprise  are  collapsing  no  one  can 
profitably  employ  capital,  and  therefore  money  is  a  drug.” 

The  peculiar  effect  of  a  contraction  in  a  volume  of 
money  is  to  give  to  the  holders  of  unemployed  capital 
a  profit,  in  the  increased  purchasing  power  which  such 
money  acquires  by  the  mere  lapse  of  time.  The  New 
York  Press  in  1893  said: 

“Every  gold  monometallist  insists  that  the  full  remonetiza¬ 
tion  of  silver  would  decrease  the  value  of  existing  debts.  This 
is  indeed  the  main  argument  used  against  remonetization.  But 
if  to  remonetize  silver  in  1893  would  be  to  decrease  debts,  was 
not  the  result  of  demonetization  in  1873  necessarily  to  increase 
them?  Can  it  be  seriously  held  that  the  argument  is  good  in 
one  case  and  not  in  the  other?  Why  would  silver  remonetiza¬ 
tion  decrease  debt?  Because  it  would  depreciate  gold.  Why 
did  silver  demonetization  increase  debt?  Because  it  appreciated 
gold.  Suppose  gold  should  be  demonetized  as  silver  was,  and 
silver  should  be  made  the  sole  standard,  who  will  venture  to 
urge  that  the  value  of  gold  would  remain  stable?  Beyond  dis¬ 
pute  it  would  fall  far  below  the  value  of  silver,  for  silver  would 
at  once  advance.  It  is  possession  of  the  money  function  that 
gives  value  to  gold,  and  the  loss  of  it  that  depreciates  silver. 
With  the  question  of  the  morality  of  decreasing  the  dimen¬ 
sions  of  debt  by  legislative  action  we  do  not  now  propose  to 
deal.  But  the  man  who  contends  that  it  would  be  immoral 
to  remonetize  silver,  for  that  reason  must  confess  that  it  was 
equally  immoral  to  demonetize  it  in  1873.  The  truth  is  that 
every  creditor  is  benefited  by  that  which  increases  the  gen¬ 
eral  prosperity  of  debtors.  The  man  in  New  York  who  holds 
Kansas  mortgages  cannot  in  the  long  run  profit  by  a  system 
that  urges  his  debtors  toward  bankruptcy.  What  wealth  pro¬ 
ducers  of  all  lands  require  is,  that  there  should  be  such  sta¬ 
bility  of  values  as  will  permit  no  change  for  or  against  the 
creditor  or  debtor,  and  that  stability  can  be  had  only  by 
resort  to  bimetallism.” 


m  THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 

But  this  question  of  scarce,  or  abundant,  money  goes 
far  beyond  the  mere  question  of  the  remonetization  of 
silver,  important  as  indeed  that  is,  for  it  involves  the 
question,  that  is  fundamental,  namely,  whether  the  vol¬ 
ume  can  be  constitutionally  issued  and  controlled  by 
the  banks,  by  a  class  for  exclusive  class  benefit,  at  the 
expense  of  all  other  classes;  or  whether  money  must 
not  be  issued  directly,  and  its  volume  controlled  by  the 
National  Government  for  the  benefit  and  prosperity  of 
the  entire  Nation,  for  the  advantage,  for  the  prosperity 
and  progress  of  the  great  masses  of  the  people. 

In  considering  this  vital  point  of  the  monetary  contro¬ 
versy,  it  is  essential  to  a  correct  conception  of  the  money 
problem,  that  we  consider  in  what  respects  our  National 
banking  system  has  proven  not  only  a  failure  as  banks 
of  issue  imparting  stability  to  business,  but  also  its  char¬ 
acter  as  serious  and  growing  menace  to  the  rights  and 
liberties  of  the  people. 

CHAPTER  XV. 

THE  FAILURE  OF  OUR  NATIONAL  BANKING  SYSTEM. 

Under  the  section,  entitled,  The  Rothschild  Gold  Con¬ 
spiracy,  the  influence  that  Wall  Street  has  exercised  over 
our  finacial  legislation,  up  to  the  enactment  of  the  Bland- 
Allison  Law  of  1878  requiring  the  coinage  of  not  less 
than  2,000,000  ounces  or  more  than  4,000,000  ounces  of 
silver  per  month  into  dollars,  has  already  under  that  sec¬ 
tion  been  sufficiently  fully  described,  not  to  be  further 
adverted  to.  The  passage  of  the  Sherman  Silver  Law 
of  1890  required  the  purchase  of  4,500,000  ounces  of  sil¬ 
ver  per  month  by  silver  certificates  issued  for  its  pay¬ 
ment. 

Both  of  these  laws  required  the  Secretary  of  the  Treas¬ 
ury  to  redeem  all  the  Government  bonds  and  paper  cer¬ 
tificates  in  both  gold  and  silver,  without  discrimination 
against  either  metal;  yet  every  Secretary  of  the  Treas¬ 
ury,  from  John  Sherman,  in  1878,  down  to  the  present 
incumbent  of  that  office,  has  persistently  violated  both  the 
spirit  and  the  letter  of  the  law. 

It  was  the  expectation  that  silver  would  be  used  as 
redemption  money  as  the  law  provided,  that  caused  silver 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


67 


to  go  to  $1.19  cents  an  ounce  from  67  cents,  just  after 
the  passage  of  the  Sherman  law  in  1890,  .or  within  ten 
cents  of  $1.29,  the  ratio  value  of  16  to  1.  When,  however, 
it  was  discovered  that  silver  would  not  be  so  used,  that 
the  demand  the  law  had  created  for  silver  money,  did 
not  by  its  violation  exist,  silver  values  again  declined. 
Stability  of  value  can  be  secured  only  by  a  volume  of 
money  which  steadily  expands  to  meet  the  steadily  ex¬ 
panding  needs  of  business.  Does  the  National  Bank 
system  provide  us  with  such  a  currency?  Bonds  afford 
the  only  tangible  and  effective  security  that  bank  money 
can  possess. 

If  the  State  banks  are  allowed  to  issue  paper,  money 
notes,  such  notes  are  issued  against  such  security  that  the 
different  States  require,  thus  there  ever  exists  a  difference 
in  the  security  which  is  constantly  changing  between  the 
security  one  State  requires  and  the  security  another  State 
requires.  State  bank  money  therefore  lacks  the  uniform¬ 
ity  in  the  security  against  which  it  is  issued  that  is  essential 
to  confidence;  the  people  are  continually  at  a  loss  to  know 
whether  such  bank  notes  are  good,  or  whether  they  are 
worthless ;  and  since  even  the  best  informed  money  brok¬ 
ers  are  unfamiliar  with  such  money,  the  people  are  unable 
to  tell  whether  a  State  bank  note  is  genuine  or  counterfeit. 
To  “farm”  out  the  privilege  of  issuing  money  to  individuals 
or  corporations  for  the  people,  is  as  barbarous  as  was  the 
old  practice  of  “farming”  out  the  taxes  to  the  highest  bid¬ 
der.  Each  system  is  designed  to  give,  and  does,  in  fact, 
give  a  class  a  chance  to  fleece  the  people. 

The  National  Banks  were  empowered,  during  the 
war,  to  issue  their  notes  against  90  per  cent,  of  the 
National  bonds  they  were  required  by  law  to  hold.  The 
security  this  system  gave  to  such  money  was  ample  and 
satisfactory  to  give  the  people  confidence  in  it,  but  such 
a  currency  lacks  and  will  forever  lack  elasticity,  without 
which  quality  it  is  a  menace  to  business. 

In  1892  our  National  bonded  indebtedness  amounted 
to  $585,000,000,  which,  if  the  entire  bonded  issue  be  held 
by  the  National  Banks,  they  could  in  that  year  have  is¬ 
sued  $526,000,000,  or  90  per  cent,  of  our  Government  debt. 
In  1893,  during  the  panic,  the  National  Banks  clamored 


68 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


for  the  right  to  issue  the  full  face  of  the  bonds  in  notes, 
or  the  entire,  $585,000,000.  It  might  be  reasonably  sup¬ 
posed  that  they  had  already  issued  the  90  per  cent,  allowed 
by  law,  but  their  notes  in  that  year,  1892,  amounted  to  only 
in  round  numbers,  $125,000,000,  and  in  following  year 
was  even  less. 

The  largest  issue  of  notes  the  National  Banks  have  ever 
made  was  in  1882,  which  then  amounted  to  $358,000,000. 
Between  October  31st,  1884,  and  October  31st,  1892,  the 
National  Bank  currency  had  been  reduced  $214,000,000. 
In  the  five  years  ending  October  31st,  1890,  their  circula¬ 
tion  was  decreased  from  $276,000,000  to  $124,000,000, 
showing  a  decrease  during  the  five  years  of  $150,000,000, 
an  average  decrease  of  $30,000,000,  during  which  time  the 
average  annual  increased  demand  for  money  was  $70,- 
000,000.  Yet  these  National  Banks,  to  whom  we  had 
entrusted  our  welfare  and  prosperity,  instead  of  giving  us 
an  adequate  circulating  currency;  instead  of  increasing 
their  bank  notes  $350,000,000,  during  those  five  years,  as 
they  should  have  done,  actually  decreased  them  $150,000,- 
000. 

Not  only  did  these  banks  fail  to  increase  their  issue,  but 
they  opposed  any  increase  in  the  volume  of  money,  that 
did  not  increase  the  bonded  indebtedness  of  our  Govern¬ 
ment,  and  increase  their  wealth  and  power.  These  banks, 
by  circulating  petitions,  by  exciting  suspicions  as  to  the 
credit  of  the  Government,  so  aroused  public  confidence  as 
to  alarm  the  people  and  secured  the  repeal  of  the  silver 
purchasing  clause  of  the  Sherman  Law  of  1890,  in  1893, 
which  had  increased  our  volume  of  money  at  the  rate  of 
$150,000,000  a  year.  Between  January  1st  and  July  1st, 
1893,  we  shipped  $61,000,000  of  our  gold  to  Europe  to 
pay  for  the  balance  of  trade  which,  during  the  first  six 
months  of  the  year,  is  usually  against  us,  but  during  the 
two  months,  between  July  1st  and  September  1st,  1893, 
we  recovered  $54,000,000  to  pay  for  the  balance  of  trade 
at  that  season  of  the  year  usually  due  us.  Thus  it  ap¬ 
pears  that  if  the  Sherman  law  drove  gold  out  of  the  coun¬ 
try,  it  also  brought  it  back.  The  repeal  of  the  Sherman 
law  completed  the  demonetization  of  silver  and  left  gold 
the  sole  money  of  redemption.  The  Secretary  of  the 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


69 


Treasury,  Foster,  in  1893,  when  there  was  $220,000,000  in 
gold  in  the  Treasury,  $120,000,000  of  free  gold  in  excess 
of  the  reserve,  made  the  administrative  ruling  that  the 
creditor  would  be  given  the  choice  of  which  kind  of 
money  he  preferred.  The  statements  then  emanated  from 
the  Treasury  Department  that  silver  was  a  cheap  money, 
that  it  was  unfit  for  redemption  purposes.  The  result  of 
this  was  that  the  Government  soon  lost  all  its  surplus 
gold,  and  has  since  been  compelled,  at  the  dictation  of  the 
banks,  to  borrow  several  hundred  millions  of  gold,  $262,- 
000,000.  As  soon  as  the  Sherman  Law  was  repealed  these 
conspirators  began  to  “raid”  and  “loot”  the  Treasury  of  its 
gold  and  force  the  Government  to  issue  $500,000,000  in 
gold  30-year  bonds. 

The  Banks  have  also  sought  to  have  the  Government 
retire  the  $346,000,000  of  greenbacks,  so  as  to  so  con¬ 
tract  the  currency  that  the  people  will,  to  secure  relief, 
give  them  the  exclusive  privilege  to  issue  all  paper  money, 
so  that  owning  as  they  now  already  do,  all  the  money  of 
redemption,  gold,  they  can  control  the  volume  of  money 
to  further  their  private  interests,  and  to  enslave  the  people. 

The  most  disgraceful  act  in  our  history,  the  basest  be¬ 
trayal  of  the  people  was  the  sale  of  our  bonds  in  February, 
1895,  to  a  foreign  syndicate  at  a  higher  rate  of  interest 
than  could  have  been  secured  in  the  open  market.  Thirty- 
year4  per  cent,  bonds  were  sold  for  only  $104,  where  bonds 
that  were  to  expire  in  a  few  years  were  selling  at  $1 12.  In 
return  for  this  present  of  $16,000,000  the  syndicate  agreed 
to  make  no  raid  on  our  Treasury  for  a  period  of  eight 
months.  The  fact  that  there  was  no  raid  made  for  that 
period  proves  that  the  capitalists  own  or  control  the  sup¬ 
ply  of  gold.  We  now  have  a  matchless  system  of  finance, 
which  for  security  could  scarce  be  surpassed.  We  have 
$1,000,000,000  in  paper  money,  and  $100,000,000  in  the 
gold  reserve  of  the  Treasury  to  redeem  our  obligations; 
one  dollar  to  redeem  ten,  think  of  the  safety  of  the  system. 
And  when  it  is  proposed  to  coin  more  redemption  money, 
silver,  and  to  use  the  $500,000,000  of  such  money  already 
coined  for  redemption  purposes  these  bankers  tell  us  that 
our  credit  will  be  shaken.  They  propose  to  issue  still 


70 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


more  obligations  and  reduce  the  amount  of  redemption 
money. 

Senator  Voorhees  has  thus  vividly  described  the  dan¬ 
gerous  and  unbridled  power  of  these  National  Banks,  in 
a  speech  delivered  in  the  Senate  in  1893,  during  the  de¬ 
bate  on  the  Sherman  law  repeal: 

“The  merits  possessed  by  the  National  Banks  are  created 
and  upheld,  every  one  of  them,  by  the  official  hand  of  the 
Government.  On  the  other  hand  the  unrestricted,  unrestrained 
and  unbridled  power  which  is  permitted  to  the  management 
of  these  banks,  whereby  the  circulation  of  money  in  the  hands 
of  the  people  can  be,  and  often  has  been,  suddenly  fluctuated 
from  a  prosperous  maximum  to  a  stunted  and  distressful  min¬ 
imum,  constitutes  a  standing  and  a  frightful  menace  against 
the  safety,  the  welfare  and  the  happiness  of  the  great  and 
most  useful  body  of  the  American  people,  those  who  have 
labor  and  the  products  of  labor  to  exchange  for  money,  and 
who  have  a  right  to  expect  steady  and  remunerative  rates  of 
pay.  The  idea  here  presented  is  an  appalling  one.  No  other 
government  within  the  boundaries  of  civilization,  as  far  as 
I  can  learn,  has  ever  committed  to  private  parties  the  power 
to  make  money  plenty  or  money  scarce;  times  easy  or  times 
hard;  business  prosperity  or  business  bankruptcy;  the  power, 
in  fact,  to  circulate  the  Government’s  own  currency  or  to  with¬ 
hold  it  from  circulation,  at  such  times  and  under  such  cir¬ 
cumstances,  and  in  such  amounts  as  will  inure  to  the  ben¬ 
efit  of  private  speculation  and  personal  gain  rather  than  to 
the  public  interests.  Yet  such  is  exactly  the  terrible  power 
now  possessed  by  those  engaged  in  National  Banking,  and 
such  the  power  they  have  called  into  disastrous  action.  While 
in  the  midst  of  a  fair  and  reasonable  degree  of  prosperity 
the  volume  of  our  circulating  medium,  even  while  the  people 
were  looking  at  it,  suddenly  shriveled  away  and  disappeared 
from  their  sight.  As  if  by  some  infernal  enchantment  money 
disappeared,  as  it  were,  in  a  single  night,  and  left  the  people 
in  mourning  and  deep>  trouble  when  the  morning  came.  Have 
the  men  of  active  business,  and  the  toiling  millions  who  suffer 
most,  been  tempted  in  their  distress  to  say  that  there  is  no 
longer  any  money  in  the  country.” 

The  Money  Power  tells  us  that  the  Government  must 
stop  issuing  money,  and  go  out  of  the  banking  business. 
Banks  legitimately  possess  but  two  functions,  that  of 
deposit  and  exchange.  The  right  to  issue  money,  to 
increase,  regulate  and  control  its  supply  is  an  attribute 
of  sovereignty;  it  is  not  a  legitimate  function  of  banking. 
The  exercise  of  this  sovereign  power  by  the  bank  is 
the  rankest  usurpation,  a  privilege  mistakenly  or  cor- 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


71 


ruptly  given  them,  which  imperils  the  liberties  of  the 
people,  and  endangers  the  perpetuity  as  well  as  the 
prosperity  of  the  Republic. 

To  empower  either  National  or  State  banks  to  issue 
money  creates  a  danger  to  public  interests;  by  manipu¬ 
lating  the  volume  of  money,  either  to  increase  or  decrease 
it,  gives  the  banks  an  opportunity  to  engage  in  a  specula¬ 
tion  of  all  property  at  the  expense  of  the  people,  the 
profits  of  which  they  possess  full  power  to  enlarge  or 
diminish,  for  they  willing  it,  would  know  beforehand 
whether  money  would  be  scarce  and  prices  low,  or  money 
plentiful  and  prices  high. 

Government  bonds  alone  provide  the  only  tangible 
and  effective  security  that  National  Bank  notes  possess. 
But  bonds  represent  indebtedness,  which  the  people  must 
pay;  they  are  burdens  upon  industry.  There  is  no  more 
reason  why  a  monetary  system  should  be  founded  upon 
debt,  than  there  is  that  health  must  depend  upon  disease. 
A  monetary  system  should  be  based  upon  hope,  not 
upon  despair;  upon  possibilities,  not  upon  debt;  upon  the 
resources  of  the  country,  upon  its  industry,  upon,  in 
short,  its  needs. 

The  true  monetary  system  is  the  one  whose  volume 
of  money  constantly  increases  proportionate  to  the  in¬ 
creased  needs  of  business.  Now,  if  our  paper  currency 
consists  exclusively  of  National  Bank  notes,  as  the  banks 
demand,  then  its  expansion  involves  a  perpetual  increase 
of  indebtedness,  which  not  only  could  never,  but  would 
never,  be  paid.  To  pay  part  of  our  bonded-  indebtedness, 
which  would  secure  such  bank  note  currency,  would  con  • 
tract  the  volume  of  money,  and  unsettle  business;  to  pay 
all  of  our  bonded  debt  would  destroy  all  the  security 
such  bank  notes  possess,  and  would  sweep  them  out  of 
existence,  and  produce  a  panic.  The  result  of  the  pro¬ 
posed  extension  of  the  present  monetary  system  would 
involve  the  creation  of  a  debt  so  large,  that  the  Nation 
would  eventually  be  unable  to  pay  even  the  interest  upon 
it. 

These  proposed  Government  bonds  would  be  given 
for  gold  borrowed  of  the  bankers,  who,  while,  drawing 
interest  on  those  bonds  from  the  Government,  would 


72 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


also  at  the  same  time  be  drawing  interest  from  the  peo¬ 
ple  on  the  bank  notes  loaned,  which  would  be  issued 
against  those  same  bonds,  thus  giving  the  banks  a  double 
interest,  a  double  profit.  This  system  could  result  in 
but  one  of  two  things,  either  slavery  or  repudiation,  a 
repudiation  effected  by  revolution.  This  usurpation  of 
the  banks  must  end;  the  National  Government  alone, 
the  great  central  authority,  should  and  •  must  issue  all 
money.  If  there  is  a  profit,  and  there  is  a  large  one, 
in  this  banking  business  of  issuing  money,  let  the  Gov¬ 
ernment  realize  it,  so  that  the  whole  Nation  can  enjoy  it. 

This  bank  system  is  the  rankest  class  legislation. 
“Equal  rights  to  all,  and  especial  privileges  to  none.” 
To  empower  a  class  to  make  money  plentiful  or  money 
scarce,  prices  high  or  prices  low,  is  not  only  to  give 
it  an  opportunity  to  manipulate  money  for  the  exclusive 
benefit  of  that  class,  but  also  to  give  it  the  power  that 
can  despotically  enslave  the  people. 

Give  us  Government  money,  “Greenbacks,  the  people’s 
favorite  money,  better  than  gold  or  silver”  (John  Sher¬ 
man,  in  1894).  Give  us  greenbacks  not  made  redeem¬ 
able  in  gold  or  silver,  but  money  itself  legal  tender  for 
all  debts  and  dues;  money  which  the  people,  being  ac¬ 
quainted  with  it  and  having  confidence  in  it,  would  ac¬ 
cept,  and  upon  which  they  would  pa.y  no  interest. 
Government  money  alone  provides  and  guarantees  an 
elastic,  a  continually  expanding  curency,  which  would 
entail  no  burden,  because  it  would  represent  no  debt, 
but,  being  on  the  contrary  fragrant  with  hope,  would 
provide  a  currency  that  would  impart  vigor  to  commerce, 
confidence  to  business,  stability  to  values,  and  prosperity 
to  the  Nation. 

There  is  no  doubt  about  our  ability  to  maintain  such  a 
monetary  system,  iii  a  time  of  peace,  when  we  reflect  that 
our  Government  did  maintain  it  during  four  years  of  war 
to  meet  the  needs  of  commerce  as  well  as  the  exigencies 
of  war,  and  maintained  it  during  the  fourteen  succeeding 
years  of  peace,  and  that  the  discount  it  was  sometimes 
at  was  due  entirely  to  the  discrimination  against  its  use 
for  interest  or  for  custom  duties. 

Government  money,  consisting  of  gold,  silver  and 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


73 


greenbacks,  all  three  legal  tender  for  all  debts,  without 
discrimination  against  any,  is  the  only  genuine  sound 
money  possible,  because  it  is  the  only  money  whose  vol¬ 
ume  can  ever  be  equal  to  the  needs  of  business,  whose 
supply  will  ever  equal  the  demand.  An  increase  in  Na¬ 
tional  Bank  currency  would  increase  debt,  and  decrease 
our  ability  to  pay  it;  an  increase  in  Government  money 
would  not  increase  our  National  debt,  while  increasing 
our  ability  to  pay  existing  indebtedness. 

The  people  must  appeal  to  the  Republican  Party  to  re¬ 
form  our  monetary  system  by  substituting  Government 
money  for  Bank  money,  for  the  Democratic  Party  is  in¬ 
dissolubly  wedded  to  the  old  State  Bank  swindle.  And  if 
this  appeal  to  the  Republican  Party  prove  in  vain,  then 
the  people  must  organize  a  party  that  will  protect  their 
interests,  and  hearken  to  their  commands,  a  Nationalist 
Party. 

Many  expect  relief  from  the  evils  of  the  gold  standard 
by  an  international  agreement,  and  believe  that  the  assist¬ 
ance  and  concurrence  of  Great  Britain  can  be  obtained, 
but  those  acquainted  with 

CHAPTER  XVI. 

THE  ATTITUDE  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN  ON  THE  MONEY  PROBLEM, 

expect  no  concession  from  that  nation,  favorable  to  a 
bimetallic  standard,  until  she  is  first  forced  and  driven  to 
it.  The  policy  that  helps  Great  Britain,  hurts  the  United 
States,  for  the  interests  of  'the  two  nations  are  antagonistic. 
Great  Britain  is  the  creditor  nation  of  the  world,  while 
the  United  States  is  a  debtor  nation. 

Great  Britain  is  a  gold  producing  nation,  while  the 
United  States  is  both  a  gold  and  silver  producing  nation; 
it  is  to  the  interest  of  the  former  to  favor  gold  and  discrim¬ 
inate  against  silver;  while  our  interests  are  best  conserved 
by  using  both  metals. 

Great  Britain  is  a  dependent  nation;  dependent  upon 
the  world  both  for  what  she  buys  and  for  what  she  sells. 
The  United  States  is  an  independent  nation,  capable  of 
producing  all  she  consumes,  and  of  consuming  all  she  pro¬ 
duces.  Great  Britain  imports  96  per  cent,  of  the  raw 
materials  of  her  manufactures,  and  she  imports  also  94 


74 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


per  cent,  of  all  her  food  supplies;  Great  Britain  must  buy 
of  the  world,  or  starve;  she  must  sell  to  the  world,  or 
perish.  Great  Britain  is,  therefore,  benefited  by  cheap 
wheat,  corn,  cotton,  meats,  wool,  and  other  products  of 
food,  or  materials  of  manufactures  which  she  is  compelled 
to  buy.  The  United  States  is  injured  by  the  low  price 
of  such  products,  because  she  must,  or  at  least  does,  sell 
them.  Giffen,  an  advocate  of  the  blessings  to  the  debtor 
of  the  single  gold  standard,  says: 

“A  creditor  nation  is  able  to  draw  more  from  its  tributaries, 
who  have  to  pay  it  in  appreciating  money,  than  it  would  oth¬ 
erwise  be  able  to  draw.  To  pay  the  same  debt  they  must 
send  to  their  creditors  30,  50,  perhaps  100  per  cent,  more 
produce  than  they  would  otherwise  have  to  pay  or  send. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  in  this  sense  the  weight  of  the  gold 
debt  of  a  debtor  country  like  India,  or  the  United  States,  has 
enormously  increased  of  late  years.” 

In  proof  of  the  profit  that  Great  Britain  obtains  from  re¬ 
duced  prices  of  imports  due  to  the  shrinkage  of  values 
caused  by  her  gold  monometallism,  we  cite  the  testimony 
of  the  London  Statist  of  January  nth,  1896,  a  gold  stand¬ 
ard  paper,  in  which  edition  it  gives  the  following  facts  and 
figures : 

“Our  (Great  Britain)  foreign  trade  in  1895  has  been  the 
most  profitable  in  the  history  of  the  country,  and  very  much 
more  profitable  than  it  was  in  1890,  when  superficially  it  ap¬ 
peared  to  be  extremely  prosperous.  Reckoned  by  its  cash 
value  our  foreign  trade  has  been  slightly  better  in  1895  than 
in  1894,  and  much  worse  than  in  1890.  In  1890  our  imports 
amounted  to  £420,692,000;  in  1894  they  were  £408,345,000,  and 
in  1890  they  have  been  £416,687,000.  That  is  to  say,  our  im¬ 
ports  have  been  £8,342,000  greater  in  1895  than  in  1894,  and 
£4,000,000  smaller  than  in  1890.  As  regards  the  cash  value 
of  our  exports,  an  increase  of  £10,000,000  has  occurred  in  1895 
as  compared  with  1894,  and  a  decline  of  as  much  as  £37,400,000 
compared  with  1890,  exports  in  1890  having  been  valued  at 
£263,530,000,  in  1894  at  £216,194,000,  and  in  1895  at  £226,169,000. 

“The  cash  value  of  our  foreign  trade  is  however,  no  guide 
to  its  real  value  or  its  profitableness.  The  United  Kingdom 
is  a  consuming  country,  and  it  imports  the  greater  portion  of 
its  food  supplies,  as  wTell  as  nearly  the  whole  of  the  raw 
materials.  These  foodstuffs  and  raw  materials  are  sent  here 
in  payment  for  purchases  of  British  manufactured  goods,  for 
interest  and  profits  upon  capital  due  to  Great  Britain  from 
producing  nations,  and  for  transports  and  other  services  ren¬ 
dered,  consequently  the  lower  the  price  for  foodstuffs  and 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


75 


raw  materials  the  greater  will  be  the  quantity  required  to 
be  sent  to  this  country  to  meet  interest  and  other  obligations, 
and  to  pay  for  other  services  rendered.  Further,  should 
prices  of  British  goods  not  fall  to  an  extent  corresponding  to 
the  fall  in  prices  of  foreign  and  colonial  produce,  the  profit 
on  the  sale  of  British  goods  to  foreign  countries  and  our  colo¬ 
nies  would  be  enhanced.  The  conditions  of  1895  compared 
with  both  1894  and  1890  have  been  that  prices  of  foreign  and 
colonial  produce  have  been  extremely  low,  and  consequently 
a  great  deal  more  produce  has  had  to  be  sent  to  this  country  in 
order  to  meet  interest  and  other  obligations.  Further,  prices 
of  British  manufactures  exported  have  not  fallen  to  an  ex¬ 
tent  corresponding  to  the  decline  in  prices  of  foreign  and  colo¬ 
nial  produce  imported,  and  consequently  the  cash  proceeds 
of  our  exports  have  purchased  a  relatively  larger  quantity  of 
foreign  and  colonial  produce.  The  cash  value  of  our  imports  in 
1895  was  £416,687,000,  but  at  the  level  of  prices  (of  1890)  their 
value  would  have  been  no  less  than  £507,100,000.  The  benefit  to 
this  country  (Great  Britain),  therefore,  from  the  fall  in  the 
prices  of  foreign  and  colonial  produce  in  1895  compared  with 
1890  thus  amounted  to  the  enormous  sum  of  £90,400,000.  On 
the  other  hand,  our  exports  in  1895  were  of  the  cash  value  of 
only  £226,169,000,  whereas  at  the  prices  of  1890  the  value 
would  have  been  £267,600,000,  thus  entailing  a  loss  of  £41,- 
500,000,  due  to  the  fall  in  price.  On  balance,  therefore,  the 
fall  in  prices  in  1895  compared  with  1890  gave  a  profit  to  this 
country  amounting  to  about  £49,000,000  ($245,000,000). 

“We  compare  below  the  actual  cash  value  of  our  imports 
in  1895  with  what  the  value  would  have  been  at  the  prices 
current  in  1894  and  1890: 


At  prices  of  1890 . ($2,535,500,000)  £507,100,000 

At  prices  of  1894 . ($2,169,255,000)  £433,851,000 

At  prices  of  1895 . ($2,083,435,000)  £416,687,000 


“The  profit  to  Great  Britain  from,  a  fall  in  prices,  £90,400,000, 
or  $447,000,000. 

“Below  we  give  the  value  of  our  exports  in  1895  compared 
with  what  the  value  would  have  been  at  the  prices  current 
in  1894  and  1890: 


At  prices  of  1890 . ($1,338,190,000)  £267,638,000 

At  prices  of  1894 . ($1,174,010,000)  £234,802,000 

At  prices  of  1895 . ($1,133,435,000)  £226,169,000 


“The  loss  to  Great  Britain  by  fall  of  exports,  £41,469,000,  or 
$207,345,000. 

“A  net  gain  to  Great  Britain  from  excess  of  fall  of  prices 
of  imports  over  the  fall  in  the  price  of  her  exports,  amounting 
to  about  £48,000,000,  or  $240,000,000  in  the  single  year  1895.” 

In  order  to  maintain  the  position  as  the  creditor  nation 
of  the  world,  lending  gold,  Great  Britain  must  be  a  gold- 
producing  nation ;  she  must  replenish  her  stock  of  gold ; 
therefore,  Great  Britain  has  not  only  developed  the  gold 


76 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


mines  of  her  colonies,  but  she  has  stolen,  and  is  to-day 
engaged  in  stealing  every  gold-producing  nation,  by  one 
pretext  or  another,  that  she  is  permitted  to.  At  present 
she  is  trying  to  steal  the  gold-producing  portions  of 
Venezuela,  and  is  even  endeavoring  to  steal  some  of  the 
rich  gold-producing  part  of  our  own  Alaska.  Rather 
than  let  her  get  another  foot  of  American  soil,  we  should 
drive  her  off  the  Continent  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet. 
It  is  the  policy  of  Great  Britain  to  encourage  the  produc¬ 
tion  of  gold,  and  discourage  the  production  of  silver,  be¬ 
cause  she  is  a  gold  lending  nation,  but  not  a  silver-pro¬ 
ducing  one. 

Owning  and  controlling  the  supply  of  redemption 
money,  gold,  Great  Britain  can,  at  her  will,  to  suit  her 
own  purposes,  make  money  scarce,  and  prices  low. 

Gold  monometallism  gives  Great  Britain  peculiar  ad¬ 
vantages  over  her  commercial  rivals,  whom  she  can  seri¬ 
ously  cripple  by  demanding  the  payment  of  their  gold 
bonds  on  short  notice,  thus  impairing  their  credit.  This 
policy  contracts  the  currency,  and  depresses  the  indus¬ 
tries  of  her  competitors,  and  before  they  can  recover, 
creates  a  market  for  British  goods. 

In  her  commerce  with  silver  nations,  such  as  India, 
Japan  and  the  South  American  nations,  Great  Britain  sells 
her  manufactures  for  gold,  or  for  silver  at  its  gold  valua¬ 
tion,  and  buys  their  products  for  silver  at  its  face  value, 
thus  pocketing  the  difference  between  the  bullion  and  the 
coinage  value  of  silver. 

The  financial,  commercial  and  political  policy  of  Great 
Britain  is  controlled  by  the  Rothschilds,  who  own  her,  be¬ 
cause  they  own  her  gold.  Said  Rothschild  at  the  Brus¬ 
sels  Conference:  “Bimetallism  for  England  is  an  abso¬ 
lute  impossibility.”  Gladstone  expresses  the  sentiment  of 
the  British  Government,  when  he  declared  in  Parliament: 

“The  world  owes  us  ten  billion  dollars.  I  think  under  these 
circumstances  it  is  a  rather  serious  matter  to  ask  this  country 
to  consider  whether  wTe  are  going  to  perform  this  supreme  act 
of  self-sacrifice.  We  have  nothing  to  pay  them;  we  are  not 
debtors  at  all;  we  should  get  no  comfort,  no  consolation  out 
of  this  substitution  of  an  inferior  material,  of  a  cheaper  metal 
which  we  can  obtain  for  less,  and  part  with  for  more.  We 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


77 


should  get  no  consolation,  but  the  consolation  .throughout  the 
world  would  be  great.” 

Though  the  Rothschilds  forced  Great  Britain  to  adopt 
the  single  gold  standard  in  1816,  30  years  before  she  be¬ 
came  a  free  trade  nation,  it  is  proven  by  experience  that 
gold  monometallism  has  been  her  bulwark  of  protection 
against  the  evils  of  the  free  trade  system.  For  years 
Great  Britain  has  been  engaged  in  a  terrific  industrial 
struggle  with  other  nations,  a  struggle  between  free  trade 
and  protection.  Protective  tariffs  have  greatly  dimin¬ 
ished  the  foreign  market  for  British  goods.  The  United 
States  and  the  European  nations  have  ceased  to  be  the 
consumers  of  Britain;  they  have  become  her  competitors. 

These  nations  are  both  industrially  and  commercially 
independent;  Great  Britain  is  not,  therefore  she  possesses 
no  power  to  industrially  retaliate;  she  must  continue  to 
import  her  raw  materials  and  her  foodstuffs.  If  the  for¬ 
eign  market  for  her  manufactures  is  lessened  or  destroyed 
she  is  helpless.  The  protective  nations  with  whom  she 
trades,  in  the  five  years,  1880  to  1885,  inclusive,  had  the 
enormous  balance  of  trade  against  her  of  $7,000,000,000. 

No  nation  could  long  stand  such  a  tremendous  deple¬ 
tion  of  its  wealth;  there  must  be  some  counteracting  in¬ 
flow.  What  is  it?  Though  Great  Britain  cannot  stop  or 
diminish  her  importations,  the  single  gold  standard  en¬ 
ables  her  to  reduce  the  price  of  such  importations  fully 
one-half,  by  making  money  scarce  and  products  cheap. 
As  Giffen  says,  Great  Britain  gets  back  money  which 
because  of  its  growing  scarcity  buys  more  than  the  money 
she  loaned;  both  the  principal  and  interest  on  these  gold 
loans  are  returnable  in  gold,  which  is  steadily  appreciat¬ 
ing  in  value. 

The  world  annually  produces  an  average  of  $130,000,- 
000  of  gold,  nearly  80  per  cent,  of  which  some  authorities 
hold,  is  used  in  the  arts,  leaving  only  20  per  cent,  to  be 
added  to  the  stock  of  money,  and  this  20  per  cent,  is,  or 
quite  required  to  restore  the  loss  coins  have  lost  by  usage, 
thus  the  stock  of  money  is  practically  not  increased. 

The  world  annually  pays  Great  Britain  more  than  $600,- 
000,000  in  gold  as  interest  on  the  debt  it  owes  her,  or  pays 
it  in  products  at  their  gold  price,  which  is  five  times  the 


78 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


amount  of  the  yearly  output  of  all  the  gold  mines  in  the 
world. 

The  United  States  alone  pays  Great  Britain  fully  $200,- 
000,000  a  year  as  interest  on  the  debt  that  it  owes  her,  in 
gold  or  its  equivalent  in  products,  which  is  more  than  half 
a  million  a  day. 

The  ocean  carrying  trade,  yearly  yields  Great  Britain 
in  its  freights  hundreds  of  millions  of  dollars;  she  gets 
.  from  us  nearly  if  not  quite  $250,000,000  per  annum.  The 
freights,  the  appreciation  of  her  loans  under  gold  mono¬ 
metallism,  and  the  balance  of  trade  in  her  favor  with 
silver-producing  countries  more  than  offsets  the  losses 
Great  Britain  sustains  in  her  commerce  with  protective 
nations. 

Without  the  gold  standard,  Great  Britain  would  soon 
succumb  to  the  tariff  warfare  waged  against  her,  though 
gold  monometallism  is  partly  the  cause  for  high  tariffs. 
No  wonder  Gladstone  said,  that  the  consolation  through¬ 
out  the  world  would  be  great,  if  his  country  gave  up 
the  single  gold  standard. 

Yet  gold  monometallism  is  not  an  unmixed  blessing  to 
Great  Britain,  for  while  it  gives  her  great  advantages,  it 
also  threatens  her  destruction.  The  supply  of  gold  is 
utterly  insufficient  for  the  world’s  needs.  Goschen  says: 

“A  campaign  against  silver  would  be  extremely  dangerous 
for  even  countries  with  a  gold  standard.  If  all  nations  should 
adopt  the  single  gold  standard,  there  would  not  be  suffi¬ 
cient  gold  for  the  purpose  without  a  tremendous  crisis.” 

Great  Britain  is  to-day  between  two  fires;  if  the  value 
of  silver  continues  to  falfr  she  will  not  only  lose  her  for¬ 
eign  market,  she  will  not  only  lose  a  large  part  of  her 
textile  and  other  manufactures,  but  she  will  at  the  same 
time  be  obliged  to  pay  enhanced  prices  for  all  her  im¬ 
portations  from  silver  countries  whose  manufactures  and 
industries  have  been  encouraged  by  the  silver  standard. 

While  on  the  other  hand,  if  the  value  of  silver  rises, 
even  if  she  can  retain  her  foreign  markets,  she  will  be 
compelled  to  pay  double  prices  for  all  she  buys/  lose  the 
margin  she  now  gets  between  the  market  and  coin  value 
of  silver,  lose  perhaps  a  large  portion  of  her  foreign  trade 
with  silver  countries  to  a  bimetallic  manufacturing  rival 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


79 


like  the  United  States,  but  additionally  be  compelled  to 
lose  one-half  of  all  the  ten  billion  dollars  the  world  owes 
her  by  getting  it  back  in  money  which  only  buys  half 
as  much  as  the  money  she  loaned  after  the  competition  of 
silver  has  knocked  all  the  premium  out  of  gold. 

Great  Britain  has  sprung  her  own  death  trap,  her  very 
existence  is  at  stake,  and  either  move  silver  makes, 
whether  up  or  down,  she  is  damned. 

Most  of  the  British  foreign  trade  is  with  silver  coun¬ 
tries,  that  as  a  direct  result  of  the  single  gold  standard, 
gives  double  prices  for  imported  goods  in  their  money, 
and  get  only  half  price  in  their  money  for  all  they  sell 
that  is  export. 

India  and  Japan  therefore  are  ceasing  to  be  her  con¬ 
sumers,  and  are  rapidly  becoming  her  powerful  com¬ 
petitors,  especially  in  textile  goods,  such  as  silks  and  cot¬ 
tons.  These  nations  possess  the  immense  advantage 
of  even  Great  Britain  in  having  not  only  vastly  cheaper 
labor,  as  measured  in  money,  but  even  that  vast  differ¬ 
ence  is  doubled  when  their  money  is  taken  for  only  half 
its  value. 

Japanese  cotton  laborers,  men,  get  18  and  20  cents  a 
day  in  their  money  for  the  same  work  that  the  British 
laborer  gets  75  cents  and  $1,  and  that  money  is  worth 
only  one-half  its  value  in  gold,  so  that  in  reality  the  Brit¬ 
ish  laborer  competes  with  laborers  who  get  only  8  and 
10  cents  a  day.  Thus  the  beauties  of  cheap  labor,  and 
the  free  trade  doctrine  of  the  blessings  of  cheap  goods 
is  likely  to  come  home  to  roost  in  free  trade  England  in 
retribution  for  her  activity  in  extending  her  trade. 

The  gold  standard  is  barring  out  imports  from  all  sil¬ 
ver  countries,  but  stimulating  the  exports  of  those  coun¬ 
tries.  Foreign  goods  are  being  imitated,  foreign  trade 
marks  duplicated,  thus  destroying  the  Japanese  market 
for  all  foreign,  though  chiefly  British  commodities.  Brit¬ 
ish  manufacturers  are  leaving  England,  and  removing 
to  India,  China  and  Tapan. 

“The  first  cotton  mill  was  erected  in  Japan  in  1863  with 
5,456  spindles.  In  1883  there  were  16  mills  with  43,700  spin¬ 
dles.  In  1894  there  were  46  mills  with  505,419  spindles.  There 
have  been  seven  new  mills  with  160,000  spindles  already  added 
this  year  (1895)  and  several  more  are  nearing  completion, 


80 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


which  will  bring  the  number  of  spindles  up  to  711, 000  before 
January  1,  1896.  The  40  mills  in  the  city  of  Osaka  in  1894 
paid  an  average  dividend  of  16  per  cent.  The  highest  was 
28  and  the  lowest  was  8  per  cent.;  the  difference  was  due 
to  management.  The  yarn  mills  pay  the  best."’— William  E. 
Curtis,  Special  Correspondent  from  Japan  for  the  Chicago 
Record. 

It  thus  appears  how  the  silver  standard  is  “ruining” 
Japanese  industry,  the  dividends  being  from  8  up  to 
28  per  cent.,  while  under  the  gold  standard  in  the  United 
States,  the  manufacturers  realized  in  1892  about  4  per 
cent,  profit. 

Not  only  will  Japan  and  India  supply  all  their  own 
needs  in  the  near  future,  but  threaten  to  compete  with 
European  nations  and  the  United  States  in  the  markets 
of  the  world.  Already  Japanese  competition  has  alarmed 
our  manufacturers.  China  is  likely  to  become  her  own 
manufacturer  of  cotton  goods  at  an  early  date.  Eng¬ 
land’s  foreign  commerce  with  these  silver  countries  will 
be  destroyed,  and  with  her  commerce  will  go  her  mari¬ 
time  supremacy. 

At  the  same  time  the  development  of  these  countries 
will  create  a  home  demand  for  foodstuffs  and  raw  mate¬ 
rials,  that  will  oblige  England  to  pay  far  higher  prices 
for  them  than  she  now  does. 

England  cannot  procure  cheap  wheat  from  India  when 
it  commands  a  higher  price  at  home,  nor  can  she  get 
cheap  cotton  when  Japan  will  pay  better  prices  for  it; 
wool  will  also  cost  her  more  then  than  now,  because 
higher  prices  can  be  obtained  in  the  home  factories, 
where  the  market  exists,  into  which  England  cannot  get 
entrance.  Such  are  the  dangers  that  a  fall  in  the  value 
of  silver  involves  for  Great  Britain. 

Great  Britain  is  also  confronted  by  the  imminent  and 
fearful  danger  that  some  great  bimetallic  manufacturing 
nation,  like  the  United  States,  will,  by  restoring  bimetal¬ 
lism,  raise  the  value  both  of  silver,  and  of  all  the  imports 
that  England  is  compelled  to  buy,  thus  capturing  the 
markets  of  these  silver  producing,  silver  standard  coun¬ 
tries,  involving  both  maritime  and  financial  supremacy. 
Additional  to  these  losses  Great  Britain  would  also  lose 
half  the  debt  the  world  owes  her. 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


81 


America  is  for  bimetallism,  and  within  less  than  a  year 
after  she  adopted  it,  Great  Britain  would  be  compelled 
to  follow. 

“We  are  the  greatest  of  all  the  producers  of  silver.  About 
40  per  cent,  of  the  world’s  supply  of  silver  comes  from  our 
mines.  We  must  therefore  gain  a  special  advantage  from  the 
restoration  of  silver  to  its  ancient  place  as  the  coordinate  of 
gold.  All  Asia  and  nearly  if  not  quite  all  Latin  America  are 
silver  countries.  On  the  west  we  face  Asia,  as  on  the  east 
we  face  Europe,  and  Latin  America  is  within  our  hemisphere, 
with  trade  that  is  certain  to  be  mastered  by  us,  if  we  act 
wisely.  No  gold  monometallic  nation  can  maintain  commer¬ 
cial  relations  with  silver  monometallic  nations,  so  easily  as 
the  latter  can  trade  with  one  another.  If  all  hope  of  diverg¬ 
ence  from  the  gold  standard  shall  disappear,  the  possibility 
that  we  can  overthrow  British  supremacy  in  the  silver  using 
nations  will  also  disappear.  Englishmen  have  not  failed  to 
appreciate  this  fact,  and  it  may  perhaps  partly  account  for 
their  strong  eagerness  that  we  shall  abandon  silver.” — The 
New  York  Press,  in  1893. 

This  paper  has  a  keen  perception  of  the  reality  of  our 
position,  and  of  our  exceptional  opportunity  for  national 
aggrandizement. 

Geographically,  our  Nation  occupies  the  position  of 
destined  commercial,  financial  and  political  dictatorship ; 
and  the  hour  of  destiny  is  the  present  moment. 

Eventually,  the  development  of  these  silver-producing 
countries,  would  create  such  a  market  for  silver  money, 
while  reducing  the  use  of  European  gold,  by  destroying 
the  market  for  European  exports,  that  the  values  of  gold 
and  silver  would  balance.  Such  a  result,  remote  as  it 
might  prove,  would  only  inflict  greater  injury  on  the 
gold  countries,  and  confer  greater  advantage  and  benefit 
on  silver  standard  countries. 

CHAPTER  XVII. 

THE  POSITION  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES;  OUR  SILVER  COM¬ 
PETITORS. 

It  now  becomes  indispensable  to  review  the  industrial 
and  financial  position  of  the  United  States  at  the  present 
day,  before  proceeding  to  consider  the  means  of  alleviat¬ 
ing  the  distress  and  removing  the  danger  that  exists. 
Naturally  the  interests  of  the  United  States,  which  is 
both  a  gold  and  silver  producing  nation,  are  best  promoted 


82 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


by  the  unrestricted  use  of  both  metals  as  money.  The 
greater  the  volume  of  money  in  this  country,  the  higher 
will  be  the  price  of  our  products;  the  higher  prices  and 
wages  are,  the  easier  it  will  be  to  pay  our  debts. 

Unless  an  enlarged  demand  accompanies  an  increased 
production  of  commodities,  their  prices  will  fall.  The 
destruction  of  half  the  supply  of  money,  increasing  the  use 
of  the  remaining  half,  which  has  to  do  double  work,  ap¬ 
preciates  money  as  much  as  it  depresses  prices.  Legis¬ 
lation  should  enlarge  the  volume  of  money  so  as  to  re¬ 
sist  this  fall  in  prices  due  to  overproduction,  instead  of 
diminishing  the  volume  of  money  and  aggravating  the 
tendency  to  reduce  prices.  In  the  20  years  preceding 
1873,  though  production  steadily  increased  in  the  United 
States,  prices  rose  20  per  cent.,  but  during  the  period  1873 
to  1879,  though  production  increased  at  no  greater  ratio, 
prices  fell  30  per  cent.,  thus  we  lost  in  five  years  more 
than  we  gained  in  the  preceding  twenty.  This  has  not 
been  due  solely  to  diminished  cost  of  production,  for  the 
price  of  real  estate  fell  as  much  almost  as  products.  The 
fall  in  prices  due  to  a  shrinkage  in  the  volume  of  money, 
has  fallen  principally  upon  the  farmers,  more  upon  them 
than  upon  the  manufacturers*  who  could  buy  their  raw 
material  in  the  cheapest  market,  thus  shifting  the  loss 
upon  others,  which  the  farmers  could  not  do. 

The  clearest  demonstration  of  the  fact  that  the  demone¬ 
tization  of  silver  has  appreciated  gold,  that  is,  forced  it 
to  a  premium,  is  that  the  “50-cent”  Mexican  dollar  now 
buys  as  much  produce  as  the  100-cent  gold  dollar  did  in 
1873,  while  the  gold  dollar  now  buys  twice  as  much  as 
it  did  then,  thus  disclosing  the  fact  that  silver  buys  as 
much  of  everything,  gold  alone  excepted,  as  it  ever  did, 
while  gold  buys  twice  as  much  of  everything,  silver  in¬ 
cluded,  as  it  did  prior  to  the  legislation  of  1873.  Silver 
dollars  are  therefore  worth  50  cents  in  gold,  but  100  cents 
in  everything  else.  The  gold  dollar,  however,  is  worth 
200  cents  in  everything  else  but  itself,  in  other  words,  gold 
is  equal  in  value1  to  itself.  So  is  everything  else. 

The  demonetization  of  silver  has  produced  two  great 
results,  important  because  pernicious:  First,  it  has  ap¬ 
preciated  gold  which  reduced  by  one-half  the  selling  price 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


83 


of  all  products,  in  gold  standard  countries,  diminishing 
the  earning  capacity  of  producers  and  laborers,  diminish¬ 
ing  the  home  market  and  impoverishing  the  country. 
Second,  it  has  closed  the  ports  of  silver  countries,  in¬ 
dustrially  developing  those  countries  and  increasing  their 
exports  of  competitive  goods.  Gold  monometallism  has 
destroyed  those  silver  nations  as  our  consumers;  it  has 
created  them  our  competitors.  The  gold  standard  has 
decreased  profits;  it  has  increased  debts.  The  higher  the 
value  of  gold  has  risen,  the  lower  the  price  of  products 
has  fallen.  The  higher  gold  has  risen,  the  more  silver  it 
would  exchange  for,  with  which  the  same  amount  of  the 
products  of  silver  countries  could  be  procured  at  their 
silver  valuation  as  formerly. 

If  the  value  of  'the  imports  of  these  silver  countries 
would  fall  proportionately  to  the  fall  in  the  value  of  their 
exports  the  silver  countries  would  not  sustain  the  loss 
that  the  actual  results  of  gold  monometallism  has  inflicted. 
But  they  have  not  fallen  proportionately.  The  value  of 
Japanese,  Indian,  or  Mexican  silver,  in  gold  countries, 
has  fallen  50  per  cent.,  thus  requiring  the  exchange  of 
$100,000  of  their  money  for  only  $50,000  American  or 
British  money  which  will  buy  goods  that  have  fallen  only 
40  per  cent  in  value.  Instead  of  exchanging  for  $100,000 
worth  of  goods  as  formerly,  these  goods  now  cost  him 
$60,000,  so  that  he  is  forced  to  send  $20,000  more  of 
silver  money,  or  $10,000  more  of  gold  money  in  order  to 
get  these  goods.  But  the  $50,000  gold  will  exchange  for 
$100,000  of  silver  money  which  will  buy  $100,000  worth  of 
silver  products.  Thus  these  countries  lose  both  in  buy¬ 
ing  and  selling.  Rather  than  suffer  this  loss,  these  silver 
nations  have  begun  to  manufacture  for  themselves,  thus 
closing  their  ports  to  the  wares  of  gold  countries,  becom¬ 
ing  our  competitors. 

No  protective  tariff  has  ever  proven  so  invigorating 
to  the  industry  of  countries  on  a  silver  basis,  as  has  gold 
monometallism.  It  costs  about  8  cents  a  pound  to  raise 
Mexican  coffee,  which  is  sold  for  an  average  price  of 
18  cents  a  pound  in  New  York  and  Liverpool.  The  Mex¬ 
ican  producer  apparently  realizes  a  profit  of  10  cents  a 
pound,  but  in  reality  he  gets  much  more,  for  the  18  cents 


84 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


in  gold  when  he  gets  exchanges  for  36  cents  in  “cheap 
silver/’  which  allows  him  a  profit  of  28  cents  a  pound. 
Mexico,  to-day,  offers  more  inducements  to  labor  and 
capital  than  the  United  States. 

The  developments  of  these  silver  countries  which  began 
about  1873  and  has  progressed  steadily  ever  since,  has 
progressed  wonderfully  since  the  closing  of  the  East  In¬ 
dian  mints  on  June  26,  1893,  which  reduced  the  value  of 
silver  from  83  to  about  63  cents  an  ounce,  or  about  25 
per  cent.  This  caused  the  value  of  the  exports  of  silver 
.countries  to  fall  more  rapidly  than  the  imports  increased 
their  losses  in  foreign  trade,  thus  stimulating  domestic 
manufacturing. 

In  1873  the  number  of  cotton  spindles  in  Bombay, 
India,  was  450,000;  in  1886  they  had  increased  to  1,700,- 
000;  in  1894  to  4,000,000.  In  1874  India  exported  to 
Japan  and  China  3,000  bales  of  cotton  goods;  in  1886 
220,000  bales.  To  Europe  and  England  India  was  selling 
about  1,000,000  bales  annually,  and  is  to-day  not  only  sup¬ 
plying  her  own  needs,  but  competing  with  England. 
British  capital  is  investing  in  cotton  manufacturing  in 
India,  where  it  will  buy  twice  as  much  as  at  home,  and 
where  labor  is  cheaper. 

India  exported  less  than  1,000,000  bushels  of  wheat  in 
1873;  ln  *886  she  exported  40,000,000  bushels;  in  1891 
over  50,000,000  bushels.  This  increased  exportation  is 
not  due  to  the  Suez  Canal  diminishing  the  cost  of  trans¬ 
portation,  for  the  cost  of  transportation  from  the  United 
States  to  England  has  fallen  vastly  more,  yet  the  exporta¬ 
tion  of  American  wheat  has  fallen  from  150,000,000  bush¬ 
els,  in  1881,  to  only  55,000,000  bushels  in  1891.  This  re¬ 
duced  cost  of  transportation  of  American  wheat  from  1873 
to  1886  was  26  cents  a  bushel,  yet  the  price  fell  over  70 
cents  a  bushel,  showing  that  its  fall  is  not  due  entirely  to 
decreased  freights. 

Our  farmers  are  forced  to  meet  this  cheap  competition, 
which  is  grinding  them  into  poverty.  The  price  of  the 
surplus  fixes  the  price  of  the  whole  crop.  This  surplus 
we  are  forced  to  sell  to  Europe  and  will  continue  to  do  so 
under  the  gold  standard  for  years  to  come  at  ruinous 
prices.  Our  farmers  must  not  only  sell  at  the  prices 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


85 


asked  for  Indian  wh'eat  now,  but  we  must  sell  lower  than 
they  can  possibly  do.  Our  farmers  now  get  50  cents  a 
bushel;  they  may  expect  to  sell  it  for  25  cents  if  prices 
continue  to  fall  as  they  must  under  a  shrinkage  of  the  vol¬ 
ume  of  money.  They  cannot  buy  as  high-price  goods  or 
as  many  from  our  manufacturers,  as  if  they  got  upward 
of  a  dollar  for  their  wheat.  A  blow  at  our  farmers  is 
therefore  a  blow  at  our  manufacturers,  and  through  them 
at  our  labor,  which  must  accept  lower  wages.  There  is  a 
limit  to  endurance,  a  limit  to  submission:  Coxey  armies 
are  premonitory  of  trouble. 

The  result  of  the  demohetization  of  silver  is  not  only 
to  destroy  our  foreign  market,  but  to  also  threaten  our 
home  market  with  the  invasion  of  cheap  goods  from  the 
silver  countries. 

Protection  alone  will  not  suffice ;  taxation  will  not  retard 
the  industrial  development  of  the  silver  nations;  taxation 
will  not  raise  the  value  of  silver  if  it  is  not  remonetized; 
taxation  will  not  threaten  the  creditorship  of  Great  Britain. 
Because  Protection  will  not  arrest  the  downward  ten¬ 
dency  of  prices;  because  it  will  not  check  the  competition 
of  these  silver  nations  it  will  not  even  save  our  home  mar¬ 
ket  from  their  invasion.  So  long  as  the  value  of  silver 
continues  to  fall  more  rapidly  than  the  price  of  commodi¬ 
ties  falls  in  this  country,  it  will  not  prevent  the  importa¬ 
tion  of  Japanese  goods. 

If  the  present  low  price  of  products  is  due  to  overpro¬ 
duction,  which  the  gold  advocates  assert,  protection, 
which  increases  production,  augments  the  existing  sur- 
"  plus,  will  not  prove  a  remedy,  but  a  curse.  But  the  fall 
of  prices  is  due,  not  to  overproduction,  but  to  the  appre¬ 
ciation  of  gold.  Any  measure  that  fails  to  destroy  the 
premium  on  gold  by  remonetizing  silver  and  putting  it 
into  competition  with  gold  will  prove  at  best  only  a  pallia¬ 
tive.  The  disease  demands  a  cure. 

Protection,  unaccompanied  by  the  remonetization  of 
silver,  would  aggravate  the  evil,  for  the  reason  that  the 
result  of  protection  is  to  increase  industry,  which  increases 
the  demand  for  money,  which  would  increase  the  use  of 
gold  and  send  it  to  a  higher  premium  than  it  now  com¬ 
mands.  Thus  the  Protective  system,  under  the  gold 


86 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


standard,  involves  the  baneful  power  to  reduce  the  price 
of  property,  products  and  wages  by  other  means  than  in¬ 
creasing  the  supply. 

Let  not  the  Republican  Party  imagine  that  the  present 
troubles  is  due  to  a  lack  of  revenue;  that  may  effect  the 
Government,  but  it  has  no  relation  to  our  industrial  de¬ 
pression.  The  party  must  face  the  question;  it  must  give 
both  bimetallism  and  protection  in  order  to  restore  pros¬ 
perity,  else  it  will  be  hurled  from  power,  if  it  attains  it. 
More  money  is  needed;  more  money  must  be  had;  the 
bondholder  has  been  pampered  long  enough;  the  people 
now  require  legislation. 

CHAPTER  XVIII. 

CAN  WE  GO  IT  ALONE? 

Millions  of  citizens  of  this  great  Republic,  the  greatest 
Nation  on  earth,  fail  to  understand  why  our  Nation,  with 
a  population  of  70,000,000,  cannot  adopt  any  kind  of  a 
monetary  system  it  desires,  without  first  obtaining  the 
consent  of  European  powers,  just  as  readily  and  just 
as  successfully  as  our  Nation  did  when  it  had  a  popula¬ 
tion  of  only  3,000,000,  or  less  than  the  population  of  the 
single  state  of  New  York,  Pennsylvania  or  Illinois. 

Our  people  do  not  believe  that  there  is  any  greater 
reason  why  we  should  await  European  assistance  to  adopt 
our  own  financial  system  because  they  have  a  gold  stand¬ 
ard,  than  we  should  abandon  Republican  institutions 
because  they  have  not  yet  decided  to  relinquish  their 
monarchical  system. 

The  spirit  of  Americanism  is  rising;  those  who  believe 
that  we  should  do  as  we  please,  adopt  any  policy  or  sys¬ 
tem  we  choose,  independently,  regardless  of  what  other 
nations  may  or  may  not  do  are  becoming  daily  more 
numerous;  thousands  would  support  the  platform  of  in¬ 
dependent  action,  for  no  other  reason  than  their  convic¬ 
tion  that  we  are  not  free  unless  we  act  so,  and  that  we 
should  manifest  our  independence  by  taking  such  ac¬ 
tion. 

In  fact,  the  only  class  that  affects  to  disbelieve  our 
ability  to  establish  independent  bimetallism,  is  the  very 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


87 


class  that  most  dreads  its  success;  that  class  is  the 
creditor  class. 

“The  responsibility  of  re-establishing  silver  in  its  ancient 
and  honorable  place  as  money  in  Europe  and  America  de¬ 
volves  really  on  the  Congress  of  the  United  States.  If  we 
act  here  with  prudence,  wisdom  and  firmness  we  shall  not 
only  successfully  remonetize  silver  and  bring  it  into  general 
use  as  money  in  our  country,  but  the  influence  of  our  example 
will  be  potential  among  all  European  nations,  with  the  pos¬ 
sible  exception  of  England.  Indeed,  our  national  indebtedness 
to  Europe  is  so  great  that  if  we  have  the  right  to  pay  it  in 
silver  we  necessarily  coerce  those  nations  by  the  strongest 
of  all  forces— self-interest —to  aid  us  in  upholding  the  value 
of  silver  as  money.”— James  G.  Blaine,  in  the  United  States 
Senate,  in  1878. 

It  thus  is  evident  that  Blaine  had  confidence  in  the 
ability  ’of  the  United  States  to  remonetize  silver,  and  to 
coerce  other  nations  to  remonetize  it;  he  believed  that 
our  Nation  should  take  the  initiative,  and  let  other  nations 
follow. 

Do  we  possess  the  choice  as  debtors  under  the  Con¬ 
stitution  to  pay  in  what  kind  of  legal  money  we  prefer? 
The  Constitution  has  declared  that  both  gold  and  silver 
shall  be  money,  legal  tender  for  all  debts,  public  and 
private. 

The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  has  decided 
that  greenbacks  were  legal  tender  money.  By  the 
authority  of  the  fundamental  law  of  the  Republic,  sanc¬ 
tioned  by  the  highest  tribunal  in  the  land,  we,  as  citizens 
have  the  right  as  debtors  to  choose  the  kind  of  money 
we  shall  pay  to  our  creditors,  who  are  our  fellow-citizens, 
and  since  foreigners  have  no  rights  superior  to  our  own 
citizens  they  cannot  require  us  to  violate  our  Constitution 
by  depriving  us  as  debtors  of  that  right  of  choice.  No 
court  in  the  land  could  compel  a  citizen  of  this  country 
to  pay  his  debts  in  gold,  if  he  prefers  and  finds  it  more 
convenient  to  pay  it  in  silver  or  paper. 

The  United  States  owes  Europe  fully  $5,000,000,000, 
which  it  can  pay  in  either  gold  or  silver  or  paper,  in 
anything  that  is  legal  tender  money  in  this  country,  even 
when  by  the  terms  of  the  bonds  they  be  made  payable 
in  gold. 

Any  Congressional  law  that  violates  the  spirit  and 


88 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


the  letter  of  the  Constitution  by  limiting  the  legal  tender 
quality  of  money  is  null  and  void,  and  any  contract  that 
requires  that  a  debt  be  payable  in  any  specified  kind  of 
money,  even  if  the  debtor  under  the  stress  of  circum¬ 
stances  or  otherwise,  consents  to  it,  is  not  a  contract,  be¬ 
cause  not  for  a  legal  consideration;  it  is  null  and  void 
as  to  that  provision,  that  deprives  the  debtor  of  his  choice 
of  metals  at  the  time  of  payment. 

Europe  can  take  our  silver  or  paper  money,  in  pay¬ 
ment  for  the  bonds  they  hold,  else  take  nothing,  for  we 
have  the  right  to  tender  any  lawful  money  of  this  coun¬ 
try. 

And  if,  after  accepting  silver  in  payment  of  our  in¬ 
debtedness,  they  allow  it  to  go  to  a  discount,  they  do 
so  at  their  own  loss;  if,  after  taking  our  silver  dollars 
they  allow  them  to  fall  in  value  to  80,  50  or  20  cents 
each,  they  merely  do  so  at  their  own  expense*  we  can 
stand  it  if  they  can. 

If  they  repay  us  in  those  same  depreciated  silver  dol¬ 
lars  at  a  discount  we  merely  get  higher  prices  for  our 
products  than  we  expected,  thus  commensurately  aug¬ 
menting  our  profits  and  enriching  our  Nation. 

We  can  force  Europe  to  take  the  kind  of  money  we 
prefer  to  pay  our  bonds  in,  else  take  nothing.  After  the 
payment  of  our  foreign  debt  Europe  dares  not  let  such 
money,  whether  silver  or  paper,  go  to  a  discount  of  one 
single  cent. 

As  we  owe  most  of  our  foreign  debt  to  Great  Britain, 
we  possess  more  opportunity  and  power  to  coerce  her 
than  any  other  European  nation. 

If  in  trade  European  nations  refused  to  accept  any 
money  save  gold,  they  would  diminish  their  market,  for 
they  make  nothing  which  the  ingenuity  of  our  laborers 
cannot  duplicate  and  improve  upon  in  quality. 

Our  Nation  and  its  citizens  have  the  sovereign  right 
to  pay  in  the  money  they  wish,  and  possess  the  coercive 
power  to  which  Blaine  alluded.  But  the  doubt  largely 
prevails  that  while  silver  can  be  remonetized  by  inter¬ 
national  agreement  between  the  leading  nations  the 
United  States  alone,  cannot  against  all  the  other  great 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


89 


nations  succeed,  and  that  to  attempt  it  would  produce 
our  financial  ruin  and  destruction. 

The  ability  of  the  United  States  adverse  to  the  policy 
of  other  nations,  or  without  their  aid,  to  remonetize  sil¬ 
ver,  depends  upon  our  ability  to  fix  the  value  of  silver 
the  wide  world  over.  If  our  Congress  can  by  its  fiat  fix 
the  ratio  between  gold  and  silver  at  16  to  i,  thus  making 
the  silver  dollar  consist  of  371J  grains  of  pure  silver,  and 
the  gold  dollar  consist  of  23.2  grains  pure,  then  the  legal 
ratio  of  gold  and  silver  will  be  fixed  at  16  to  1  all  the 
world  over,  and  the  value  of  both  metals  determined  by 
the  value  required  at  the  American  mints. 

If  the  United  States  can  alone  fix  the  legal  ratio  at 
16  to  1  all  the  world  over,  then  it  can  control  the  com¬ 
mercial  ratio,  which  is  governed  by  it,  for  no  owner  of 
silver  bullion  will  give  more  than  16  ounces  of  silver 
for  one  of  gold  in  other  countries,  when  he  can  get  an 
ounce  of  gold  for  precisely  16  ounces  of  silver  in  the 
United  States.  For  the  market  price  to  differ  from  our 
mint  valuation  of  silver,  would  be  to  undervalue  silver 
and  force  it  to  come  to  us. 

If  after  our  Congress  has  admitted  gold  and  silver 
to  unlimited  free  coinage  at  the  ratio  of  16  to  1,  a  variance 
exists  then  between  the  legal  and  commercial  ratio  or 
between  the  American  and  Foreign  legal  ratios,  gold 
would,  being  slightly  undervalued  in  this  country,  go  to 
Europe,  as  it  did  when  there  was  a  difference  of  3  per 
cent,  between  the  American  and  French  ratios. 

Now,  if  after  the  free  coinage  of  silver  by  our  Govern¬ 
ment  the  present  difference  of  50  per  cent,  existed  between 
the  value  of  our  gold  and  silver  dollars,  we  would  lose  our 
gold,  but  gain  silver. 

While  this,  result  would  not  occur,  still  many  are  con¬ 
vinced  that  it  would,  and  that  unless  the  remonetization 
of  silver  can  be  secured  by  international  agreement  they 
are  opposed,  true  friends  of  silver  though  they  are,  to  the 
independent  free  coinage  Of  silver  by  the  United  States. 
These  thousands  think,  as  many  other  thousands  do,  that 
the  free  coinage  of  silver  by  us  now  when  silver  is  only 
worth  “50  cents”  would  drive  all  of  our  gold  out  of  the 
country  and  produce  a  panic,  and  such  direful  results 


90 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


they  earnestly  seek  to  avoid.  The  support  of  these  men 
can  never  be  won,  until  the  silver  in  a  silver  dollar  be 
worth  ioo  cents  in  the  open  market. 

This  cry  of  the  “50-cent  dollar,”  “cheap  money”  and 
“honest  money”  constitutes  the  sole  strength  almost  of  the 
so-called  “sound  money”  cause  in  the  United  States.  The 
people  are  being  misled  by  a  subsidized  press  and  by 
purchased  talent. 

The  first  object  of  the  bimetallists  should  be  to  dislodge 
the  gold  men  from  this  false  and  misleading  position;  they 
can  never  be  driven  from  that  strategic  point  until  they 
are  deprived  of  these  arguments  by  making  the  silver 
dollar  worth  100  cents  in  the  open  market,  making  its 
legal  and  commercial  value  the  same. 

How  can  this  be  accomplished?  By  making  the  dollar 
contain  more  silver  than  it  does  at  present?  Certainly 
not,  for  that  plan  is  too  absurd  and  unreliable  to  merit 
serious  consideration;  suppose  the  amount  of  silver  in  a 
dollar  be  doubled,  with  silver  worth  64  cents  in  the  mar¬ 
ket,  say  the  moment  it  was  coined  free  and  used  as  re¬ 
demption  money,  its  value  would  rise  to  something  above 
64  cents,  say  80  cents,  which  would  necessitate  the  re¬ 
coinage  of  all  silver  coins,  because  they  would  then  be 
worth  more  in  the  bullion  than  in  the  coin.  The  result 
would  be  that  until  silver  reached  its  real  value,  $1.29  an 
ounce,  if  this  plan  be  adopted,  its  value  would  be  con¬ 
stantly  rising  in  proportion  to  its  increased  use,  causing 
the  constant  recoinage  of  all  silver  coins. 

If  the  silver  advocates  can  first  make  the  silver  in  a 
dollar  worth  100  cents  in  the  open  market,  then  they  can 
readily  rout  the  gold  men  and  destroy  all  opposition  to 
its  remonetization.  America  could  then  go  it  alone  with¬ 
out  any  danger. 

But  the  silver  men  tell  us  that  the  present  low  price  of 
silver  is  the  direct  result  of  demonetization,  and  that  its 
free  coinage  would  make  the  silver  dollar  worth  100 
cents. 

That  is  perfectly  true  in  theory,  and  no  doubt  expe¬ 
rience  would  demonstrate  it  to  be  perfectly  true  in  fact,  but 
thousands  do  not  believe  it,  and  what’s  more,  cannot  be 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


91 


made  to  believe  it,  before  actual  experience  proves  it  to 
be  correct. 

The  remonetization  of  silver,  if  it  can  be  successfully 
accomplished  by  the  United  States  independently,  would 
be  productive  of  great  advantage  and  prosperity,  but  if 
unsuccessful,  it  is  difficult  to  estimate  just  how  much  dis¬ 
aster  the  attempt  might  entail. 

Millions  fear  that  it  would  be  a  dangerous  experiment, 
one  not  to  be  adopted  save  as  a  last  desperate  measure. 
To  coin  it  free  now  might  produce  a  panic,  for  it  is  not 
necessary  that  the  danger  men  apprehend  be  actual,  but 
that  the  fear  they  entertain  be  genuine,  and  controls  their 
actions;  the  mere  fear,  groundless  as  in  reality  it  might 
prove  to  be  may  cause  a  monetary  convulsion. 

An  act  that  incites  apprehension  must  above  all  things 
be  avoided,  for  we  cannot  afford  to  shake  public  confi¬ 
dence,  disturb  business,  lose  our  gold  or  frighten  away 
European  capital  seeking  investment  here,  for  we  need 
and  desire  all  the  money  we  can  get,  and  don’t  propose  to 
lose  a  cent  if  we  can  help  it. 

Is  there  not  some  policy  that  will  prove  transitional, 
that  is,  one  that  will  gradually,  swiftly,  yet  safely  reduce 
the  value  of  gold  and  advance  the  value  of  silver  so  that 
their  values  will  exactly  balance;  a  transitional  policy  that 
will  change  prices  of  property  from  a  low  to  a  high  level? 

Such  a  policy  must  be  found  before  silver  can  be  re¬ 
monetized  without  awakening  apprehension,  disturbing 
business  and  causing  a  financial  convulsion. 

Can  such  a  policy  be  found?  First  make  the  silver  dol¬ 
lar  worth  ioo  cents  before  silver  is  admitted  to  free,  un¬ 
limited  coinage. 

But  free  silver  advocates  declare  that  we  cannot  make 
the  silver  in  a  dollar  worth  ioo  cents,  before  first  ad¬ 
mitting  it  to  unlimited  free  coinage. 

The  ability  of  the  United  States  to  fix  the  ratio  of  silver 
and  gold  anywhere  and  everywhere  in  the  world  at  16  to  I ; 
that  is,  fix  the  value  of  silver  absolutely  at  $1.29  an  ounce, 
depends  entirely  upon  whether  our  country  is  capable  of 
actively  using  in  its  commerce  all  the  SURPLUS  SIL¬ 
VER  in  the  world,  but  not  all  the  silver  in  the  world. 

We  have  a  home  market  whose  value  is  $70,000,000,- 


92 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


ooo  a  year;  we  could  actively  use  every  dollar  of  the  $8,- 
000,000,000  gold  and  silver  in  the  world,  for  even  if  our 
present  demand  be  not  equal  to  so  great  a  volume  of 
money,  it  would  soon  become  so,  because  an  increased 
supply  of  money  always  increases  business  activity  and 
the  demand  for  money. 

But  all  of  the  $4,000,000,000  of  silver,  the  world’s  stock 
of  that  metal  would  not  come  to  us,  for  the  silver  countries 
could  not,  and  would  not  part  with  it  except  in  exchange 
for  products  of  this  country,  which*would  greatly  benefit 
us,  and  vastly  augment  our  wealth  and  prosperity;  if 
India,  China,  Mexico,  Japan  or  South  America  gave  us 
their  money  at  a  discount  in  exchange  for  our  products 
they  would  increase  our  profits  and  their  expenses;  cer¬ 
tainly  they  would  not  make  us  a  present  of  their  money. 
Of  the  $2,870,000,000  legal  tender  silver  money  outside 
the  United  States  $950,000,000  is  in  India;  $750,000,000  in 
China,  $115,000,000  in  the  Straights  Settlements  and 
$68,000,000  in  Japan,  making  $1,983,000,000.  These 
countries  have  a  population  of  800,000,000,  or  $2.50  per 
capita. 

European  Nations  need  and  use  every  dollar  of  silver 
they  possess  as  subsidiary  money,  amounting  to  $630,- 
000,000,  or  $1,000,000,000  of  full  legal  tender 
silver  money,  therefore  they  would  not  flood 
our  country  with  it,  they  could  not  do  so  except  at  a 
great  loss,  for  silver  in  this  country  would  be  worth  in 
coin  and  bullion  only  $1.29  an  ounce,  while  in  Europe  it 
is  coined  on  an  average,  at  a  value  per  ounce  of  from  $1.32 
up  to  $1.47. 

The  very  fact  that  has  for  years  prevented  the  melting 
of  our  silver  dollars  which  are  worth  in  the  coin  100  cents 
into  bullion  which  is  worth  only  about  60  cents,  prevents 
and  would  prevent  were  we  to  coin  silver  free  these  Euro¬ 
pean  silver  coins  from  being  melted  into  bullion  in  order 
to  recoin  them  into  American  coins  at  a  much  lower  value. 

In  addition  to  this  difference  in  their  face  value,  these 
European  silver  coins  have  lost  considerable  weight  by 
usage,  which  if  melted  into  bullion  for  recoinage  into  our 
money  would  pass  only  at  the  value  of  the  bullion  which 
would  be  $1.29  an  ounce,  losing  value  because  of  their 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


93 


light  weight.  Europe  will  not  make  us  a  gift  of  her  sil¬ 
ver;  she  owes  us  no  debt,  for  she  is  our  creditor;  she  can 
exchange  it  for  our  products  at  its  weight  in  pure  metal, 
entailing  a  loss,  or  increasing  our  profit  if  she,  allows  it  to 
go  to  a  discount  and  exchanges  it  for  our  exports. 

Thus,  if  the  United  States  undertook  to  coin  silver  free 
in  unlimited  quantities  independent  of  the  action  of  other 
nations,  no  silver  would,  or  could  come  to  this  country 
but  the  surplus  silver  of  the  world,  which  probably  now,  as 
it  probably  never  did,  does  not  exceed  60,000,000  ounces 
per  year  at  the  highest  figure,  and  probably  considerably 
less,  which  is  a  volume  so  small  that  we  can  readily  fix 
its  value,  and  by  fixing  the  value  of  the  surplus  silver,  we 
can  fix  the  value  of  all  the  silver  in  the  world. 

In  1894  the  world’s  product  of  silver  was  168,000,000 
ounces,  of  which  87,000,000  ounces  were  coined  in  the 
different  countries;  21,000,000  ounces  used  in  the  arts, 
leaving  a  surplus  of  only  60,000,000  ounces.  If  we  can 
use  this  surplus  silver  in  our  commerce,  we  can  make 
its  coin  and  bullion  value  precisely  the  same,  because  the 
market  value  of  money  is  controlled  by  its  coinage  value. 

If  the  United  States  can  make  the  coinage  and  market 
values  of  silver  the  same,  if  it  can  make  the  legal  ratio  of 
gold  and  silver  16  to  1,  then  it  can  maintain  the  parity  of 
gold  and  silver  at  that  ratio  all  over  the  world,  neither 
silver  nor  gold  would  be  overvalued  or  undervalued  in 
this  country,  neither  would  leave  us,  but  both  would  re¬ 
main  in  concurrent  circulation  in  this  country,  because 
they  would  be  equal  in  value.  Neither  gold  nor  silver 
would  leave  us  because  in  foreign  countries  they  would 
not  be  worth  one  cent  more  than  they  would  be  here. 
But  can  we  use  all  the  surplus  silver? 

Mexico  fails  because  she  is  not  industrially  and  com¬ 
mercially  strong  enough  to  use  all  of  this  surplus. 

France  and  the  Latin  Union  were  able  for  70  years 
after  they  changed  the  ratio,  to  maintain  the  value  of 
silver  and  gold  at  that  ratio  because  they  could  use  all 
of  it. 

The  United  States  is  to-day  industrially  and  commer¬ 
cially  far  more  powerful  than  those  countries  unitedly 
ever  were,  or  in  fact  are  now. 


04 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


America  can  do  anything,  but  she  would  not  be  un¬ 
supported  in  this  struggle  to  remonetize  silver,  for  she 
would  have  the  support  of  India,  Japan,  Mexico,  South 
America,  France,  the  Latin  Union  and  all  silver  countries, 
who  would  gladly  assist  in  maintaining  the  value  of  their 
own  money. 

The  coinage  of  the  American  product  of  the  silver 
mines  is  suggested  by  some  as  a  remedy,  but  the  coinage 
of  our  silver  would  be  insufficient;  the  coinage  and  market 
value  of  silver  that  has  been  produced  in  the  United 
States,  and  protected  from  competition  with  foreign  silver 
by  tariff  duties,  would  be  the  same,  for  there  would  be  no 
surplus  in  this  country,  what  the  arts  did  not  use,  our 
mints  would  coin  as  money;  but  outside  of  the  United 
States  there  would  be  no  monetary  demand  for  silver, 
that  is,  no  coinage  of  it,  so  that  what  the  arts  did  not 
consume  would  be  surplus,  for  the  mints  would  not  coin 
it;  in  the  United  States  the  legal  and  market  values,  the 
legal  and  market  .ratios  of  gold  and  silver  would  be  ex¬ 
actly  the  same,  but  outside  of  the  United  States  their  val¬ 
ues,  and  ratios  would  not  be  the  same.  The  surplus 
silver  on  the  foreign  market  for  which  there  would  be  no 
demand  would  depress  its  market  price  and  cause  it  to 
differ  from  its  coin  value.  It  is  only  by  opening  our  mints 
to  the  unlimited  free  coinage  of  all  the  silver  of  the  whole 
world  that  the  United  States  can  control  the  ratio  of  silver 
and  gold,  for  it  must  fix  the  value  of  the  surplus  silver 
which  would  fix  the  value  of  all  silver.  The  coinage  of 
the  American  silver  product  by  the  United  States  would 
be  impotent  to  thoroughly  remonetize  silver,  because  in¬ 
sufficient;  it  would  remonetize  silver  in  our  country,  but 
not  in  other  countries ;  it  would  make  its  coin  and  bullion 
value  the  same  in  the  United  States,  but  in  Europe  silver 
would  continue  to  be  worth  in  gold  only  half  its  value. 
The  pernicious  result  of  such  a  law  would  be  that  while 
it  would  expand  the  volume  of  money  in  this  country 
and  increase  our  industrial  activity,  it  would  not  open  up 
and  conquer  for  us  the  foreign  markets  from  Great 
Britain,  because  it  would  not  raise  the  value  of  silver  bul¬ 
lion  to  $1.29  an  ounce  in  Europe,  as  it  would  do  in  this 
country;  because  it  would  not  double  the  value  of  silver, 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


05 


it  would  fail  to  double  the  value  of  British  IMPORTS 
which  is  essential  to  crippling  British  commercial  com¬ 
petition,  and  destroying  the  foreign  markets  of  the  silver 
countries  for  British  goods;  it  would  not  gain  for  us 
the  silver  markets  of  the  world  by  our  refusal  to  remone¬ 
tize  their  money,  taking  it  at  its  face  value;  as  it  would 
not  capture  for  us  their  markets,  it  would  also  fail  to  gain 
for  us  the  carrying  trade  of  those  countries,  which  is  de¬ 
pendent  upon  whom  they  trade  with;  as  it  would  not 
double,  or  even  materially  advance  the  low  price  of  In¬ 
dian  wheat,  or  Argentine  wool,  it  would  not  lessen  the 
drastic  competition  our  farmers  are  now  compelled,  un¬ 
der  the  single  gold  standard,  to  meet;  as  it  would  continue 
the  present  gold  valuation  of  silver  money  it  would  not 
retard  the  industrial  development  of  India,  Japan  and 
other  silver  nations,  nor  diminish  their  competition  which 
our  manufacturers  are  already  beginning  to  experience; 
as  it  would  not  reduce  or  destroy  the  premium  on  British 
gold,  it  would  not  affect  the  creditorship  of  Great  Britain; 
as  the  coinage  of  the  American  product  would  not  ac¬ 
complish  the  above  results  essential  to  forcing  Europe 
to  remonetize  silver  it  would  prove  a  failure,  a  makeshift, 
a  delusion  and  a  snare  that  the  silver  champions  and  the 
advocates  of  bimetallism  should  never  consent  to,  nor  al¬ 
low  to  become  a  law. 

If  Congress  can  remonetize  silver,  great  blessings  would 
result  from  it,  but  if  it  failed,  as  is  possible,  though  not 
probable,  fearful  disaster  might  follow. 

Is  it  possible  to  determine  before  admitting  silver  to  un¬ 
limited  free  coinage  whether  the  United  States  can  use 
all  the  surplus  silver  of  the  world  and  gauge  our  ability 
thereby  to  fix  the  value  of  silver  at  $1.29  an  ounce  all 
over  the  world? 

If  this  fact  can  be  ascertained  before  we  attempt  the 
unlimited  free  coinage  of  silver  independently,  we  can 
tread  on  solid  ground,  possessing  the  certain  knowledge 
that  we  can  independently  remonetize  silver  before  we  at¬ 
tempt  it,  that  we  can  do  so  safely,  successfully,  swiftly, 
without  risking  our  commerce  or  our  confidence,  to  our 
own  advantage  and  aggrandizement,  then  let  us  proudly, 
triumphantly  remonetize  it. 


96 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


But  if  we  ascertain  by  this  same  certain  policy  that  we 
can  not  remonetize  silver  without  the  aid  of  other  na¬ 
tions,  we  can  avoid  the  danger  involved,  risk  not  a  single 
penny,  jeopardize  neither  our  confidence  nor  our  com¬ 
merce,  drive  no  money  out  of  the  country,  nor  frighten 
any  away,  but  calmly  wait  until  we  can  either  get  assist¬ 
ance  or  until  we  can  remonetize  silver  alone. 

Before  disclosing  how  we  can  ascertain'  whether  we 
can  independently  remonetize  silver,  it  is  better  first  to 
demonstrate  that  no  matter  which  party,  or  which  faction 
wins  at  the  polls  this  year,  whether  Republican,  Demo¬ 
crat  or  Populist,  whether  gold  or  silver  advocates,  their  . 
victory  is  almost  certain  to  be  partial  and  not  complete, 
so  that  neither  party  or  faction  can  get  what  it  demands, 
and  must  compromise  if  they  get  anything  at  all. 

CHAPTER  XIX. 

FRACTIONAL  LEGISLATION  IMPOSSIBLE.  NOTHING  CAN  BE 

DONE.  * 

The  two  old  parties,  the  Republican  and  Democratic, 
are  split  wide  open,  hopelessly  and  helplessly  divided  on 
the  financial  question;  their  silver  and  gold  wings  will 
not  unite  on  any  straddle;  unitedly  either  party  might 
win,  but  divided,  neither  faction  of  either  party  can  hope 
for  victory  except  in  a  three-cornered  fight. 

The  Populists,  or  whatever  the  Third  party  may  be 
called,  is  numerically  too  weak,  without  securing  the  sil¬ 
ver  wings  of  either  or  both  the  old  parties,  to  have  any 
chance  of  success  at  the  polls. 

What  is  to  be  done?  The  Eastern,  and  perhaps  sev¬ 
eral  of  the  Northern  States  can  not  be  carried  by  either 
of  the  old  parties  on  the  independent  free  coinage  of  sil¬ 
ver;  the  Western,  and  perhaps  most  of  the  Southern 
States,  can  not  be  carried  by  International  Agreement  or 
any  disgraceful  straddle  declaring  for  “gold,  silver  and 
paper  money,  one  as  good  as  the  other,  and  all  maintained 
on  a  parity  with  each  other,”  these  States  can  be  carried 
only  on  the  platform  that  would  lose  the  former  class  of 
States. 

The  silver  men  are  tired  of  the  East  promising  to  treat 
the  metals  equally  and  maintain  them  on  a  parity  be- 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


97 


fore  election  and  failing  to  do  so  after  the  victory  is  won, 
so  they  do  not  propose  to  accept  anything  but  a  flat-footed 
declaration  one  way  or  the  other. 

The  Democratic  party  has  the  two-thirds  rule;  unless 
the  silver  men  can  control  two-thirds  of  the  Convention 
they  can  neither  dictate  what  the  platform  shall  be,  nor 
nominate  the  candidates,  for  the  gold  wing  would  merely 
have  to  have  one  delegate  more  than  one-third  of  the 
number  of  delegates  to  the  Convention  in  order  to  pre¬ 
vent  the  adoption  of  a  silver  platform  and  the  nomination 
of  silver  candidates;  the  gold  men  also  are  at  the  same 
disadvantage,  for  unless  they  can  control  two-thirds  of 
the  delegates  to  the  Convention  that  meets  at  Chicago, 
they  can  do  nothing. 

If  the  Democratic  Delegates  to  the  Chicago  Convention 
have  the  manhood  and  the  backbone  of  the  Democratic 
Delegates  to  the  Charleston  Convention  of  i860,  the 
Democratic  party  will  split,  there  will  be  two  conventions, 
two  candidates,  or  the  silver  and  gold  wings  of  the  party 
will  unite  with  the  silver  and  gold  wings  of  the  other 
party. 

The  Republican  party  is  not  embarrassed  with  the  two- 
thirds  rule,  for  the  majority  rule  prevails  in  that  party, 
but  the  prospect  of  a  bitter,  unyielding  fight  in  the  St. 
Louis  Convention  is  just  as  certain  to  occur  as  it  will 
in  the  Chicago  Convention. 

Unless  the  silver  men  are  cravens  they  will  not  yield, 
but  will,  unless  a  silver  platform,  with  silver  candidates 
be  adopted  and  nominated,  march  out  of  that  Conven¬ 
tion  hall  and  unite  with  the  silver  men  in  the  Democratic 
and  Third  party,  adopt  a  platform  and  name  candidates 
whom  all  can  support. 

If  the  gold  men  of  either  party,  on  a  gold  platform 
or  on  an  “honest  money”  platform,  win  at  the  polls  next 
November,  or  in  Congress,  if  the  election  fall  into  the 
hands  of  Congress,  what  can  they  do?  Absolutely  noth¬ 
ing,  except  by  the  consent  of  the  silver  men,  for  their 
victory  can  but  be  partial,  it  cannot  possibly  be  complete  ; 
they  may  secure  the  House  and  the  Presidency,  but  the 
Senate  will  be  silver  beyond  a  shadow  of  a  doubt,  and 
no  legislation  can  be  enacted  without  the  silver  Senate 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


•••  V 

T  -  •  _ 

N  ■  *  1 


98 


first  passes  a  free  silver  coinage  law  that  meets  with  the 
President’s  approval  and  becomes  a  law. 

The  Eastern  manufacturer  may  as  well  recognize  now 
as  then  that  the  Wilson-Gorman  Tariff  Law  cannot  be 
repealed,  that  neither  the  McKinley  Law  or  any  other 
protective  tariff  law  can  take  its  place,  unless  a  free 
coinage  law  be  first  permitted  to  be  enacted. 

The  Eastern  manufacturer  of  shoes  or  pigiron  or  calico 
has  no  more  rights  as  an  American  citizen  under  the 
Constitution  and  the  Llag  than  the  Western  silver  miner 
and  farmer;  neither  is  he  entitled  to  any  more  solicitude, 
protection  and  encouragement  than  the  other;  and  when 
the  Eastern  manufacturer  who  is  so  exact  in  his  percep¬ 
tion  of  right  charges  that  the  silver  miners  have  a  class 
interest  in  the  remonetization  of  silver  by  increasing 
their  profits  at  the  expense  of  the  people,  they  should 
recall  that  they  too  have  been  subjected  to  the  same 
suspicion,  groundless  and  untrue  as  it  is  in  both  cases. 

The  silver  men  have  the  government  by  the  throat, 
and  they  intend  to  hold  it  so,  until  they  secure  the  legis¬ 
lation  they  demand,  which  will  not  be  obtained  unless 
the  unlikely  result  occurs  of  their  securing  complete 
power  by  having  both  the  House  and  the  Presidency. 
This,  while  it  is  not  impossible,  if  all  the  silver  men 
unite  in  one  party,  is  most  unlikely. 

If  the  silver  men  cannot  control  the  whole  Government 
what  do  they  propose  to  take?  They  should  not  arouse 
the  antagonism  of  all  the  people  by  preventing  any  legis¬ 
lation  from  being  enacted,  if  there  is  any  policy  by  which 
they  can  get  the  unlimited  free  coinage  of  silver  inde¬ 
pendently  of  the  action  of  other  nations,  yet  in  such  a 
way  as  to  absolutely  secure  sound  money. 

The  silver  men  are  not  willing  either  to  take  the  coin¬ 
age  of  the  American  product,  or  of  a  limited  amount, 
as  under  the  Bland-Allison  Law  or  the  Sherman  Law, 
because  either  is  insufficient;  they  must  accept  either  a 
compromise  which  in  all  cases  is  makeshift,  else  take 
nothing,  for  the  ‘'sound  money”  faction  will  likely  control 
either  the  House  or  the  Presidency  or  both,  and  in  any 
case  prevent  the  passage  of  a  free  coinage  law. 

Is  there  not  a  policy  which,  while  it  prevents  either 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


99 


faction  from  securing  what  it  demands  in  the  form  it 
demands,  gives  them  exactly  what  in  substance  they  re¬ 
quire;  a  policy  that  is  not  a  compromise,  for  each  faction 
gets  precisely  the  substance  which  each  demands,  but 
secures  it  in  a  form  that  all  factions  will  consent  to 
and  support,  a  policy  that  the  silver  Senate  could  enact, 
which  a  “sound  money”  House  would  pass  without 
amendment,  and  which  a  “sound  money”  President  would 
sign,  a  policy  which  would  ultimate  inevitably  in  the 
independent  unlimited  free  coinage  of  silver  in  a  few 
days,  weeks  or  months,  while  guaranteeing  that  the 
money  will  be  “sound”  and  the  silver  dollar  not  worth 
“50  cents?” 

What  is  that  policy,  which  no  one,  strange  to  say, 
simple  as  it  is,  has  thus  far  suggested  or  advocated?  It 
is  the  policy  that  furnishes  the  key  to  the  problem. 

CHAPTER  XX. 

THE  KEY  TO  THE  PROBLEM  OF  INDEPENDENT  AMERICAN 

BIMETALLISM. 

Let  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  enact  that  silver 
shall  be  admitted  to  unlimited  free  coinage,  Europe  agree¬ 
ing,  or  disagreeing,  precisely  the  very  moment  that  the 
silver  in  a  silver  dollar  is  worth  100  cents  in  the  markets 
of  this  country. 

This  law’  would  determine  before  a  dollar  was  coined 
whether  we  can  maintain  independent  bimetallism;  if 
we  could  not,  foreign  capital  seeking  investment  here 
would  not  be  frightened  away,  nor  would  our  gold  leave 
us  to  go  to  Europe,  for  the  simple  reason  that  no  “cheap 
silver  dollars”  could  be  coined  before  they  became  ex¬ 
actly  equal  to  the  value  of  the  gold  dollar  when  it  is 
worth  only  100  cents;  for  what  purpose  would  our  gold 
leave  us?  It  would  not  be  worth  a  single  cent  more 
elsewhere  than  it  would  be  worth  here. 

If  we  find  that  we  cannot  fix  the  value  of  silver  at  $1.29 
an  ounce  independently,  that  we  cannot  use  all  of  the  sur¬ 
plus  silver  in  our  commerce,  thin  let  that  promise  remain 
on  the  statute  book,  and  proceed,  by  other  legislation,  to 
so  increase  our  ability  to  u«e  all  of  it  by  National  devel¬ 
opment,  that  we  can  u«i  all  of  it,  then  coin  it. 


100 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


Business  would  remain  undisturbed,  for  in  the  mean¬ 
time  foreign  capital  would  come  here,  enterprise  would 
increase,  and  our  prosperity  would  be  greater  and  more 
generally  diffused.  Money  always  commands  a  higher 
rate  of  interest  and  secures  greater  returns  when  it  is 
plentiful,  when  business  is  brisk,  when  there  is  need  of  it, 
than  when  it  is  scarce  and  industry  languishing. 

It  being  assured  that  silver  would  not  be  coined  free 
until  worth  its  face  value,  European  capital  would  come 
here,  because  it  could  earn  more  than  elsewhere,  and 
earning  more  here  than  it  could  earn  elsewhere,  it  would 
stay  here. 

This  policy,  if  adopted  by  the  advocates  of  silver  and 
enacted  into  law,  would  dislodge  the  gold  men  from  their 
false  position  of  championing  “honest  money;”  this  policy 
would  absolutely  cut  the  dust  out  from  under  the  feet  of 
the  advocates  of  the  single  gold  standard,  masquerading 
as  “sound  money”  men. 

No  silver  dollars  would  be  coined  until  they  first  be¬ 
came  worth  ioo  cents;  would  any  gold  man  dare  oppose 
the  passage  of  such  a  law?  Would  he  dare  to  say  that  sil¬ 
ver  dollars  then  would  not  be  “honest  money,”  “sound 
money?”  the  law  would  require  that  such  silver  dollars  be 
worth  precisely  ioo  cents;  would  any  advocate  of  the  sin¬ 
gle  gold  standard  have  the  hardihood  to  contend  that  the 
silver  dollars  should  be  worth  MORE  THAN  ioo  CENTS 
before  it  can  be  recognized  as  “honest  money?” 

No  honest  man  can  object  to  the  passage  of  such  a  law 
on  the  ground  that  it  provides  for  “a  depreciated  currency,” 
that  it  will  flood  the  country  with  “50-cent  dollars;” 
he  would  have  to  either  support  it  or  declare  himself 
openly  an  enemy  of  the  people  by  advocating  money 
DISHONESTLY  HIGH. 

The  silver  men  cannot  logically  oppose  this  policy 
which  as  certainly  as  the  policy  they  advocate  would  re¬ 
monetize  silver  by  securing  the  consent  and  support  of 
the  other  faction,  because  they  have  repeatedly  claimed 
that  the  passage  of  the  Sherman  law  caused  silver  to  rise 
from  about  70  cents  an  ounce  to  $1.20;  was  still  rising  until 
it  was  ascertained  that  the  silver  money  coined  would  not 
be  treated  as  redemption  money,  after  which  it  began 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


101 


to  fall.  The  advocates  of  bimetallism  hold  that  the  re¬ 
monetization  of  silver  will  undoubtedly  restore  the  value 
of  that  metal  to  $1.29  an  ounce  just  as  soon  as  such  a  law 
is  passed;  that  its  value  has  invariably  risen  whenever  the 
prospect  of  its  complete  or  even  its  partial  remonetization 
appeared  bright;  if  this  would  be  the  result,  is  it  not  as 
logically  true  that  its  value  would  rise  to  its  coinage  value 
the  moment  a  law  is  actually  enacted  that  requires  its  un¬ 
limited  free  coinage  whenever  its  bullion  price  reaches 
$1.29  an  ounce? 

The  silver  men  contend  that  the  free  coinage  of  silver 
would  make  its  legal  and  market  values  the  same  for  371  £ 
grains,  or  100  cents’ worth;  that  the  United  States  alone  can 
fix  the  value  of  silver  at  that  figure  all  the  world  over; 
then  if  those  statements  be  correct,  as  they  are,  upon  what 
ground  can  they  object  to  enacting  a  law  that  requires  its 
unlimited  free  coinage,  the  very  moment  it  becomes 
“honest  money;”  that  is,  the  moment  its  market  and  legal 
values  become  the  same? 

Would  not  the  absolute  certainty  of  its  full  remonetiza¬ 
tion  which  the  silver  men  say  will  produce  such  results, 
accomplish  identically  the  same  result? 

This  policy  presents  several  advantages  over  the  one 
they  champion,  without  sacrificing  a  particle  of  the  prin¬ 
ciple  they  require  to  be  recognized;  in  the  first  place,  it 
shows  the  people  that  there  would  be  no  difference  be¬ 
tween  the  market  and  legal  values  of  silver  under  its  free 
coinage,  giving  the  silver  miners  no  more  profit  than  they 
now  get,  for  the  cost  of  labor  and  machinery  would  be 
doubled. 

In  the  second  place,  the  rise  in  the  value  of  silver  to 
$1.29  an  ounce  will  absolutely  destroy  the  campaign  cries 
of  “honest  money,”  “sound  money,”  “cheap  money,”  and 
“50-cent  dollars;”  which  constitute  the  strength  of  the  so- 
called  “sound  money  cause;”  in  the  third  place,  this  policy 
would  destroy  all  effective  opposition  to  the  full  remoneti¬ 
zation  of  silver  by  securing  the  support  of  many  Congress¬ 
men  who,  while  friends  of  silver  now  cannot  be  prevailed 
upon  to  vote  for  free  coinage  in  the  form  it  is  now  de~ 
manded;  by  securing  the  passage  of  such  a  law,  which  a 
President,  whoever  he  may  be,  will  not  dare  to  veto.  How 


102 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


can  the  President  explain  why  he  vetoed  a  law  that  pro¬ 
vided  for  the  unlimited  free  coinage  of  silver  the  moment 
it  became  “honest  money,”  the  moment  it  became  worth, 
in  the  bullion,  ioo  cents? 

“Sound  money”  men  may  argue,  that  if  such  a  law  was 
passed,  the  silver  miners  would  merely  “bull’  the  value  of 
silver  until  it  became  worth  ioo  cents,  so  that  they  could 
take  371 J  grains  to  the  mints  and  get  a  dollar  stamped 
upon  it,  for  the  reason  that  they  would  not  sell  in  the 
market,  to  Rothschilds  for  less  than  $1.29  an  ounce,  when 
the  United  States  Government  would  coin  it  at  that  value. 

These  “sound  money”  advocates  may  contend  that 
the  silver  miners  will  hold  their  silver  bullion,  shove 
the  price  up  till  it  becomes  “honest  money,”  in  order  to 
procure  its  free  coinage,  so  as  to  enjoy  a  dishonest 
profit 

It  is  perfectly  true  that  the  silver  miners  will  “bull” 
the  value  of  silver  until  it  reaches  that  value  required 
for  its  coinage,  but  after  securing  its  free  coinage,  after 
obtaining  this  alleged  dishonest  profit  by  finding  a  per¬ 
manent  market  for  their  bullion  at  the  rate  of  100  cents 
for  371J  grains,  would  they  take  any  less,  would  they 
let  the  value  of  silver  fall  a  single  cent,  thus  diminishing 
that  dishonest  profit? 

Most  of  the  silver  of  the  world  is  produced  in  the  three 
countries,  the  United  States,  Mexico  and  Peru,  so  that 
a  silver  trust  could  readily  “bull”  the  value  of  silver. 

There  would  be  another  factor  that  would  powerfully 
contribute  to  the  rise  in  the  value  of  silver,  if  this  law 
was  enacted,  the  speculators  beholding  an  opportunity 
to  buy  all  the  silver  they  could  obtain  in  order  to  enjoy 
the  rise  in  its  value,  would  go  into  the  market  to  pur¬ 
chase  all  the  silver  available,  which  the  more  they  sought 
to  get  it,  the  higher  its  value  would  climb. 

The  probabilities  are  that  if  that  law  requiring  the  free, 
unlimited  coinage  of  silver  the  moment  the  silver  in  a 
dollar  was  worth  100  cents,  the  actions  of  the  silver  min¬ 
ers  in  holding  it  until  its  value  reaches  that  figure,  and 
the  bidding  of  the  speculators  to  get  it,  that  they  might 
get  a  profit  before  it  did  reach  that  value,  would  in  the 
course  of  a  few  days,  weeks  or  perhaps  months  at  the 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


103 


very  outside,  make  it  worth  that  value  and  thus  obtain 
its  coinage. 

This  apparent  rise  in  the  value  of  silver  could  be  greatly- 
assisted  and  expedited  by  the  adoption  of  the  following 
fiscal  legislation.  As  has  been  shown,  silver  has  not 
fallen,  but  gold  has  risen,  therefore  any  measure  that 
will  destroy  the  premium  on  gold  would  actually  reduce 
its  value,  while  apparently  advancing  the  value  of  silver, 
thus  insuring  its  earlier  free  coinage. 

This  promise  of  Congress  to  coin  silver  free  as  soon 
as  it  is  worth  ioo  cents  must  be  accompanied  by  other 
legislation  that  will  maintain  the  parity  of  the  two  metals. 

Parity  means  equality,  and  no  parity  of  the  values  of 
the  two  metals,  gold  and  silver,  is  possible  unless  each 
metal  has  a  parity,  an  equality  of  right,  and  a  parity,  an 
equality  of  use.  Gold  and  silver  are  not  treated  equally 
when  the  mints  are  open  to  gold,  but  closed  to  silver; 
when  gold  is  used  to  redeem  all  the  bonds  and  certificates, 
and  silver  considered  too  worthless  to  perform  that  great 
function.  Both  gold  and  silver  must  be  used  as  redemp¬ 
tion  money,  and  both  must  be  admitted  to  free  coinage 
before  they  can  be  at  a  parity  or  maintained  at  it. 

Gold  men  claim  that  if  silver  is  coined  free  in  un¬ 
limited  quantities  that  it  would  be  impossible  for  our 
Government  to  maintain  the  metals  at  a  parity,  because 
it  would  not  possess  sufficient  gold  with  which  to  redeem 
the  silver.  True  enough,  if  that  idiotic  and  infamous  pol¬ 
icy  was  continued. 

Where  did  Congress  or  the  Administration  get  the 
power  or  authority  to  treat  silver  as  a  mere  promise  to 
pay?  The  Constitution  distinctly'  declares  that  both 
gold  and  silver  are  money,  good  for  all  purposes  and  for 
all  amounts,  not  a  mere  promise  to  pay  money,  but 
money. 

After  first  providing  in  this  law  to  coin  silver  as  soon 
as  the  metal  in  a  dollar  is  worth  ioo  cents,  Congress 
should  enact  that  the  law  of  1873  be  repealed  forth  will) 
and  the  bimetallic  law  of  1792  restored  to  force. 

Second — Congress  should  declare  that  both  metals  are 
legal  tender  for  all  debts  and  dues  and  must  be  treated 
without  discrimination. 


104 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


The  people  would  exercise  their  constitutional  right 
to  pay  in  the  cheaper  metal,  thereby  destroying  at  once 
the  premium  now  on  gold. 

This  decreased  demand  for  the  dearer,  and  this  conse¬ 
quent  demand  for  the  cheaper  money,  would  diminish 
the  value  of  gold  and  advance  the  value  of  silver  until 
their  values  exactly  balanced. 

Oh,  but  the  gold  men  tell  us,  to  coin  silver  free  and 
treat  it  as  redemption  money  would  cause  gold  to  go 
to  a  premium.  This  is  tantamount  to  contending  that 
the  competition  between  gold  and  silver  would  advance 
the  value  of  one  of  the  competitive  metals.  Gold  is  al¬ 
ready  at  a  premium  of  at  least  ioo  per  cent.;  it  could 
scarcely  command  a  higher  premium  than  that  under 
bimetallism. 

Third — Congress  should  enact  that  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury  be  required  to  redeem  all  the  bonds  and 
coin  certificates  of  the  United  States  Government,  in 
what  at  the  time  of  their  redemption  happened  to  be  the 
cheaper  money.  This  would  guarantee  the  equal  use 
of' the  two  metals,  for  when  equally  treated  and  equally 
used,  they  must  of  necessity  be  of  equal  value. 

This  law  would  be  mandatory,  the  Secretary  would  be 
compelled  to  redeem  the  bonds  and  certificates  in  the 
cheaper  money,  and  not  have,  as  he  is  now  given  by 
existing  laws,  the  option  as  to  which  he  considers  the 
more  convenient  metal,  and  conclude  that  the  more  con¬ 
venient  metal  is  the  one  the  Government  must  borrow 
and  pay  interest  on,  instead  of  the  one,  of  which  there 
are  $370,000,000  in  the  Treasury  vaults. 

Whenever  Wall  Street  and  the  agents  of  the  Roths¬ 
childs  attempt  to  rob  the  United  States  Treasury  of  its 
gold  by  presenting  immense  sums  of  certificates  for  re¬ 
demption,  the  Treasury  should  be  required  to  exercise 
the  old-fashioned,  common  sense,  stiff  backboned  method 
of  redeeming  them  in  silver. 

The  Nation  needs  to-day  an  Andrew  Jackson,  a  Young 
Hickory  to  curb,  control  and  crush  Wall  Street  as  “Old 
Hickory”  curbed  and  crushed  the  old  United  States  Bank. 
When  our  National  debt  is  paid,  our  National  Bank  cur¬ 
rency  will  disappear,  thus  contracting  the  volume  of 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM.  T05 

money.  In  their  stead  either  other  bank  notes  must  be 
issued,  involving  the  creation  of  a  new  debt  by  the  sale 
of  bonds,  to  which  the  people  are  always  averse,  or  by 
issuing  greenbacks  and  declaring  them  legal  tender  for  all 
debts  and  dues.  Retain  the  $346,000,000  of  greenbacks 
now  outstanding,  and  as  the  bank  notes  and  coin  cer¬ 
tificates  are  retired  and  canceled,  issue  greenbacks  in  their 
stead,  dollar  for  dollar.  Whenever  the  Government  re¬ 
quires  more  money  than  the  increase  in  metallic  money 
supplies,  let  it  issue  greenbacks.  Give  the  people  Govern¬ 
ment  money  whose  integrity  and  value  depends  upon  the 
stability  and  existence  of  the  Government,  then  the  rich 
would  have  peculiar  reasons  for  their  loyalty  in  addition 
to  the  patriotism  they  may  possess,  for  they  would  not 
seek  to  overthrow  a  Government  whose  destruction  would 
destroy  the  value  of  their  property. 

This  would  stop  the  “endless  chain”  system;  to  issue 
more  bonds,  and  increase  our  National  bank  circulation 
will  not  improve  matters,  but  increase  burdens. 

Fourth — The  $370,000,000  silver  and  the  $100,000,000 
gold  dollars  now  kept  in  the  Treasury  vaults  to  redeem 
paper  money  should,  after  the  retirement  of  outstanding 
certificates,  and  the  substitution  of  greenbacks  in  their 
stead,  be  put  into  active  circulation  to  quicken  trade  and 
*  invigorate  commerce. 

This  would  of  itself  increase  prosperity,  and  since  all 
money,  gold,  silver  and  greenbacks  would  then  be  money 
endowed  with  full  legal  tender  qualities  there  would  no 
longer  be  any  reason  to  keep  them  out  of  circulation. 
Why  should  half  a  billion  dollars  be  kept  on  the  shelf 
when  business  demands  it,  and  men  are  out  of  work  and 
starving  for  the  need  of  it? 

The  very  fact  that  half  the  money  in  a  country  is  kept 
locked  up  to  redeem  the  other  half,  discloses,  the  insanity 
of  such  a  system,  is  evidence  that  more  money  is  needed, 
else  substitutes  for  it  would  not  be  resorted  to. 

Fifth — Congress  should  empower  the  Treasury  De¬ 
partment  that  whenever  Europe  manipulates  the  rates  of 
exchange  to  get  our  gold  or  silver,  to  meet  such  changes 
by  counteracting  variations  in  the  rates  of  our  exchange. 

Sixth,  and  last — The  number  and  capacity  of  our 


106 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


mints  should  be  increased  so  as  to  enable  them,  when  the 
free  coinage  of  silver  is  resumed  to  coin  all  the  gold  and 
silver  of  the  world  produced  in  a  year  within  twelve 
months.  Thus,  at  no  time  would  there  be  any  surplus 
silver  or  gold  on  the  market  to  depress  its  price  below  the 
legal  value. 

Should  money  get  too  plentiful  in  this  country,  its  pur¬ 
chasing  power  would  fall,  and  the  selling  price  of  commo¬ 
dities  would  rise,  causing  our  money,  temporarily  at 
least,  to  leave  us  and  to  go  to  Europe,  where,  because 
being  scarce,  it  would  buy  more  than  it  could  buy  here. 

To  prevent  such  an  exodus  of  our  surplus  capital,  it 
should  be  the  policy  of  our  Government  to  so  increase 
the  need  and  use  of  money  in  this  country,  by  internal 
improvement  and  development,  and  by  the  extension  of 
our  foreign  trade  that  we  can  use  all  of  it  and  keep  its 
purchasing  power  up  to  the  proper  point. 

•  Free  trade  does  not  create  new  uses,  and  an  increased 
demand  for  money  in  this  country,  therefore  it  is  inimical 
to  the  full  remonetization  of  silver. 

CHAPTER  XXL 

FREE  TRADE  VS.  FREE  SILVER. 

Free  trade  is  our  royal  road  to  ruin;  it  forges  the  fetters  * 
of  an  endless  tyranny  for  us  because  it  increases  the  power 
of  the  nation  that  demonetized  silver  to  perpetuate  its 
demonetization. 

Four  trials  of  it  demonstrates  that  free  trade  destroys 
American  manufacures  and  depresses  our  agriculture; 
that  it  forces  us  to  buy  British  goods,  to  give  Great 
Britain  our  gold,  that  it  increases  British  prosperity  and 
diminishes  our  own. 

The  more  foreign  products  we  buy  the  less  home  prod¬ 
ucts  we  make;  the  less  products  we  make,  the  less  money 
we  can  use  at  home;  the  less  money  we  can  actively  em¬ 
ploy  here,  the  less  able  we  are  to  maintain  independent 
bimetallism.  Let  us  do  our  own  work,  then  we  can  make 
our  own  money. 

^Free  trade  repels  capital;  protection  attracts  it. 

Free  trade  impoverishes  the  United  States  and  en- 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


107 


riches  Great  Britain;  protection  enriches  the  United 
States  and  impoverishes  Great  Britain. 

Free  trade  increases  the  power  of  Great  Britain  to  main¬ 
tain  the  single  gold  standard;  protection  diminishes  her 
power  to  maintain  that  standard  and  increases  our  power 
to  destroy  it. 

The  shibboleth  free  trade  and  free  silver  is  supremely 
absurd,  to  secure  the  one  compels  us  to  lose  the  other. 
With  what  grace  can  the  Democratic  Party  advocate  free 
silver  and  free  trade,  it  would  involve  Democratic  leaders 
in  an  inextricable  tangle.  Advocating  free  trade  they 
have  for  years  been  telling  us  that  the  protective  tariffs 
has  put  prices  UP  50  PER  CENT.  HIGHER  than  they 
were  in  1873,  then  they  tell  us  that  during  that  same 
period  the  single  gold  standard  has  put  prices  DOWN  50 
PER  CENT.  It  is  free  trade  vs.  free  silver;  50  per  cent, 
up  vs.  50  per  cent.  down.  Which  are  the  voters  to  be¬ 
lieve?  Who  would  extricate  the  leaders  from  this  Demo¬ 
cratic  dilemma? 

It  is  not  sufficient  that  the  United  States  remonetize 
silver,  our  Nation  must  also  force  Europe  to  remonetize 
it. 

Great  Britain  can  not  be  coerced  into  adopting  bimetal¬ 
lism  by  increasing  the  volume  of  her  exports;  by  de¬ 
creasing  the  price  of  her  imports;  by  increasing  her  carry¬ 
ing  trade;  by  increasing  her  creditorship,  her  wealth,  and 
her  power. 

Great  Britain  must  be  crippled,  she  must  be  crushed 
before  she  can  be  coerced. 

The  demand  for  silver  money  in  America  can  not  be 
increased  by  the  destruction  of  our  manufactures.  The 
more  commodities  we  manufacture,  the  more  money  we 
can  and  must  use. 

Yet  free  trade  silverites  confidently  expect  to  force 
Great  Britain  to  abandon  gold  monometallism  by  aug¬ 
menting  her  power  to  maintain  it.  They  urge  our  adop¬ 
tion  of  free  trade  which  increases  the  wealth  and  creditor- 
ship  and  power  of  Great  Britain. 

Instead  of  destroying  our  manufactures,  we  must  en¬ 
courage  and  develop  them.  Instead  of  impoverishing 
our  country,  we  must  enrich  it. 


108 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


Any  satisfactory  and  permanent  solution  of  the  money 
problem  must  come  from  a  party  advocating  protection  to 
American  industries  in  all  its  branches,  protection  to  the 
American  people,  whether  that  party  be  the  Republican 
party  or  a  Nationalist  party. 

CHAPTER  XXII.- 

THE  ATTITUDE  OF  THE  REPUBLICAN  PARTY  ON  BIMETALLISM. 

The  Republican  Party  should  be  true  to  its  traditions,, 
it  must  if  it  expects  to  keep  close  to  the  hearts  of  the 
people  and  command  their  support,  follow  the  plume  of 
their  matchless  leader,  James  G.  Blaine,  who  declared  in 
the  United  States  Senate  Chamber  in  1878,  during  the 
Bland-Allison  Debate: 

“I  do  not  think  that  this  country,  holding  so  vast  a  pro¬ 
portion  of  the  world’s  supply  of  silver  in  its  mountains  and 
its  mines,  can  afford  to  reduce  that  metal  to  the  situation  of 
mere  merchandise.  If  silver  ceases  to  be  used  as  money  in 
Europe  and  America,  the  great  mines  of  the  Pacific  Slope 
will  be  closed  and  dead.  Mining  enterprises  of  the  gigantic 
scale  existing  in  this  country  cannot  be  carried  on  to  provide 
backs  for  looking  glasses  and  to  manufacture  cream  pitchers 
and  sugar  bowls.  A  vast  source  of  wealth  to  this  entire 
country  is  destroyed  the  moment  silver  is  permanently  dis¬ 
used  as  money.  It  is  for  us  to  check  that  tendency  and  bring 
the  continent  of  Europe  back  to  the  full  recognition  of  the 
value  of  the  metal  as  a  medium  of  exchange.” 

From  this  it  does  not  appear  that  Blaine  thought  that 
the  United  States  should  await  the  adoption  of  an  inter¬ 
national  agreement,  but  believed  that  we  should,  and  that 
we  could  force  Europe  to  remonetize  silver. 

‘‘What  is  the  attitude  of  the  Republican  party  toward  the 
question?  Beyond  dispute  the  party  is  committed  conclusively 
to  the  promotion  of  the  joint  use  of  both  the  precious  metals. 
It  is  committed  by -The  fact  (among  others)  that  the  Repub¬ 
lican  party  represents  protection  to  American  interests  against 
European  aggression.  The  Western  farmer  who  is  impover¬ 
ished  by  gold  monometallism,  the  silver  miner  whose  industry 
is  injured  by  it,  the  cotton  planter  who  has  his  debts  enlarged 
by  it,  these  men  are  our  fellow-citizens.  Their  prosperity 
brings  prosperity  to  the  Nation.  When  they  can  buy,  then 
the  great  manufacturing  industries  of  the  East  have  an  in¬ 
satiable  market.  When  they  suffer,  we  suffer.  When  their 
products  are  exported  at  half  their  value  or  less,  the  Nation 
as  a  Nation  is  the  victim  of  a  kind  of  brigandage.  The  same 
devotion  to  our  country’s  welfare  'which  compels  the  party  to 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


109 


resist  British  free  trade  urges  it  to  oppose  British  gold  mono¬ 
metallism.  Both  systems  have  a  common  origin.  Both  have 
a  common  purpose — to  pluck  and  to  plunder  other  nations 
for  British  advantage.  The  cause  of  the  Western  victims  of 
the  single  gold  standard  is  our  cause.  It  is  the  cause  of  the 
Eastern  manufacturer,  who  is  menaced  from  the  same  source 
with  British  free  trade.  It  is  the  cause  of  the  Eastern  mer¬ 
chant,  who  finds  trade  active  only  when  the  West  is  rich. 
The  Republican  party,  then,  must  stand  fast  by  bimetallism. 
It  must  be  faithful  to  its  declarations  and  its  principles.  It 
must  be  firmly  allied  to  the  West  in  the  conflict  now  begun.” 
—The  New  York  Press,  in  1893. 

CHAPTER  XXIII. 

PROTECTION  IS  ESSENTIAL  TO  THE  SOLUTION  OF  THE  MONEY 

PROBLEM. 

A  victorious  commercial,  financial  and  political  war¬ 
fare  waged  by  the  United  States  against  Great  Britain  i$ 
the  only  possible  solution  of  the  vexed  monetary  prob¬ 
lem. 

The  British  people  are  not  our  enemies,  they  are  in 
fact  with  us  in  this  struggle  which  is  every  day  becoming 
more  imminent  and  certain. 

It  is  the  Jewish  Government  of  Great  Britain  which 
seeks  by  its  financial  policy  to  enslave  the  world,  that  is 
the  foe  which  we  must  crush. 

The  reign  of  those  international  pawnbrokers,  the 
Rothschilds,  must  end,  if  the  world  is  to  be  free.  The 
United  States  now  possesses  both  the  power  and  the  op¬ 
portunity  to  dictate  the  financial  policy  of  Great  Britain, 
to  influence  it  to  adopt  bimetallism,  else  hurl  the  Com¬ 
mons  from  power,  sweep  the  House  of  Lords  out  of  ex¬ 
istence,  and  shake  the  very  throne  of  Britain  itself,  if  it 
attempts  to  prevent  it. 

This  is  not  visionary,  this  is  not  chimerical,  but  simple 
and  easy.  The  United  States,  by  striking  British  com¬ 
merce,  by  capturing  its  markets  with  silver  nations  which 
constitutes  three-fourths,  of  her  foreign  commerce,  can 
compel  the  British  subjects  to  strike  at  their  ballot  boxes 
and  force  their  Parliament  to  adopt  the  bimetallic  sys¬ 
tem  in  order  to  recover  their  foreign  trade  which  they 
would  be  fast  losing. 

The  United  States,  by  maintaining  the  bimetallic  stand- 


110 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


ard,  can  secure  the  foreign  trade  of  Mexico,  Central  and 
South  America,  India,  Japan  and  China,  in  fact  o'f  every 
silver  country  on  the  globe  which  could  buy  their  im- 
poits  from  us  at  the  face  value  of  their  money,  instead  of 
being  obliged  to  give,  as  they  now  do,  $2  of  their  money 
to  procure  a  dollars  worth  of  British  goods;  by  main¬ 
taining  the  bimetallic  standard,  our  country  can  also  cap¬ 
ture  the  carrying  trade  of  those  countries,  for  the  carry¬ 
ing  trade  always  follows  commerce;  by  thus  depriving 
Great  Britain  of  most  of  her  foreign  markets  upon  which 
she  depends  for  subsistence  the  United  States  can  close 
the  British  factories,  or  depress  British  wages,  in  either 
event  starve  and  force  the  British  laborers  into  coercing 
their  Parliament  adopting  the  same  monetary  standard 
that  we  would  possess  in  order  to  reopen  their  factories,  to 
recover  their  trade,  and  procure  bread. 

Their  shipping  would  be  prostrate  and  their  sea  power 
crippled,  the  need  of  a  navy  to  protect  her  diminishing 
commerce  would  be  lessened,  and  for  every  importation 
of  foodstuffs  and  raw  materials  the  British  would  be 
compelled  to  pay  double  the  price  they  now  give.  In 
addition  to  the  great  blows  struck  at  British  power  and 
prestige,  she  would  as  a  result  lose  half  of  the  $10,000,- 
000,000  owed  her,  By  the  destruction  of  the  premium 
on  her  gold. 

Thus  the  United  States  possesses  the  power  to  revolu¬ 
tionize  either  the  British  financial  system  or  the  British 
Government,  and  that,  too,  under  the  guise  of  commer¬ 
cial  and  financial  competition. 

This  is  the  hour  of  destiny;  the  hour  which,  while  it 
threatens  the  greatest  disaster  in  our  history  if  the  pres¬ 
ent  financial  system  be  adhered  to,  also  promises  the 
greatest  opportunity  for  national  development  and  ag¬ 
grandizement  ever  given  the  American  Republic,  by 
aoandoning  that  system  and  establishing  the  bimetallic 
standard. 

The  American  Republic  to-day  needs  a  man,  brilliant, 
able  and  aggressive,  a  man  fearless  and  true  to  the  des¬ 
tiny  of  the  Nation. 

It  needs  a  Napoleon  with  his  Berlin  and  Milan  decrees, 
not  enforced  against  British  commerce  and  shipping  by 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM 


111 


blockade  and  bayonet,  but  made  effectual  by  the  advan¬ 
tages  the  difference  in  American  and  British  monetary 
systems  would  give  us  in  our  relations  with  silver  coun¬ 
tries. 

It  needs  a  Blaine,  with  his  policy  of  Protection,  Reci¬ 
procity,  and  his  brilliant  foreign  diplomacy,  with  his 
vast  and  matchless  conception  of  a  gigantic  Pan-Amer¬ 
ican  Federation.  Protection  and  Reciprocity  is  what 
the  Nation  demands,  for  “Protection  is  defense,  Reci¬ 
procity  is  conquest.” 

Were  Blaine  living,  he  would  perceive  what  our  other 
statesmen  appear  unable  to  see,  that  the  demonetization 
of  silver,  silver  money  worth  in  gold  countries  only  half 
its  true  value,  gives  to  the  United  States  an  extraordi¬ 
nary  opportunity  to  secure  and  hold  the  trade  of  all  our 
sister  American  Republics  by  Reciprocity  treaties  based 
upon  the  recognition  by  our  Nation  of  their  silver  money 
at  its  face  value,  provided  it  is  of  the  same  weight  and 
fineness  and  denomination  as  our  own,  now,  before  this 
Nation  is  able  to  make  the  silver  in  our  dollar  worth  ioo 
cents  by  the  enactment  of  a  law  making  its  coinage  com¬ 
pulsory  as  soon  as  it  becomes  worth  that  much. 

In  return  for  accepting  the  silver  money  of  Mexico 
and  the  South  American  Republics  at  its  face  value, 
which  would  enable  them  to  buy  twice  as  much  with 
their  dollars  as  British  gold  monometallism  now  allows 
them  to  do,  these  countries  must  negotiate  Reciprocity 
treaties  with  our  Government  by  which  the  products  of 
this  country,  now  imported  by  them  from  Europe,  be 
admitted  under  such  heavily  discriminating  duties  as  to 
shut  out  European  importations,  and  give  their  trade 
to  us.  If  in  their  trade  with  this  country  our  Congress 
will  make  the  silver  money  of  those  countries  acceptable 
at  its  face  value  now,  it  will  give  those  countries  an  in¬ 
ducement  to  buy  of  us,  so  that  after  our  Nation  succeeds 
in  making  our  silver  dollars  worth  ioo  cents  their  trade 
would  be  held  by  the  discriminative  duties  in  our  favor. 
Their  money  made  legal  tender,  in  their  purchases  of  us 
they  would  receive  in  purchase  of  their  exports 

As  a  permanent  consideration  of  the  trade  advantages 
they  give  us,  the  products  they  sell  and  which  we  must 


112 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


buy,  we  shall  agree  to  buy  of  our  sister  Republics  duty 
free,  or  under  discriminating  duties,  provided  the  same 
be  imported  in  American  ships.  This  would  perma¬ 
nently  give  us  both  the  commerce  and  the  carrying  trade 
of  these  countries. 

Thus,  by  Reciprocity  treaties,  based  on  the  demoneti¬ 
zation  of  silver,  the  United  States  can  secure  the  entire 
import  trade  of  all  those  American  Republics  that  en¬ 
tered  into  such  treaties  with  our  Government;  the  prod¬ 
ucts  of  those  that  refused  to  give  us  those  advantages  over 
our  European  rivals  to  be  discriminated  against,  and 
their  money  accepted  at  only  its  bullion  value.  The 
United  States  now  has  the  chance  to  establish  a  perma¬ 
nent  American  trade  union,  a  chance  to  dictate  a  uniform 
monetary  standard,  a  common  system  of  measure  and 
weight  and  commercial  law  for  the  Western  Continent. 

Thus  the  United  States  now  has  the  opportunity  to 
blockade  against  British  and  European  goods  the  ports 
of  all  free  America  by  such  Reciprocity  treaties  ;  a  “paper 
blockade”  indeed,  but  for  that,  all  the  more  effectual  than 
if  enforced  by  bayonets,  for  it  involves  financial  advan¬ 
tage  to  those  countries  to  boycott  European  goods;  it 
would  invoke  the  resistless  force  of  the  Almighty  Dollar 
which  governs,  as  it  always  does  govern,  trade  relations. 
It  would  be  a  blockade  that,  while  it  would  not  cost  us 
a  cent,  it  would  help  us  as  much  as  it  would  hurt  Great 
Britain.  Let  our  Nation  negotiate  Reciprocity  treaties 
on  the  basis  described  and  capture  thereby  the  markets 
of  the  world. 

The  great  leaders  of  both  parties  are  beginning  to  per¬ 
ceive  that  territorial  extension  and  National  development 
and  aggrandizement  is  the  true  solution  of  the  money 
problem. 

Senator  Teller  of  Colorado  has  declared  that  we  must 
make  our  own  goods  instead  of  buying  them  from 
Europe. 

Senator  John  T.  Morgan  of  Alabama,  one  of  the  great¬ 
est  statesmen  of  Ihe  present  day,  if  not  the  greatest,  per¬ 
ceives  that  we  must  go  beyond  that  position,  that  we 
must  annex  all  strategic  islands  and  countries  contigu¬ 
ous  to  our  country  or  essential  to  a  control  of  the  seas 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


113 


that  we  can  acquire,  that  we  should  have  annexed  Hawaii, 
and  still  should  do  so,  that  we  should  annex  such  West 
India  islands  that  we  can  obtain,  that  we  should  con¬ 
struct  and  control  the  Nicaragua  Canal,  as  essential  not 
only  to  our  industrial  development,  but  also  to  our  mili¬ 
tary  and  naval  defense.  This  is  statesmanship. 

The  gallant  Foraker  of  Ohio,  whose  dash,  vigor  and 
brilliancy  remind  the  people  of  Blaine,  recently  announced 
at  a  banquet,  that  the  United  States  must  not  only  con¬ 
struct  the  Nicaragua  Canal  at  the  earliest  possible  mo¬ 
ment,  but  that  it  must  revive  the  American  merchant 
marine,  by  discriminating  tonnage  and  ^customs  duties 
in  favor  of  our  ships,  and  greatly  increase  the  size  and 
effectiveness  of  the  American  Navy  to  protect  our  com 
merce  and  our  ships.  Here  is  true  statesmanship  again; 
we  need  such  leaders  to  guide  us. 

New  England  is  now  entering  the  third  state  of  her 
industrial  life;  first  she  was  seafaring,  second  manufac¬ 
turing,  and  now  that  Western  and  Southern  competition 
is  proving  too  much  for  her  in  the  home  market,  she 
perceives  that  the  extension  of  our  foreign  trade,  and 
the  acquisition  of  foreign  markets,  is  not  only  essential 
to  the  Nation,  but  especially  so  to  her,  so  she  is  to  manu¬ 
facture  for  foreign  markets  and  to  become  again  sea 
faring. 

This  New  England  influence  partially  accounts  for 
Blaine's  Reciprocity  and  Pan  American  Federation  poli¬ 
cies  and  under  its  influence  as  his  worthy  successor, 
Thomas  B.  Reed,  is  an  ardent  advocate  of  Reciprocity, 
Pan  Americanism,-  the  protection  of  our  shipping  inter¬ 
ests  and  a  vigorous  foreign  policy. 

The  protective  development  of  our  inexhaustible  re¬ 
sources  is  essential  to  the  solution  of  the  money  problem. 
But  the  lop-sided  protection  that  has  thus  far  been  given 
the  American  people,  will  not  suffice,  for  all  classes  and  all 
enterprises  and  industries  must  be  equally  protected. 

Our  true  policy  is  to  buy  absolutely  nothing  of  foreign¬ 
ers  that  we  can  make  at  home.  Protective  duties  on  im¬ 
ported  articles  should  be  made  high  enough  to  insure  their 
manufacture  in  this  country,  and  when  that  is  secured, 
in  fact,  while  it  is  being  secured,  we  should,  by  rigid  immi- 


114 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


gration  laws,  also  secure  their  manufacture  here  only  by 
American  labor. 

This  is  McKinley’s  position,  and  to  it  must  be  attributed 
in  large  measure  hi's  seemingly  boundless  popularity, 
which  renders  his  nomination  for  the  Presidency  prob¬ 
able.  Such  leadership  is  what  the  American  people  de¬ 
mand. 

Protective  duties  prevent  competition  with  the  products 
of  pauper  labor;  now  let  us  go  still  further,  after  keeping 
out  the  goods  these  paupers  made  in  Europe,  let  us  keep 
those  paupers  out  of  this  country  to  compete  with  our 
laborers  on  our  own  soil. 

The  manufacturer  has  been  protected  against  foreign 
competition,  but  given  the  chance  to  get  cheap  labor  from 
Europe,  thus  while  giving  American  laborers  work,  giv¬ 
ing  it  to  them  at  lower  wages  than  they  deserve. 

Now  let  the  American  laborers  strike  at  the  ballot  box 
instead  of  striking  at  the  shops;  strike  where  they  would 
get  the  encouragement  and  support  of  all  the  friendly 
classes,  instead  of  striking  where  they  infringe  upon  other 
rights  and  trample  upon  other  interests,  arousing  their 
antagonism. 

Admit  no  immigrants,  but  desirable  candidates  for 
American  citizenship,  thus  keeping  our  home  market 
to  ourselves,  advancing  our  wages,  increasing  our  con¬ 
sumption  and  our  wealth  and  power. 

Whenever  it  happens,  temporarily  at  least,  that  certain 
of  our  domestic  articles  and  fabrics  are  inferior  in  quality 
to  their  competitive  imports,  let  those  imports  come,  so 
long  as  they  must  come,  from  bimetallic  countries,  or 
countries  friendly  to  silver  instead  of  from  countries  hav¬ 
ing  the  gold  standard. 

If  we  are  obliged  to  import  fine  dress  goods,  cloths, 
laces  and  silks,  let  them  come  from  bimetallic  France  in¬ 
stead  of  from  gold  standard  England. 

We  must  protect  our  farm  products,  too,  for  what  can 
be  raised  in  the  United  States  should  be  grown  here.  We 
now  import  annually  about  300,000,000  pounds  of  raw 
wool,  which  could  just  as  readily  be  grown  in  our  own 
country.  If  we  must  import  raw  wool,  then  let  us  import 
is  from  silver  Argentine,  rather  than  from  gold  Australia. 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


115 


We  import  ten-elevenths  of  all  the  sugar  we  consume, 
all  of  which  can  be  produced  by  our  own  farmers,  from 
cane  or  from  beets.  If  we  must  import  sugar,  then  let  us 
import  it  from  bimetallic  France,  rather  than  from  gold 
Germany. 

To  protect  our  farmers  is  to  diversify  their  products, 
thus  diminishing  or  disposing  of  our  surplus  crops  which 
now  we  must  sell  abroad,  thereby  reducing  our  depend¬ 
ence  on  foreign  markets. 

This  lop-sided  protection,  protection  on  the  land  and 
free  competition  on  the  sea,  must  end,  for  our  shipping 
is  essential  to  our  prosperity.  Our  shipping  must  be 
fostered,  our  merchant  marine  revived,  we  must  carry 
all  of  our  own  freight,  thereby  saving  fully  $300,000,000 
a  year,  which  mostly  goes  now  to  our  commercial  rival 
'and  financial  enemy,  Great  Britain,  for  carrying  our  im¬ 
ports  and  exports  and  our  passengers,  all  of  which  we 
could  just  as  well  carry  in  our  own  ships. 

Our  shipping,  therefore,  must  be  as  thoroughly  pro¬ 
tected  as  are  our  land  interests,  for  the  entire  Nation  is 
benefited  by  the  new  markets  for  our  labor^and  our  prod¬ 
ucts,  which  the  creation  of  our  merchant  marine  would 
give;  the  whole  Nation  would  be  benefited  by  the  gate¬ 
way  to  foreign  markets  for  our  products  that  our  ships 
would  open,  the  freight  they  would  save  us  and  the  trade 
they  would  capture. 

All  this  can  be  accomplished  simply  by  re-enacting  the 
law  of  1792,  that  provided  for  discriminating  duties  of  ten 
per  cent,  in  the  custom  duties  and  for  discriminating  ton¬ 
nage  duties  in  favor  of  all  imported  goods  from  silver  or 
bimetallic  countries,  provided  the  same  are  imported  in 
American  ships,  built  in  American  shipyards,  out  of  Amer¬ 
ican  material  by  American  labor. 

The  shipping  law  of  1792,  however,  made  no  provision 
as  to  such  imports  coming  from  silver  or  bimetallic  coun¬ 
tries.  This  favoritism  and  discrimination  would  take  our 
imports  from  Great  Britain  and  other  gold  countries^and 
give  them  to  silver  or  bimetallic  countries,  while  at  the 
same  time  giving  all  our  exporting  and  importing  carry¬ 
ing  trade  to  our  own  merchant  marine,  thus  reviving  our 
shipping  and  extending  our  foreign  commerce. 


116 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


If  some  gold  nations  retaliate  by  imposing  the  same 
discriminating  duties,  they  can  be  counteracted  by  sub¬ 
sidies. 

The  discriminative  tonnage  and  custom  duties  could  be 
arranged  thus:  Suppose  the  tariff  on  a  certain  line  of  im¬ 
ports  is  50  per  cent.,  these  goods  if  imported  from  gold 
standard  Great  Britain,  Germany  or  Austria,  would  be  ad¬ 
mitted  under  the  custom  duty  of  40  per  cent.,  provided  they 
were  imported  in  American  ships.  This  would  transfer  the 
carrying  trade  of  our  imports  from  foreign  to  American 
vessels.  When,  however,  these  same  competitive  goods 
come  from  bimetallic  France,  or  any  nation  adopting  our 
bimetallic  system,  or  from  a  country  on  the  silver  basis, 
they  should  be  admitted  under  a  duty  of  30  per  cent., 
provided,  however,  they  were  imported  in  American  ships. 
This  would  transfer  our  importations  from  gold  to  bime¬ 
tallic  or  silver  countries,  thus  industrially  forcing  the  for¬ 
mer  class  of  nations  into  adopting  bimetallism  if  they 
desired  to  continue  their  trade  relations  with  us.  A  differ¬ 
ence  of  even  a  small  per  cent.,  when  prices  approach  cost, 
would  be  sufficient  to  divert  commerce  from  countries 
discriminated  against  to  those  favored  by  such  a  law;  a 
discrimination  of  10  per  cent,  would  undoubtedly  divert  it. 
The  imports,  however,  even  from  such  favored  nations, 
when  imported  in  American  ships,  would  be  made  to 
bear  duties  sufficiently  high  tc  thoroughly  protect  our 
home  industries. 

This  distinction  should  be  observed  even  when  goods 
are  imported  from  the  colonies  of  gold  standard  countries. 
Congress  should  discriminate  against  the  products  and 
the  shipping  of  Canada,  and  against  the  Canadian  Pacific 
Railroad,  which  now  seriously  competes  with  and  injures 
our  transcontinental  railroads,  so  vigorously  and  strin¬ 
gently  as  to  render  her  industrial  and  commercial  condi¬ 
tion  so  deplorable,  and  her  political  situation  dependent 
thereon,  so  intolerable  that  to  find  relief,  progress  and 
prosperity,  she  will  be  forced  to  come  under  the  Stars  and 
Stripes.  The  prevailing  irritation,  distrust  and  enmity 
due  to  the  unnatural  separation  of  the  United  States  and 
Canada  should  end  by  their  union.  We  want  no  North¬ 
ern  menace  to  our  peace;  we  want  no  Northern  fetter 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


117 


upon  our  destiny.  The  annexation  of  all  of  British  North 
America  would  secure  our  Alaskan  possessions,  make  the 
Great  Lakes  domestic  waters,  complete  our  coast  line  and 
carry  our  territory  to  the  Northern  Pole.  This  would 
be,  as  it  should  be,  as  it  must  and  will  be. 

It  would  be  necessary  to  construct  a  great  navy  to 
protect  our  shipping  in  event  of  war,  and  as  a  preserver 
of  peace.  Our  coasts  and  harbors  should  be  thoroughly 
fortified  and  protected. 

If,  after  all  these  measures  of  National  development,  we 
are  still  found  to  be  too  weak  industrially  and  commer¬ 
cially  to  use  all  of  the  surplus  gold  and  silver  of  the  world; 
if  we  are  still  unable  to  make  the  silver  in  a  dollar  worth 
ioo  cents,  necessary  to  its  free  coinage,  then  let  us  still 
further  increase  the  earning  power  of  money  in  the  United 
States  by  gigantic  internal  improvements  that  our  fiat  can 
fix  its  value  and  the  ratio  of  gold  and  silver  at  16  to  i. 

Let  our  Congress  devise  a  scientific  method  of  irriga¬ 
tion  for  the  West;  let  it  deepen  our  waterways;  let  -it  con¬ 
struct  great  post  roads  and  canals;  let  it  connect  the  Mis¬ 
sissippi  and  the  Lakes;  let  it  connect,  by  a  canal,  Chicago 
with  Toledo;  let  it  deepen  the  Erie  canal  so  that  a  con¬ 
tinuous  inland  waterway  from  New  York  to  New  Orleans 
may  provide  a  highway  for  commerce  and  a  protected 
route  for  our  ships  in  time  of  war. 

Let  our  National  Government  construct  the  Nicaragua 
Canal  and  control  it,  so  that  not  only  will  it  be  of  mercan¬ 
tile  service  and  military  advantage  to  us,  but  that  the 
tolls  may  fill  the  coffers  of  our  National  Treasury. 

CHAPTER  XXIV. 

THE  AMERICAS  FOR  THE  AMERICANS;  THE  PAN-AMERICAN 

FEDERATION. 

The  desire  to  secure  bimetallism,  which  the  “sound 
money’’  advocates  profess,  is  confession  that  gold  mono¬ 
metallism  must  and  should  be  abandoned. 

Instead  of  this  great  Nation  pursuing  the  undignified, 
weak-kneed,  vacillating  policy  of  awaiting  the  dilatory 
adoption  of  international  bimetallism  by  the  signatory 
powers,  during  which  time  the  value  of  silver  will  bob 
up  and  down  in  exact  proportion  to  the  prospect  of  the 


118 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


Nations  agreeing  to  remonetize  it,  it  should  take  the 
proud,  brave,  determined  course,  to  remonetize  it  by  the 
strength  of  its  own  colossal  powers  at  all  hazards. 

If  it  be  deemed  that  our  policy  would  be  more  quickly 
followed  by  France  and  the  Latin  Union,  if  we  adopted 
their  ratio  of  15  J  to  1,  we  should  do  so,  by  increasing  the 
size  of  the  gold  coins.  This  would  secure  a  uniform 
ratio  all  over  the  world,  and  guarantee  the  concurrent 
circulation  of  both  gold  and  silver  in  the  United  States. 

Our  Nation  is  rapidly  outgrowing  its  now  narrow 
limits;  it  is  the  manifest  destiny  of  our  Republic  to  ex¬ 
pand  until  it  embraces  every  foot  of  territory  on  the 
Western  Continent  from  pole  to  pole. 

The  doctrine  promulgated  by  James  Monroe  is  being 
outgrown  by  our  Nation. 

The  Olney  Doctrine  is  more  suited  to  our  imperious 
spirit  and  purpose:  “THAT  THE  FIAT  OF  THE 
UNITED  STATES  ON  THE  WESTERN  CONTI¬ 
NENT,  IS  LAW.”  That’s  the  doctrine  to  nail  to  the 
mastheads  of  our  ships  and  defend  with  arms,  if  needs  be. 

True  both  the  Monroe  and  the  Olney  doctrines  nega¬ 
tive  and  contradict  our  own  Declaration  of  Independence 
that  a  country  has  the  inherent  right  to  choose  its  own 
form  of  government,  by  contending  that  no  European 
Nation  can  secure  additional  territory  on  the  Western 
Continent,  by  arms,  by  purchase,  nor  by  the  expressed 
wish  of  any  American  country  to  become  a  European 
colony.  This  doctrine  is,  however,  essential  to  our  free¬ 
dom  and  to  our  prosperity,  and  must  be  maintained. 

Again,  these  nations  can  never  be  fully  and  fitly  de¬ 
veloped  except  under  the  control  and  guidance  of  the 
United  States,  which  should  establish  a  protectorate  over 
them,  guaranteeing  the  integrity  of  their  territory  against 
all  comers. 

We  proudly  term  ours  a  “Government  of  the  people, 
for  the  people,  and  by  the  people,”  but  is  it  true?  does 
it  deserve  that  reputation?  If  the  question  of  the  recog¬ 
nition  of  Cuban  independence  was  submitted  to  a  popu¬ 
lar  vote  to-day,  ninety-nine  men  out  of  a  hundred  would 
vote  to  make  that  island  free  and  independent.  Can  it 
then  be  claimed  that  the  National  Democratic  Adminis- 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


119 


tration,  or  the  Republican  Congress  that  denies  or  delays 
that  recognition  reflects  public  sentiment,  that  it  is  a 
Government  of  the  people?  Gold  to-day  refuses  free¬ 
dom  to  Cuba;  gold  to-day  preserves  the  peace  of  Europe. 
No  European  nation  would  dream  of  declaring  war  be¬ 
fore  first  consulting  the  Rothschilds  to  negotiate  a  loan. 
The  Money  Power  recognizes  the  fact  that  if  Cuba  is 
recognized  as  independent,  or  even  as  a  belligerent  power, 
that  the  hot-headed  Spaniards  might  declare  war  against 
the  United  States,  the  result  of  which  if  she  did,  even 
if  it  did  not  force  our  Government  to  admit  silver  to 
unlimited  free  coinage  in  order  to  get  money  enough  to 
conduct  the  war  with,  that  our  gold  would  either  leave 
the  country,  else  commanding  such  a  high  premium 
that  it  would  sneak  out  of  sight  and  refuse  to  fight,  which 
would  force  us  to  a  silver  basis,  thereby  removing  all  ob¬ 
jection  to  the  free  coinage  of  silver.  There  is  not  enough 
gold  to  do  business  with  in  time  of  peace,  much  less  to 
fight  with  in  war.  War  would  destroy  Gold  Monometal¬ 
lism,  therefore  Cuba  remains  enslaved.  Make  her  free; 
place  her  star  in  the  firmament  of  our  flag;  annex  her, 
for  she  strategically  commands  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and 
the  Nicaragua  Canal  when  it  is  constructed,  and  is  es¬ 
sential  both  to  our  peace  and  safety. 

The  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  the  Carribean  Sea  is  the 
Mediterranean  of  the  Western  Continent,  and  is  the 
destined  theatre  of  the  most  intense  commercial,  indus¬ 
trial,  social  and  political  activity  in  the  Western  Hemi¬ 
sphere;  its  waves  will  be  whitened  with  commerce,  its 
ships  ladened  with  the  products  of  industry  and  skill, 
its  shores  crowded  with  great  ports  and  cities,  and  its 
seas  dominated  by  the  genius,  energy  and  principles  of 
our  Nation. 

The  present  moment  is  the  destined  one  to  realize  the 
dreams,  hopes  and  ambitions  of  Blaine,  to  establish  a 
vast  Pan-American  Federation. 

The  United  States  can,  by  taking  the  initiative,  and  let¬ 
ting  other  nations  follow,  capture  the  trade  of  the  silver 
countries  of  the  Old  World  and  the  New,  for  the  reason 
that  they  will  not  give  $2  of  their  money  to  get  a  $1  worth 
of  British  or  European  goods,  when  they  can  procure 


120 


THE  KEY  TO  INDEPENDENT 


the  same  quantity  and  quality,  if  not  better  goods  from 
us  for  half  the  money,  accepting  their  money  at  its  face 
value. 

When  we  buy  of  these  nations,  instead  of  our  money 
buying  200  cents’  worth  of  their  products,  our  dollars  will 
buy  only  100  cents’  worth,  as  is  honest  and  just. 

As  those  silver  nations  are  not  sea-faring,  we  would 
carry  their  commerce  in  our  ships. 

The  United  States  can  now  establish  a  great  Pan  Amer¬ 
ican  Federation  by  declaring  that  the  silver  and  gold 
money  of  these  American  Republics  shall  be  treated  as 
legal  tender  money  in  our  country,  provided  they  are  of 
the  same  weight  and  fineness  as  our  coins  are  required  to 
possess;  this  would  give  us  a  chance  to  dictate  an  Amer¬ 
ican  bimetallic  standard  for  the  Western  World. 

The  United  States,  constituting  the  most  powerful  com¬ 
mercial  and  industrial  factor  of  this  Federation,  could 
readily  induce  these  American  nations  to  adopt  our  bi¬ 
metallic  system. 

The  advantages  to  be  derived  from  improved  facilities 
of  commerce  would  also  induce  them  to  agree  with  us 
to  adopt  some  metric  system  of  measures  and  weights, 
the  French. 

Self  interest  would  also  influence  these  nations  to  learn 
our  language  and  adopt  uniform  commercial  laws. 

The  trade  of  the  world  would  be  ours,  France,  Ger¬ 
many,  and  the  Latin  Union  would  immediately  follow 
our  example  and  adopt  bimetallism,  for  not  to  do  so, 
would  be  to  lose  their  foreign  trade. 

Silver  would  be  remonetized.  The  United  States 
would  be  the  industrial  and  commercial  center  of  the 
world,  and  since  money  could  then  earn  more  in  America 
than  in  Europe,  the  surplus  capital  of  the  Old  World 
wgjuld  seek  investment  here,  and  once  here,  we  could 
compel  it  to  stay  here  by  making  it  earn  more  here  than 
it  could  earn  anywhere  else.  Our  Nation  would  also  be¬ 
come  the  financial  center  of  the  world. 

Great  Britain  would  be  compelled  to  adopt  bimetallism, 
or  be  crushed;  in  either  event,  she  would  lose  half  the 
debt  due  her,  for  the  premium  on  her  gold  would  be  de- 


AMERICAN  BIMETALLISM. 


121 


stroyed,  her  gold  monopoly  would  be  dead,  and  the  world 
would  be  free. 

As  gold  would  fall  in  value,  the  values  of  silver  and 
property  and  the  wages  of  labor  would  rise;  Great 
Britain  would  be  'compelled  to  pay  double  price  for  all 
her  foodstuffs  and  raw  materials,  her  silver  markets,  three- 
fourths  of  her  foreign  market,  would  be  captured  by 
America;  her  industry  would  be  dead,  her  carrying  trade 
destroyed,  her  creditorship  would  cease,  her  commercial, 
maritime  and  financial  domination  would  be  ended. 

Great  Britain  stands  on  the  threshold  of  her  destruc¬ 
tion,  caught  in  the  gold1  trap  she  sprung  for  other  nations. 

It  merely  depends  upon  us  to  choose  whether  we  wish 
to  destroy  her  creditorship,  and  substitute  for  her  gold 
monometallism  our  American  bimetallic  standard;  it  de¬ 
pends  upon  us  whether  we  wish  to  capture  the  markets 
of  the  world,  to  acquire  the  domination  and  supremacy 
of  the  seas;  it  all  depends  upon  us  whether  we  wish  to 
create  a  Pan  American  Federation  and  become  the  com¬ 
mercial,  industrial,  financial  and  political  center  of  the 
world. 

WE  have  the  opportunity,  we  possess  the  power,  by 
bold,  energetic,  brilliant  diplomacy  and  leadership  to  in¬ 
dependently  remonetize  silver. 

Without  waiting  for  the  help  of  other  nations,  without 
cringing,  crawling,  or  begging,  without  dishonor,  but 
with  increased  prestige  and  power,  wealth  and  prosperity, 
without  lowering  or  tarnishing  the  Stars  and  Stripes,  our 
Nation,  the  United  States  of  America,  should  imperiously, 
proudly  lead  the  nations  of  the  Old  World  and  the  New, 
establish  a  Federation  of  American  Republics,  and  grasp 
the  destined  sceptre  of  the  World’s  sovereignty  to  wield 
it  for  the  enlightenment,  the  progress,  the  improvement 
and  the  welfare  of  the  down-trodden  and  oppressed  peo¬ 
ples  of  all  nations  and  all  climes. 

FINIS, 


